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Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 11 – One last problem for Rational Reinterpretation

Can’t we all just get along?
One last problem for Resolution through Rational Reconstruction: the new-fangled theory (or if you like, way of understanding the Doctrine) is invariably controversial, in the following sense: it involves metaphysical claims such that some thinkers will consider them false and impossible, and others not.

The more you think about hard stuff, the more opinions you get. I’ve taught philosophy of religion, modern philosophy, logic, and metaphysics courses, and so I have some fairly developed views. Based on theoretical (and non-theological considerations), here are some things I don’t believe in, because I think they’re impossible:

relative identity relations
constitution relations
group minds
time travel to the past
properties (whether tropes or universals) – yes, I’m a nominalist
persons/selves which are or are “constituted by” relations or relationships
multiple selves that count as one self because they’re so intimately aware of one another’s thoughts

I’m not going to argue these points here. My point is simply that in light of the above metaphysical convictions, I can’t believe in various Rational Reconstructions of the Trinity doctrine. In order corresponding to the above list:

Peter van Inwagen’s or Peter Geach’s relative identity trinitarianism (these we haven’t yet discussed here at trinities)
Brower’s and Rea’s constitution theory
group mind Social Trinitarianism as discussed by Brian Leftow in his “Anti Social Trinitarianism”
Leftow’s version of Latin Trinitarianism
ditto
misc. medieval theories, such as Henry of Ghent’s
some recent versions of Social Trinitarianism

General rule: when any philosopher looks at a Rational Reconstruction of some Christian Doctrine, he finds that Reconstruction unsatisfactory for various reasons. Other than the Two Minds approach to the Incarnation, I can’t think of exceptions to this rule. Anyone? Note that this isn’t even bringing in considerations about the Bible or how the new-fangled theory fits with Tradition.

In sum, one can’t help but admire the cleverness and ingenuity of Rational Reconstructors. Sadly, non-philosophers generally don’t understand such theories or the motivations for them, while other Christian philosophers mostly reject the Rational Reconstruction in question. This is disappointing and disturbing.

Before I move on to Resistance, though, I’d like to ask one more question:

Next time: Why do contemporary theologians ignore all recent Rational Reconstructions?

2 thoughts on “Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 11 – One last problem for Rational Reinterpretation”

  1. Suarez… he’s one of those guys I chicken out on! I think R. Cross needs to write a book about him. 🙂

    I need to think more about this issue of the Trinity and universals – I think nominalism is one reason why there was a turn towards different kinds of unitarianism circa late 1500s through much of the 18th c. (BTW – I’m a nominalist for purely metaphysical reasons.)

    What’s disturbing is that on the face of it, some kind of realism about universals is required by patristic (if not creedal) orthodoxy.

  2. I can appreciate the boldness of such a post as this one!

    Yeah– I suppose if you are a nominalist on the question of universals (of any sort) then some doctrine that says there are three distinct X’s that have the numerically same Y-kind-instantiation is going to be a problem. And this– is more or less what happened in much Trinitarian speculation in the early to middle 14th c. Once Ockham started shaving—theories like those of Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus appeared less persuasive to crowds of young graduate students (or the equivalent). Though, I hope I’m wrong on this– and that just more historical research will uncover vast fields of Trinitarian speculation hitherto unknown to us/me. I wonder whether Suarez has a place in this history?

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