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Heresy & Orthodoxy

SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – Round 4 Part 1

In this post I venture to offer some debate advice: be very hesitant to accuse your opponent of a logical fallacy.

  • First, your lack of sympathy for his position can easily cause you to be see ones which are not really there.
  • Second, it is often unclear whether or not the dude is actually making an error in reasoning – begging the question is particularly tricky to diagnose, for instance, and some of the “flags” I’ve thrown in judging previous rounds are debatable.
  • Third, there is a temptation to quickly allege a fallacy rather than dealing with the truth or falsity of your opponent’s premises. (This can verge on making an ad hominem fallacy yourself.)
  • Fourth, you may be tempted to make up a new sort of error in reasoning new for the occasion, and accuse your opponent of it.

In round 4, Burke makes the 3rd error, Bowman the 4th.

Burke argues,

Even Acts 5, where the apostle Peter accuses Ananias of “lying to the Holy Spirit” (verse 3) and his wife of trying to “test the Spirit of the Lord” (verse 9) is not an open and shut case. The usual argument made from this passage is that Peter accuses Ananias of “lying to the Holy Spirit” and Sapphira of trying to “tempt the Holy Spirit”; but since an impersonal power cannot be lied to or tempted, the Holy Spirit must therefore be a person and therefore it follows that the Holy Spirit is God. The logic here is not terribly good, and the argument ends with a non sequitur.

Neither this nor what follows it make clear what Bowman’s errors in reasoning are supposed to be. What exactly is the argument he’s criticizing? Is it this?Read More »SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – Round 4 Part 1

SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – Burke 3

In round 3, Burke comes out swinging and swinging. But how much does he connect? In my judgment, somewhat. Here’s an overview of his case, with some critical comments, and at the end I score the round.

First, Burke argues that Jesus’ messianic roles as atoning sin-offering, priest, redeemer, and Davidic king, do not require him to be divine, and further, that the first and last of these require that he is not God. I take it Burke’s point is that they require Jesus to be a human, and that no human is divine. Flag: In this context, the point is question-begging. Bowman no doubt affirms Chalcedon, according to which Jesus has both a divine and a human nature.

Next, Burke has a nice discussion of the Jewish habit, well attested in the NT and in other ancient writings, of talking about what God has predestined as already existing in heaven. This affects what one considers the natural reading of passages like John 17:5 (NIV) “And now, Father, glorify me in your presence with the glory I had with you before the world began.” Burke nicely sketches the line of thought behind this habit – what is predestined is as good as done, so what is future is moved back, as it were, to the past or present – to a time which is “too late” to avoid. He gives a vivid example from Paul of talking about a future event as present: “And God raised us up with Christ and seated us with him in the heavenly realms in Christ Jesus…” (Eph 2:6, NIV)

What is the significance of this? Read More »SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – Burke 3

SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – Bowman 3

In my comments on his first salvo, I wondered exactly what Trinity doctrine Bowman means to defend. (Some kind of modalism?) After round two, I said that Bowman has owned up to affirming a contradiction – trying to pass it off as a “mystery”, i.e. a merely apparent contradiction. In round 3, Bowman ignores these fundamental conceptual difficulties for his position, and soldiers on with… Read More »SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – Bowman 3

SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – Bowman 2

In round 2, Bowman descends to close combat on a few central texts. But first, he makes the methodological point that it is too easy to claim simply that your preferred texts are clear, whereas the ones central to your opponent’s case are obscure or ambiguous. I think that’s right, and that it is also correct that “academia… encourages revisionism”. He says, In the end,… Read More »SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – Bowman 2

SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – Burke 2

There’s a lot of meat in Burke’s second round, and both his and Bowman’s second rounds were cleaner, more free of stray punches than round 1. Here I offer some summaries and brief comments on Burke.

  • In a lot of the piece, Burke lays out his positive views about Jesus. This should give a lot of people pause; it is often assumed, contrary to the long but largely forgotten history of this minority report, that unitarians are mere “deniers”, or that they can be lumped together with the amorphous “skeptics” who appear in apologetics writings, or that they are theological “liberals”, or that they are Unitarian Universalists. Not so – arguably, Burke affirms all the really obvious doctrines of the New Testament – messiah, mediator, resurrection, atonement, etc. – roughly, all the items in the “Apostles'” Creed. Burke defends what used to be called a “humanitarian” christology – that Jesus was a human, and did not exist before his miraculous conception in Mary. It would be misleading to describe his position as being that Jesus was “just a man”. In Burke’s view, he’s far from being just a “great teacher” among many, with peers like the Buddha  and Muhammad, or even being merely a prophet.
  • It is striking to what degree Burke simply ignores some influential (but now largely forgotten) patristic ideas, to wit: the Jesus’ ministry obviously manifested the divine nature (through, e.g. his miracles), that Jesus must be divine so as to be able to divinize humanity, that Jesus and not the Father was the one who interacted with the Jews in OT times, that the title “Son of God” implies having the divine nature, that what is “divine” must be absolutely unchanging and simple. I say this more by way of observation than criticism. With the exception of the first, I expect that Bowman will largely ignore them as well.
  • Flag: Burke says that the risen, glorified Jesus isRead More »SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – Burke 2

SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – Bowman 1

I take it the purpose of the debate is whether or not “the” doctrine of the Trinity is derivable from the Bible. What is this doctrine, exactly? The burden falls on Bowman to be clear about just what doctrine is in view; he’s making the positive case. Here’s what he says: 1. There is one (true, living) God, identified as the Creator. 2. This one… Read More »SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – Bowman 1

Scoring the Burke – Bowman Debate – Intro

Over at Parchment and Pen, there’s a six week, six-installment debate starting over “the” doctrine of the Trinity. That is, what I’ve elsewhere called the orthodox formulas – that each Person “is” God, that there’s only one god, and that the three Persons differ. Here at trinities, we’ll offer summaries and philosophical commentary on each round. Feel free to weigh in with your views on… Read More »Scoring the Burke – Bowman Debate – Intro

Christology and Heresy 5 – Monophysitism Proper (JT)

I'm a hybrid. I'm made of lines, but I also shine (as indicated by more lines).

In the last post, I explained that Nestorians believe that a complete individual human nature is indiscernible from an individual human person.

Monophysites also take this idea very seriously. In fact, the Monophysite takes very seriously the more general claim that a complete individual nature of any kind is indiscernible from the corresponding individual that belongs to that kind (for instance, a complete individual cow-nature just is the individual cow in question). So if there are two natures in Christ, then there will be two individuals that correspond to each of those natures.

But the Monophysite does not want to say that there are two persons in Christ, so he will insist that there is just one nature in Christ. That way, there will just be one person. But since Christ is both human and divine, this one nature must be a special hybrid of divinity and humanity.

The strongest form of Monophysitism would claim that this hybrid Christness-nature has all divine properties, and all human properties. This, however, is incoherent, for it would amount to two persons as well. After all, having all the divine properties is sufficient for membership in God’s-kind, and having all human properties is sufficient for membership in human-kind. There would, then, still be two natures, which contradicts the initial claim that there is just one (allegedly) hybrid nature.Read More »Christology and Heresy 5 – Monophysitism Proper (JT)

Christology and Heresy 4 – Nestorianism Proper (JT)

Don't let my flowing white locks fool you. I have sound ideas.

In the last post, I explained that an individual human nature is indiscernible from an individual human person.

The Nestorianism takes this point very seriously. As she sees it, if the Word (= the second person of the Trinity) assumes a complete individual human nature, then the Word assumes a discrete human person too, for a complete individual human nature is completely indiscernible from a discrete human person. But the Word is already a discrete person, namely a divine person, so the question is this: is the divine person identical to the assumed human person?

Read More »Christology and Heresy 4 – Nestorianism Proper (JT)

Christology and Heresy 3 – The basic philosophical issue (JT)

In the last post, I classified Monophysitism, Chalcedonianism, and Nestorianism. All three of these must grapple with a basic philosophical issue, namely this: a complete indvidual human nature brings along with it everything required for being a discrete human person. Note that ‘individual human nature’ does not mean the humanity in the human in question (readers of scholastic philosophy are often tempted to think that).… Read More »Christology and Heresy 3 – The basic philosophical issue (JT)

Christology and Heresy 2 – Monophysites, Chalcedonians, and Nestorians (JT)

We're here to defend the faith against heresy!

The Council of Chalcedon (451 CE) condemned Monophysitism and Nestorianism. The following table helps to classify Monophysitism, Nestorianism, and Chalcedonianism.

Nestorianism: 2 natures, 2 persons
Chalcedonianism: 2 natures, 1 person
Monophysitism: 1 nature, 1 person

Read More »Christology and Heresy 2 – Monophysites, Chalcedonians, and Nestorians (JT)

Christology and Heresy 1 – What is Nestorianism and Monophysitism? (JT)

If the circle and triangle overlap, that's bad. If they don't overlap, that's bad too.

These days, when analytic philosophers of theology talk about the Incarnation, they often say things like ‘if such-and-such, then such-and-such, but that would be Nestorianism’. The implication, of course, is that landing oneself in Nestorianism would be a very bad thing.

But why? Perhaps a lay person might want to avoid Nestorianism because they were told it was a ‘heresy’. But a hard-core Christian philosopher, I think, would want to be more explicit about saying just what Nestorianism is, and provide some reason for why they want to avoid it (rather than just asserting that some position is Nestorian).

Read More »Christology and Heresy 1 – What is Nestorianism and Monophysitism? (JT)

confused kid

Mysterians at work in Dallas

confused kid
Clearly, the instructor’s work has been accomplished.

What I call positive mysterianism about the Trinity is the view that the doctrine, as best we can formulate it, is apparently contradictory.  Now many Christian philosophers resort to this in the end, but only after one or more elaborate attempts to spell the doctrine out in a coherent way. On the other hand, some jump more quickly for the claim, not really expanding on or interpreting the standard creedal formulas much at all. These are primarily who I have in mind when I use the label “positive mysterian”.

I ran across a striking version of this recently, in a blog post by theologian C. Michael Patton, who blogs at Parchment and Pen: a theology blog. In his interesting post, he says that all the typical analogies for the Trinity (shamrock, egg, water-ice-vapor, etc.) are useful only for showing what the Trinity doctrine is not.

This contrasts interestingly with what I call negative mysterians. Typically, and this holds for many of the Fathers, as well as for people like Brower and Rea nowadays, they hold that all these analogies are useful, at least when you pile together enough of them, for showing what the doctrine is. Individually, they are highly misleading, and only barely appropriate, but they seem to think that multiplying analogies like these results in our  achieving a minimal grasp of what is being claimed. Maybe they think the seeming inconsistency of the analogies sort of cancels out the misleading implications of each one considered alone.

In any case, in Patten’s view, the best you can do is to Read More »Mysterians at work in Dallas

Mystery Machine

More on Mysteries

Thanks to Ed Feser for some interesting dialogue on the topic of mysteries in Christian theology. This post is just a bunch of miscellaneous responses to his thoughts posted last week, here and here. As he mentioned, Ed and I knew each other briefly as students at what is now called Claremont Graduate University. I remember having a conversation in his car once, maybe around… Read More »More on Mysteries

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 22 – part 1

Has Richard, after these 21 chapters so far of Book III of his On the Trinity (De Trinitate) only succeeded in proving that there are at least three gods? In chapter 22, Richard argues for a negative answer.

First, he refers back to the doctrine of divine simplicity, which is common coin for medieval theists, even, surprisingly, for trinitarians. This needs explaining nowadays – theists now tend to think of God’s nature as something he has, and of God as having, and not being, his attributes. Moreover, we tend to think that God has many attributes.

For a primer on divine simplicity, I can do no better than Bill Vallicella:

[According to this doctrine] God is radically unlike creatures in that he is devoid of any complexity or composition, whether physical or metaphysical. Besides lacking spatial and temporal parts, God is free of matter/form composition, potency/act composition, and existence/essence composition. There is also no real distinction between God as subject of his attributes and his attributes. God is thus in a sense requiring clarification identical to each of his attributes, which implies that each attribute is identical to every other one. God is omniscient, then, not in virtue of instantiating or exemplifying omniscience — which would imply a real distinction between God and the property of omniscience — but by being omniscience. And the same holds for each of the divine omni-attributes: God is what he has. As identical to each of his attributes, God is identical to his nature. And since his nature or essence is identical to his existence, God is identical to his existence. (William Vallicella, “Divine Simplicity”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Richard starts ch. 22 by gesturing back at book I of De Trinitate – his point is that this divine being/essence/nature common to the three is utterly simple. Yet he realizes that this by itself won’t soothe the concern about monotheism. How can we rule out that there are three gods, each of which has is an utterly simple, composition free being? Then he hits on an additional argument.Read More »Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 22 – part 1

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 21 (Dale)

In the preceding chapters, Richard has been arguing for the impossibility of only one divine person. If there’s one, there must be more than one; more than that, there must be at least three.

To do this, he’s used Anselmian perfect being theology – arguing that since God is absolutely perfect, and it would add to his perfection to have certain features, he must indeed have those. It seems that he prefers a three parallel arguments, from perfect goodness, perfect happiness, and perfect glory. (See, e.g. chapter 5.)

As the book goes on, though, it seems to me that he prefers the argument from happiness. Here, in chapter 21, he sums up his case, because he feels some pressure here at the end of the book  to explain why all this should be considered monotheism, and not polytheism. More on that next time. Here’s what looks like his summary of his argument:

The fullness of supreme happiness requires fullness of supreme pleasure. The fullness of supreme pleasure requires fullness of supreme charity. The fullness of supreme charity demands fullness of supreme perfection. (p. 393)

This last part isn’t easy to see, but as we’ve been over it, I let it go here. In chapter 21, Richard assumes that perfect being reasoning should be applied to each member of the Trinity. If we do this,  then we prove the existence of equally perfect beings, such that “all coincide in supreme equality. In all of them there will be equal wisdom, equal power, undifferentiated glory, uniform goodness, and eternal happiness…” (pp. 393-4, emphasis added)

This, he asserts, meets the requirement of the “Athanasian” creed,Read More »Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 21 (Dale)

“Trinity” @ the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Little known fact: overwork causes one’s neck to become invisible! After an embarrassing amount of time, I’ve finally finished my encyclopedia entry on the Trinity for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (as well as lengthy supplementary documents on the history of Trinity doctrines, Judaic and Islamic objections, and unitarianism). Since I can’t thank them in the entry, I’d like to thank editors Ed Zalta and… Read More »“Trinity” @ the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Richard of St. Victor 3 – Perfect charity must be directed at another person (JT)

“Steven, let’s look over there and pretend like we don’t see that floating head.”
“Steven, let’s look over there and pretend like we don’t see that floating head.”

STAGE 2. In this stage, Richard tries to show that perfect charity must be directed at another person. Here’s the quotation:

‘no one is properly said to have charity on the basis of his own private love of himself. And so it is necessary for love to be directed toward another for it to be charity’.

Read More »Richard of St. Victor 3 – Perfect charity must be directed at another person (JT)

Arius and Athanasius, part 11 – General questions about divine production (JT)

In this series of posts, I’ve been discussing the view of Arius that the Son is created from nothing, and the view of Athanasius that the Father begets the Son. All of this illustrates two basic issues that any classical account of the Trinity has to face when it tries to explain how one divine person produces another. First, we need to think carefully before… Read More »Arius and Athanasius, part 11 – General questions about divine production (JT)

Arius and Athanasius, part 10 – The Father and Son can’t share all their properties (JT)

Son, I know you want it, but you just can't have my triangle.
Son, I know you want it, but you just can't have my triangle.

Last time, I explained that Athanasius has not made it clear how the Son ‘inherits’ divine properties from the Father. Yet even if Athanasius could explain how the Son ‘inherits’ properties from the Father, there’s still another problem. Like Arius, Athanasius believes that the Father is simple, and so anything ‘in’ the Father is, strictly speaking, identical to the Father. If the Son is going to inherit any properties from the Father, then surely he’d have to inherit them all. As Athanasius himself realizes, it’s not a question of the Son inheriting part of the Father. It’s a question of all or none.

However, there are certain properties the Son cannot inherit from the Father, on pain of contradiction. For instance, the Son cannot inherit the Father’s unbegotteness. The Son is begotten, but the Father is not, so the can’t inherit the Father’s unbegotteness without entailing a contradiction.

Read More »Arius and Athanasius, part 10 – The Father and Son can’t share all their properties (JT)