Congratulations to trinities contributor J.T. Paasch on his “Arius and Athanasius on the Production of God’s Son”, which has come out in the most recent issue of the prestigious philosophy of religion & philosophical theology journal, Faith & Philosophy (Vol. 27, No. 4, October 2010, pp. 382-404)
Hey JT – do you have a preprint posted online anywhere?
Here is JT’s abstract, to whet your appetite:
Arius maintains that the Father must produce the Son without any pre-existing ingredients (ex nihilo) because no such ingredients are available to the Father. Athanasius denies this, insisting not only that the Father himself becomes an ingredient in the Son, but also that the Son inherits his divine properties from that ingredient. I argue, however, that it is difficult to explain exactly how the Son could inherit certain properties but not others from something he is not identical to, just as it is difficult to explain the precise way that a statue inherits certain properties but not others from the lump of bronze it is made from.
Also, check out his blog Boring Things.
Thanks James, that’s much clearer.
@Dave
I’m unsure of Warfield’s Trinitarian model, but I work not with social Trinitarianism (ST) theory but weak relative identity theory. However, I suppose that it could work with ST.
Also, I do not say that the identity of persons is not innate, because “identity” could mean many things. But in some sense the “distinctive roles” are not innate, while each person has always been capable of any respective divine role. Likewise, each person is innately capable of their role.
Wow! It’s like an extreme form of social Trinitarianism.
So under this model, the identity of the persons is not innate, but derived from their activity (role?) within the Trinity?
Hi Dave,
B. B. Warfield in _The Biblical Doctrine of the Trinity_ suggested a similar idea, “But we are bound to bear in mind that these relations of subordination in modes of operation may just as well be due to a convention, an agreement, between the Persons of the Trinity—a ‘Covenant’ as it is technically called—by virtue of which a distinct function in the work of redemption is voluntarily assumed by each.”
This is a uniquely innovative view. I’ve never heard anything like it before.
Hi Tom, I will try to explain my view. Prior to creation, the three divine persons always knew who would be the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. I believe in an eternal designation of the names “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit,” but there was no definitive Father and Son relationship before creation. Also, there was no eternal begetting of the Logos. Each of the persons had equal ability to execute the functions of the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit, and they mutually designated who would take the respective functions. Likewise, I suppose that I disagree with the ancient catholic view of “begotten from the Father” while I agree with the catholic doctrines of three distinct divine persons and one divine substance.
James, as far as I can tell, your issue is just with ‘nomenclature’. Correct me if I’m wrong, but you want to reserve the title “Son” to describe a function of this divine person with respect to creation (and perhaps revelation)? So in “generation of the Son” it’s the fact that this person is called “Son” that you have problems with and not the fact that the relationship this person sustains to the person we call the “Father” is described in terms of “generation.”
Let me ask you it this way. Supply “Logos” (from John) into the Creed. Can you say the the Father eternally begets his Logos with no problem?
Tom
@JT: I would suspect that any theologian who thinks that ‘being ungenerated’ (ingenitum) is a personal property of the Father’s might think this way. Friedman has documented several folks who take this route, and calls this the ‘Franciscan’ tradition b/c Bonaventure might have gotten it going. At least, _some_ Franciscans follow him in this, e.g. Walter of Bruges, Eustace of Arras, Matthew of Aquasparta, Roger Marston, and John Pecham–and Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus.
@Scott: thanks for mentioning that. Yeah, I think that particular approach avoids the difficulties of explaining the Father’s priority. I don’t suppose you know any medievals who take that line? Off the top of my head, I can only think of people (like Ockham) who reject it, but it’s a big topic in the Sentences commentaries (distinction 25, isn’t it?), and I know there must be some medievals who argued for it (and of course there’s also Russ Friedman’s research on it).
@JT: Last thought to show how there might be an explanatory order between the Father and Son. Suppose logically prior to the Father’s production of the Son, that the Father exists. At this instant (not of time, maybe of nature), there is a first divine person that does not have a real relation to another person. However, at a logically subsequent instant, the Father produces the Son. Given this production, the Father is ‘Father’ and the Son is ‘Son’. Nonetheless, the Son is constituted in being thanks to this production, but the Father is already constituted in being logically prior to this production. This, I think, is how some medievals think.
I don’t know of anybody who adopted relative identity (Athanasius didn’t, so far as I know), but I agree with your basic point: many patristic authors wanted to avoid an outright contradiction, so they adopted some strategy or other to deal with the sameness and distinctness of the persons coherently. They didn’t always succeed of course, Athanasius being a case in point, but hey, at least they tried!
@JT Paasch
You might be right while I’m unsure. But I also wonder about your view of speculations about “relative identity.” (Please forgive the anachronism of this question.) Could Athanasius have argued that both the Father and Son are identical to God while giving the slack of relative identity?
Well, call me old fashioned, but I don’t think anything can be both identical and not identical at the same time. =)
@JT Paasch
“The basic point I make in the article about Athanasius is that any x and y cannot be both identical and not identical at the same time, and since Athanasius says the Father and Son are not identical, he cannot also say that they are identical without contradiction.”
How about positive mysterianism?
In the case of positive mysterianism, could a particular x and y be both identical and not identical at the same time, comparable to the wave-particle duality?
I suppose to some degree all of the imperial orthodox fathers held to something along the lines of moderate mysterianism.
@Scott:
Generator/generated, producer/product, and so on — all of these are mutually dependent pairs too.
@James:
The basic point I make in the article about Athanasius is that any x and y cannot be both identical and not identical at the same time, and since Athanasius says the Father and Son are not identical, he cannot also say that they are identical without contradiction.
Per Part 1 above:
1. I suppose B. B. Warfield was the first major proponent of doctrine teaching three distinct divine persons of one indivisible nature while clearly rejecting the doctrine of eternal natural generation.
2. I need to edit a typo by removing the word “in” before “eternal generation: “So far, I see no evidence of serious debate in the ancient church about a Trinity without eternal generation.”
@JT
I agree that opposed relations (father, son) are simultaneous in nature. Neither one explains the other, etc. Neither one is prior to the other.
However, as some of our medieval friends like to say, there are also disparate relations. For example, ‘being generated’. This is not the same as ‘being a Son’. The latter is naturally consequent to the former. And, if someone ‘is generated’ this presupposes that someone generates that person. The producer, under the description of ‘being the generator’ is not the same as ‘being the father’. It’s these disparate relations in which there is an explanatory order. The one generating is explanatorily prior to the one generated.
If a theologian denies that there are such disparate relations, he or she might suppose that there are only opposed relations. Perhaps one might be like Aquinas in supposing that there are only opposed relations. If one goes this route, then there is no explanatory order. However, if one takes divine production ‘seriously’, then one is committed to saying that there is something prior to opposed relations, e.g., disparate relations. If one is serious about internal productions, then one would not think that there are only opposed relations. Opposed relations obtain naturally consequent to the production.
That, at least, is how someone like Henry of Ghent differs from someone like Thomas Aquinas.
Thank you, JT. You’re getting close on one part of it. I’ll try to clearly divide this up into two parts.
Part 1
Yes, I believe in three unproduced persons of one indivisible nature. But Sonship refers to more than the earthly mission such as incarnation and resurrection. Sonship includes an overall relationship to creation. As I said above, “I see the Bible teaching that the Sonship of Christ relates to creation, the incarnation, and the resurrection.” Ill get more specific. I don’t claim that Christ was never the Son until the incarnation, which some call “incarnational Sonship.” Also, I cannot disprove eternal natural generation while I reject that the Bible teaches it. For example, eternal natural generation with ontological equality of the Father and Son is consistent with the teachings of the Bible while the Bible never addresses that view.
So far, I see no evidence of serious debate in the ancient church about a Trinity without in eternal generation. And I’m beginning to suppose that there was no debate at all about it in the ancient church. But yes, if anybody knows of any historical evidence that says otherwise, please reply.
Part 2
Assuming eternal generation, the Father and Son have an identical nature. So I cannot see why the Father and Son would not be two identical but distinct persons. Also, I provided an analogy of a hydra (a microscopic animal) perfectly budding an identical but distinct hydra.
I bring this up in response to your statement: “I argue, however, that it is difficult to explain exactly how the Son could inherit certain properties but not others from something he is not identical to, just as it is difficult to explain the precise way that a statue inherits certain properties but not others from the lump of bronze it is made from.”
Likewise, since the Father and Son have identical nature, Why do you make an argument along the lines that the the properties of the Father and Son are not identical? Perhaps I need to know how you distinguish properties from nature.
@Scott:
I agree that there does seem to be a sense (for Aristotelians) in which producers are responsible for their products. Nevertheless, it’s hard to parse that out. For instance, it’s hard to see how priority of any kind — even explanatory priority (whatever that means) — could really help, because producers aren’t prior to their products (e.g., fathers aren’t fathers without sons). But then again, that’s the point. Producers need their products in all the relevant senses that products need their products (or at least all the relevant senses I’ve thought of). So, even though we have the intuition to say that producers are responsible for their products, and I completely agree that intuition is there, it’s difficult to actually parse that out.
@James:
So I think you’re proposing something like this. The Father, Son, and Spirit are three equally divine persons, but none of them produce any of the others. Rather, all three have always just been ‘up there’ in heaven, so to speak, without being produced at all. And when the Bible talks the Son’s sonship, his ‘coming from the Father’, and other such things — all of that refers to the Son’s earthly mission. Is that right?
If so, I don’t know enough about the patristic period to know if anyone proposed such a view (though I wouldn’t be surprised if someone did). Perhaps someone else around here knows?
@JT
I hear that. There are different ways to understand ontological dependence. Here’s one way that I think is relevant for understanding (if one were so inclined) the Son’s ontological dependence on the Father.
1. The Father is explanatorily prior to the Son.
What motivates (1) is an intuition about productions. An agent is explanatorily prior to the product. In this sense, the Son ontologically depends on the Father; the Father does not ontologically depend on the Son. Of course, a person cannot be a father if there never is a child. So, if there is a father, then there is a child.
One might quickly reject (1) if one thought that opposed relations (paternity-filiation) are the ultimate basis of the distinction of the Father and Son.
But, if one takes ‘the Father’s production of the Son’ seriously, it seems that one is committed to (1). In this case, opposed relations (paternity-filiation) are logically posterior to the first person’s producing the second person. And so, (1).
However, one might not like this way to understand ‘the Father’s production of the Son’. One might take ‘the Father’s production of the Son’ to be a general way to name opposed relations (paternity (i.e. active generation), and filiation (i.e. passive generation)).
Admittedly, (1) is a thin notion of ontologically dependence. There might be further marks, but I need to think about this more.
I suppose I need to clarify the following. I wrote, “In my case I hold that the three divine persons eternally and equally share the same honor, glory, and ability.” But that could sound like that each have a third of the divine honor, glory, and ability, so I’ll modify that. Here’s a clearer statement: In my case I hold that the three divine persons eternally and equally share the same indivisible honor, glory, and ability.
@JT Paasch
“@James: I’m not sure I understand what you’re asking. Maybe you could say more about what you have in mind?”
I appreciate your invite to share more about what’s on my mind. And I appreciate your reply to Scott because now I have a much better context of your excellent article.
I asked three questions, fully answered the first by myself, and partially answered the second. After that I held a conversation evidentially with myself until you eventually butted in.:)
I’ll try to elaborate on my second question. In my case I hold that the three divine persons eternally and equally share the same honor, glory, and ability, while I reject the ancient church understanding of the natural generation of the Son. For example, I see the Bible teaching that the Sonship of Christ relates to creation, the incarnation, and the resurrection. I also reviewed some church history and see that the ancient church never evaluated a view similar to my view or other similar trinitarian views that reject the eternal generation of the Son. Apart from gross imperial politics sometimes favoring and sometimes opposing supporters of the orthodox trinitarian doctrine, I think the imperial church did a great job of refuting bad interpretations of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In this regard, I agree with the gist of the ancient creeds while I reject the eternal generation of the Son. With that background, my second question asked if rejection of the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son would be rejection of one point in the Nicene Creed, or worse? Well, after more reflection, I clearly see that my view is a rejection of one point in the Nicene Creed, but we cannot definitively evaluate if the imperial church would’ve rejected it because I wasn’t there at the time to defend my view.
My third question might be irrelevant because I might have confused what you wrote with your own view, but that’s a fallacy I keep falling for when I read philosophical arguments. I hope I get better at understanding this as time goes on.:)
Anyway, Athanasius and most imperial church fathers agreed that the Father and Son shared an identical nature, so I’m unsure why the Father and Son weren’t seen as identical but distinct divine persons. For example, microscopic hydras generate buds that form potentially identical but distinct hydras. (I say “potentially identical” because mutations and environmental factors ruin a potentially perfect budding process.) Likewise, why would it be necessary to explain that the Son inherited some but not all properties from the Father? If natural eternal generation happened, why would the Father and Son be distinct but less than identical?
I hope that I made myself clear, but I could try again if I didn’t.:)
Sorry for the slow reply here. I’ve been down and out with the flu and didn’t notice these comments.
@James: I’m not sure I understand what you’re asking. Maybe you could say more about what you have in mind?
@Scott: I’m wary of talking about the Son’s ‘ontological dependence’ on the Father. The fact that the Son is produced by the Father does not, in my view, necessarily make the Son ‘ontologically dependent’ on the Father.
Part of the reason I say that is because I’m not sure what it means to say that A is ‘ontologically dependent’ on B. E.g., many ancient and medieval thinkers would say there’s a sense in which Socrates’ risibility depends on Socrates, but on the other hand, Socrates depends on his risibility too: Socrates would not — and in fact could not — exist without his risibility. In light of examples like this, it’s very hard to come up with a definition of ‘ontological dependence’ that makes Socrates’ risibility ‘ontologically dependent’ on Socrates in the right way. All the definitions I can think of seem to make Socrates dependent on his risibility too. So I’m wary of talking about ‘ontological dependence’ in the first place.
Consequently, I’m wary of equating the phrase ‘the Son is produced by the Father’ with ‘the Son is ontologically dependent on the Father’. I prefer to just say ‘the Son is produced by the Father’ and leave it at that.
So, for me the question is this: does the fact that the Son is produced by the Father make him inferior to the Father?
With respect to Athanasius, I have a hard time seeing how that wouldn’t be the case. Of course, Athanasius wants to deny that the Son is inferior to the Father, but I have a hard time seeing how Athanasius could coherently defend that claim.
(But that’s only what I think about Athanasius. It’s not my own opinion. My own opinion is that no divine person is inferior to another, irrespective of whether that person is produced by another or not. So long as all divine persons are equally divine, all persons are equal in perfection. In other words, I think the question of inferiority is independent of the question of production.)
@Scott, No, I strongly believe in three distinct persons in the Trinity, revealed in creation as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. I reject modalism.
@James. Are you a Sabellian (modalist), then? Do you think that, e.g., the second person of the Trinity could put on the appearance of the Father. If that’s right, do you think that the second person of the Trinity ‘who is the Father’ died on the cross? That is, do you affirm Patripassianism? And, if a person = Father, Son, Holy Spirit, why say there are three persons? For, you’ve taken away from the persons what the majority of the Christian tradition says distinguishes the persons; if the persons are not distinct (somehow), then there may not be more than one person.
I don’t think it helps to say “there’s the first person, the second person, and the third person.” I don’t find such language in the Bible–You’d be hard pressed to find such mathematical expressions in the New Testament–supposing the NT is authoritative for you?
I finally recalled perhaps my biggest problem with the creedal eternal natural generation of the Son. I believe that the three persons of God have equal abilities, including that all three persons of God could execute the role of the Father. Likewise, the Father is no more able than the Son and Holy Spirit to execute the role of the Father. And let me tell you, that led to an interesting line of questions with the board of district presbyters while I earned ministry credentials with the Assemblies of God.
@JT: do you think that the Son’s ontological dependence on the Father entails the subordination of the Son?
Congrats, Jet Train! I’ve got my copy, but it missing your autograph. 🙂
“I argue, however, that it is difficult to explain exactly how the Son could inherit certain properties but not others from something he is not identical to, just as it is difficult to explain the precise way that a statue inherits certain properties but not others from the lump of bronze it is made from.”
I don’t believe in the eternal natural generation of the Son, but if I did, I suppose that I couldn’t see why the Son couldn’t be identical to the Father. I wish to ask JT, Why do you suppose that the Father and Son are unidentical? For example, I suppose that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three distinct identical persons who are one God.
Well, I read a paper by Rhee “the triumph of ontological realism and eternal generation in the nicene creed.” I suppose all the orthodox imperial church fathers held to “eternal natural generation.” I also suppose that no ancient church father proposed something along the lines of three co-eternal persons of one God while none of the persons was naturally begotten. So the imperial church fathers never addressed that possibility.
I apologize that I see a lot of imprecision in my above question (especially for an analytical philosophy blog, LOL). I’ll try to ask a more precise question. For background, first, somebody holds to basics of the trinity such as “there always has been three equally divine persons in the one true God.” But, second, that person rejects “eternal natural generation.” For example, that person saw begotten as an eternal declaration while Sonship is only functional since the beginning of creation. Would that then be a rejection of one point in the Nicene Creed, or worse?
JT, thank you for posting the article. This is an important slice of church history.
I have a tangent question related Athanasius holding to an eternal natural generation of the Son. But I’m wondering: Did any of the ancient church fathers hold to an eternal adoptive generation of the Son? And I want to clarify that I’m not talking about Adoptionism/dynamic monarchianism.
I think this works:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/45219820/JT-Paasch-Arius-and-Athanasius-Final
Congratulation JT!:)
Also, per “Athanasius denies this, insisting not only that the Father himself becomes an ingredient in the Son, but also that the Son inherits his divine properties from that ingredient.” This by itself sounds a lot like ontological subordination, but I’ll have to see the entire context.
Yes, well done that man! Congrats JT.
-Joseph
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