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Theories

New Papers

I’ve just updated my homepage with a paper forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy, called “Hasker’s Quests for a Viable Social Theory.” My sincere thanks to editor Thomas Flint, and to that journal’s anonymous readers for their help. The paper critically examines the various discussions of William Hasker, a very accomplished Christian philosopher, and former editor of F&P, from whom I have learned much. I think… Read More »New Papers

You’re another!

You’re another” – that’s what tu quoque means – it’s the name of an informal fallacy, often called a fallacy of relevance. For example, if I argue that your theory is self-contradictory, suppose you retort that my theory is too. Well, so…? It’s irrelevant to the point that the first theory mentioned is self-contradictory (so, self-refuting).

Cornell grad student Chad McIntosh argues that if the social trinitarian God – or rather: the three divine persons  posited by clear “social” Trinity theories – would be deceivers, then so would the perfect self in whom I believe, being a unitarian Christian. So granting that an ST is implausible, for similar reasons unitarian Christian theology is implausible (because it has a perfect being doing what appears a wrongful deception).

Is this a defense of ST?

I’ve already argued in that paper than a Swinburne-type ST implies what looks like wrongful deception by at least one of the three divine persons. This hasn’t been disputed.

I don’t grant that if God is a single self, then Read More »You’re another!

Buddhist positive mysterianism

Positive mysterianism: it’s not only for Christians. And I very much doubt it was Christians who first hit upon the strategy… In any case, here’s an example from fourth century India: Our only grounds for speculating about Mainstream responses to Mahayana thought are the objections that the Mahayanists address in the own writings. In some cases, the Mahayanists argue against the objections, in others they… Read More »Buddhist positive mysterianism

Further thoughts on Swinburne’s God-talk

In this 2010 post I reacted to an interview by social trinitarian Richard Swinburne. My concern was that Swinburne has a theory on which the Trinity is not itself a person, but in answer to the question “Is God a self?” He answers affirmatively. What gives? Recently a reader e-mailed me with this link (thanks, Anthony). If you look at around 14 minutes, you’ll hear… Read More »Further thoughts on Swinburne’s God-talk

Orthodox modalism

The standard orthodox formulas admit of a “modalistic” or one-self interpretation.

Who Should Christians Worship?

Should Christians worship only God? Or God and Jesus? Or is it redundant to say that we should worship both God and Jesus? If Jesus isn’t God himself, is it therefore the sin of idolatry to worship Jesus? I address these questions in light of scripture in this screencast version of a talk I gave in Atlanta at the 2012 Theological Conference sponsored by the Atlanta Bible… Read More »Who Should Christians Worship?

Trinitarian-Unitarian Debates – 1 Bosserman vs. Finnegan, 2008 – Part 5

Closing statements: Finnegan: 1:48:43- 1:52:12 Only one Yahweh. Jesus does things God says he can’t do, e.g. die. Jesus affirms Shema. In John 10, Jesus uses a concept of “representational deity” – i.e. calling a being who isn’t God “God” because of some likeness to God in some respect(s). Trinity is confusing, post-biblical. But it is a solution to a non-existent problem, namely, of their… Read More »Trinitarian-Unitarian Debates – 1 Bosserman vs. Finnegan, 2008 – Part 5

Trinitarian-Unitarian Debates – 1 Bosserman vs. Finnegan, 2008 – Part 4

Bosserman questions Finnegan: 1:36:20 B: Did OT saints understand that the physical Temple would be replaced by Jesus? F: No. B: So does the NT contradict the OT on this? F: Incomplete vs. contradictory claims. B: What about Deut 12? F: Like you, I think it doesn’t predict an unending physical temple. B: Why can’t God then only later reveal himself to be not only one… Read More »Trinitarian-Unitarian Debates – 1 Bosserman vs. Finnegan, 2008 – Part 4

Trinitarian-Unitarian Debates – 1 Bosserman vs. Finnegan, 2008 – Part 3

Time for mutual interrogations! This is the best part of this debate.

Finnegan questions Bosserman: 1:24:35 – 1:36:19

  • F: Was the incarnate Jesus immortal?
  •  B: Only in his divine nature. So, yes, he was.
  • F But then, he can’t die.
  • B: The human nature can.
  • F: So not God, but the impersonal human nature died?
  • B: No, Jesus died as a man; I’m no docetist.
  • F: I’m unclear on the answer then. Did Jesus die or not? If he exp’d a human death, he died, no?
Comment: Finnegan is right – the answer is totally unclear. Hence, Bosserman reaches for a red herring:Read More »Trinitarian-Unitarian Debates – 1 Bosserman vs. Finnegan, 2008 – Part 3

Trinitarian-Unitarian Debates – 1 Bosserman vs. Finnegan, 2008 – Part 2

  • Finnegan rebuttal 52:28-1:08  Back to pronouns: Bosserman’s rebuttal was unclear. Overwhelming number of pronouns and verbs re: God are singular; by the ordinary meaning of language, this communicates that he is one being. John 17 says Father is the only true God, and presupposes Jesus to be someone else. Bosserman has not answered who the first trinitarian was. And he hasn’t derived three persons and one essence from the Bible. Nor does it make sense. “Elohim” can be translated singular or plural, and needn’t refer to a plural unity. Is he saying Jesus = YHWH? If so, isn’t that modalism rather than trinitarianism. But if he’s a different “YHWH” then it seems there are two of them. “Before Abe was I am [the one]” i.e. the messiah; that’s the best way to take that saying. Believes Jesus an unfallen, sin-free human, being virgin born with God causing him. Col 1:15 doesn’t teach Jesus’ pre-existence; it’s about the new creation effected by Jesus. John 6:62 – “came down from heaven” is figurative. John 1 – can translate with “it” for “logos.” “God” in NT in over 99% of texts refers to Father. Rare in both testaments to call any human a “god.” Jesus died; God can’t. Thus they are two.

Trinitarian-Unitarian Debates – 1 Bosserman vs. Finnegan, 2008 – Part 1

Sean Finnegan is an intelligent and well spoken “Biblical Unitarian” Christian. He recently earned an M.A. in Church History from Boston University. He runs the christianmonotheism website, which aggregates work by contemporary Christian unitarians. I was pleased to meet him at a recent conference, at which he gave a fascinating presentation on how many (but not all) “church fathers” rejected the everlasting earthly Kingdom in favor of “going to heaven,” i.e. a non-bodily afterlife.

Here’s a blog post by Sean on the debate I’ll be reviewing below.

Brent Bosserman was at the time of the debate an adjunct professor at Northwest University in Washington state. I believe he’s still there, but can’t find out much about him online. But here’s a long 2007 talk of his, called “Christianity and Trinitarian Worldview.” He talks at the start about his background.

This debate suffers by not having a precisely defined debate question. While Finnegan mostly sticks to the biblical case for his view and against Bosserman’s, Bosserman pulls out a broad brush and tries to compare all-encompassing “worldviews.” This is not a good idea; a debate is finite in time!

The intros are over-long and intrusive here; I’ve skipped you to the actual start. My summaries and commentary follow.

Arguing against no one

Princeton philosopher Thomas Kelly in a paper on the epistemology of disagreement (i.e. what the reasonable response when we find the people just as smart and informed etc. as us disagree on some important matter):

In principle, we ought to be able to give due weight to the available reasons that support a given view, even in the absence of actual defenders of the view who take those reasons as compelling. But in practice, the case for a view is apt to get short shrift in the absence of any actual defenders. The existence of actual defenders can serve to overcome our blindspots by forcefully reminding us just how formidable the case is for the thesis that they defend… But the case for a given view itself is no stronger in virtue of the fact that that view has actual defenders…

Thomas Kelly, ” The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” p. 31 (in pre-print).

At first this reminded me of a proverb I’ve often thought of when reading some catholic theologian who has evidently never put the slightest effort into understanding the overall case for unitarianism:

“The first to speak in court sounds right–until the cross-examination begins.”  Proverbs 18:17 (NLT)

But this is actually a different point than Kelly’s. A better courtroom analogy for Kelly’s point is:Read More »Arguing against no one

Copan answers: Who created God?

“Well, who created God, then?” Many an atheist has lobbed this one, supposing it to be a devastating objection in question form. In reply, Christian philosopher Paul Copan knocks this one out of the park. Well played, sir. I would add a few points: One of the perfections a perfect being is supposed to have is aseity – existing but not because of anything else.… Read More »Copan answers: Who created God?

Defining the concept of a trinitarian

I woke up this morning, and realized that there is a problem with how I’ve been defining the concept of a unitarian.  In this post, I will attempt a definition of the concept of a trinitarian, after reviewing what is required of a good definition. Next time, I’ll try to define the concept of a unitarian.

According to the textbook I have used for years in my critical thinking class, a good definition should:

  1. Include the genus and a differentia.
  2. Not be too broad or too narrow.
  3. State the essential attributes of the concept’s referents.
  4. Not be circular.
  5. Not use negative terms unnecessarily.
  6. Not use vague, obscure, or metaphorical language. (p. 44)

What is a trinitarian?

Definition 1: someone who believes in a triune god.

This failsRead More »Defining the concept of a trinitarian

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 8

In this last post in this series, I want to put out a few critical reactions to Baber’s “Neo-Sabellian” Trinity theory.

My thanks to Harriet for this piece and for her interaction with us here.

No doubt, she’ll argue back; and she will probably say something about how her views have changed since she wrote this piece.

So, in no particular order:

  1. I agree with her that it’s suspicious if some philosophical theory should appeal to us only or mainly because it’ll help us in theology. I also agree with her that it’s interesting to at least try to come up with what is in some sense an acceptable Trinity theory which uses only metaphysical doctrines we have other reasons to believe.
  2. Again, I think it is a good aim to produce an intelligible (seemingly consistent) Trinity theory, assuming some such theory is called for. I think she’s correct to complain about the severe obscurity of traditional claims about “eternal generation” and “procession”.
  3. Picky point: I think “Neo-Sabellian” is a misnomer. It’s “Neo” all right, butRead More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 8

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 7 (Dale)

Time for the old Spanish Inquisition. Will she survive The (self-administered) Rack?

In the final part of her article “Sabellianism Reconsidered”, Baber turns to theological objections. To wit:

  • The account renders it impossible for the Son to pray to the Father. But the NT says this happened.
  • The account denies that each Person of the Trinity is himself eternal, and has eternally born relations to the other two Persons. (pp. 8-9, paraphrased)

Her answers? Jesus, like his contemporaries, was not a trinitarian. That is, he didn’t realize  that the God to whom he prayed had temporal parts which were gods. Or even if he did, he didn’t intend to teach any trinitarian doctrine. Thus, he addressed not the Father, but God, as “Father”. (p. 10) Thus the term “Father”, in Jesus’ context, referred to God, while nowadays (post 380 CE?) it refers to the Father, the (temporally) first Person of the Trinity.

In response to the second objection, she notes that “a notion of timeless, metaphysically necessary causationRead More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 7 (Dale)

LaBreeska’s right

LaBreeska Hemphill is right. Jesus isn’t God; he’s the Son of God. God is a certain perfect self, the one both we and Jesus call “our Father” and “our God”. Jesus is a man – but by no means a mere man, to wildly understate the case. God is not a man, not, as C.S. Lewis would say, a Son of Adam. She’s not a theologian.… Read More »LaBreeska’s right

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 5 (Dale)

To be omnipotent, Baber says, “is to be able to do [directly, by fiat] any action… including actions at times other than” the time at which one is omnipotent. (p.6) But consider, say, the action of miraculously inflicting some person with a headache on 1/1/2015. It seems that the Father, on this theory, couldn’t do that, as he wouldn’t exist then (having been superseded by… Read More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 5 (Dale)