answering Bowman’s questions about identity, being the same F

In the comments to my last round, Mr. Robert M. Bowman, Jr. replied to my request for his reply to this argument:

1. The Father and the Son are the same God.
2. For any x and y, and for any kind F, if x and y are the same F, then x is an F, y is an F, and x = y. (x and y are numerically one)
3. The Father = the Son. (1, 2)

He says,

Dale, thanks for continuing the discussion and for your questions. I do think the problem lies with premise (2) of your argument. Logically, it seems there are two ways that I as a Trinitarian can challenge your argument: I can dispute the truth of (2) or I can dispute the applicability of relevance of (2) to (1).

• I don’t understand what this last move would be – which premise would that cast doubt on or deny?
• One kind of reply is to say the argument is invalid, but that seems off the table, as 3 follows from 1 and 2 together.
• A trinitarian might well deny 1, for instance, if he thinks that Father and Son aren’t gods at all, but that each is a proper part of the one god, as Bill Craig has speculated, or as mere members of a group which is the one god. That’s an option for you, in theory.
• About 2, you could reply that 2 is false (making the argument unsound), or you could argue that no one has good reason to believe 2 (making the argument not cogent – not known to be sound by anyone). The first, I think, takes you into relative identity theory, like these guys. That’s out there, in my view, although a few very smart, conservative Christian philosophers have opted for that move.  Most Christian philosophers reject it because they think there’s not such thing as basic, unanalyzable relative identity. That is, they accept 2 above as being the correct analysis of claims like “Jack and John are the same man.” In contrast, most think that (absolute, non-relative) identity is a rock-bottom level concept that we all have and use. (See the first identity link below, discussing work by Hawthorne on that.) They don’t grant that we have any reason to think some x and y might by the same F, but different Gs (where G is some other property).

So I guess, logically, I see only these moves, at least one of which you must make:

• deny 1
• deny 2
• argue that 1 is unknown
• argue that 2 is unknown

Mr. Bowman continues,

I hesitate at this point because I would like to be sure I understand your argument correctly, just as you are trying to understand my position. Before I can decide what to think about (2) I will need to understand some of its terms, especially “kind,” but also “=” (is equal to).

About =, there’s this post, or this one. But briefly, “a = b” means that a and b are numerically one thing/being, that a just is b and b just a. The relation = is symmetrical, transitive, and reflexive. It is a relation that a thing can bear only to itself. Only philosophers and logicians discuss this concept, yet we all have, and confidently employ it. It would seem to apply to God as much as to anything. e.g. We know that this is a valid argument:

1. Yahweh = God.
2. God is the unique creator of the cosmos.
3. Therefore, Yahweh is the unique creator of the cosmos.

If YHWH just is God (and vice-versa – = is symmetrical), then the “two” of them (really, one of them) can’t differ in any way. So, whatever’s true of one, will have to be true of the other – ’cause the one just is the other.

About “kind,” I really just mean any feature. e.g. being human, being red, being square, being old, being smart. An essence/nature would count as one of those, but the argument doesn’t presuppose any theory of natures, or even of properties, arguably.

• e.g. Suppose we say that Putin and Pooty-poot are the same dictator. This means that Putin is a dictator, Pooty-poot is a dictator, and that Putin just is Pooty-poot – that is, that they are numerically one.
• Or replace “dictator” with “man,” “Russian,” “aggressor,” or “dreamy, shirtless hunk.” 🙂

Again, Mr. Bowman:

The meaning of these expressions or terms may seem obvious due to their familiarity with ordinary physical objects or mathematical abstractions, but their applicability to God might be complicated. Perhaps God is unique in such a way that (2) is not relevant or applicable to God, or in such a way that (2) must be modified to apply to God. For that matter, analytic arguments based on (1) may have to be inspected more closely, since what a Trinitarian means by “the same God” might not be understood correctly.

At the end here, I think you’re considering the option of denying 1.

I don’t think that anything about our concept of a property, or of a thing intrinsically being a certain way, depends on, or is limited to physical things, or to finite things, or to things we experience by our senses.

• e.g. “God is omnipotent.” There, we ascribe omnipotence to God. But we don’t ever see that to be so.
• Again, we can understand and know that “God = God” – that God just is himself.

Mr Bowman:

My suspicion is that the objection may be overcome by understanding that God is by nature absolutely unique and transcendent. The relevance of these facts about God is that they may call into question the applicability or relevance of the category “kind” (as a category of analytic logic) to God. But again, it might help to know more about what you mean by “kind” and how you view the use of this term in this context.

I’ll be honest – I see no help down that avenue. An unique and transcendent being will still be certain ways, will have certain intrinsic properties, if you like. And such will still be a being, and so we can ask whether that is the same being as some other. For instance, we’ll all agree that it is intelligible but false that God just is Vladimir Putin. Those differ, so must be non-identical, must be two. e.g. Only the latter is much concerned to uphold a reputation as a “manly man.” Only the former is divine.

I hope that helps – I look forward to your replies!