Now Q comes with spring arm action
and dyno bud (optional)!
The Nicene Creed claims that
(Q) The Son is begotten from the substance of the Father.
The term ‘begotten’ is just an older English term for ‘generated’. In the ancient world, ‘generation’ was a technical term for biological reproduction (e.g., when humans make baby humans, when trees make baby trees, and so on). In this post, I want to describe how Athanasius takes Q to imply a derivation view of the trinity.
1. Q and generation.
In the 4th century, most thought that a biological father produces a child by giving up a part of himself (his seed). That seed grows in the womb and becomes a child. Also, it was thought that the seed contains the father’s essence/kind-nature, and that’s why biological parents produce offspring of the same kind.
One of the key ideas here is that the child comes ‘out of’ the father, or better: ‘out of the substance/essence of the father’. Many church fathers, Athanasius included, tried to capture this notion by using the analogy of light coming out of the sun, or water flowing out of a spring.
Q’s wording thus could easily have suggested to the ancient ear that the Son is the Father’s natural offspring, and that’s how Athanasius takes it. He argues at length that the Son is the Father’s natural Son, not an adopted Son. The Son is really generated by the Father.
However, the Father is incorporeal, so he can’t break off a part of his substance and give it to the Son. Instead, the Father must share his substance with the Son. What does that mean? Well, given all this talk about daddies giving up parts of themselves to make children, it seems to me pretty natural to think of it like this: the ‘substance of the Father’ becomes a constituent of the Son.
To use a well-trodden analogy, if we compare the Son to a bronze statue, we might say that the Father’s substance is like the bronze, and the Son is like the statue, so the Father’s substance is a constituent of the Son similar to the way that the bronze is a constituent of the statue.
2. Q and God
In my first post, I said that ‘Divinity’ is that which makes the divine persons divine. How does Divinity fit into the picture? One option would be to say that Divinity is identical to the Father’s substance. Okay, but what, precisely, is the Father’s substance? If we assume that the Father’s substance is identical to the Father — it just is the Father — then it follows that Divinity is identical to the Father.
If we say that, then there’s a sense in which Divinity belongs more properly to the Father than it does to the Son. The Father is divine because he just is Divinity, but the Son is only divine because Divinity is one of his constituents. Think of the bronze statue again. A lump of bronze is bronze because it just is bronze, but a statue is bronze only because one of its constituents is bronze.
This is the central claim of the derivation view. The basic idea is just that Divinity belongs, strictly speaking, to the Father, but not the Son (and Spirit). The Son (and Spirit) have Divinity in some kind of derivative way. Let’s call this DV, for the ‘derivation view’:
(DV) Divinity belongs more properly to the Father than to the Son.
(We could state this point in a different way by saying that homoousious is an asymmetrical relation.)
This does not mean that the Son and Spirit have a lesser kind of divinity, nor does it mean that they are not God/divine. If we assume that a God (or a divine thing) is anything that has Divinity, then the Father, Son, and Spirit are all God/divine on this view. The Father has Divinity (properly), so the Father is God/divine. The Son and Spirit have Divinity too (because the Father shares his Divinity with them), so they are God/divine too.
I have described here only one version of the derivation view, namely the Nicene/Athanasian view. Athanasius’s notion of the Father as a constituent in the Son seems to me a helpful way to conceptualize the derivation view. But one needn’t think of the Father as a constituent of the Son. One could have a different account. But anyone who maintains DV in some form or other holds some version of a derivation view.
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“might deny that having divine properties admits of degrees (so having divine properties is sufficient for being fully divine).”
JT, I don’t think that move helps. It’s not an issue of one having divinity to degrees. Rather, one has it (fully) but derivatively, and one doesn’t. And it’s plausible that it’s greater to have it non-derivatively. BUT, it’s not even clear that it’s logically possible that something be divine derivatively, as divinity arguably includes aseity.
Regarding the move for NSWI for the Son and divinity/the divine nature. Won’t there still be something like subordination there? For you’re suggesting that f = d, whereas s and d aren’t that closely related. But maybe you want to say that NSWI holds between f and d as well. But then, f won’t be a component of s just because d is… will he?
“Most want to affirm that S’s production is necessary.” Really? What is your ground for saying this? I thought they were really unclear about this, but maybe were reaching for some sense of voluntariness because of the analogy with creaturely generation (which is voluntary). Does anyone out there recall an early father saying something clear about this?
Thanks for the Wolfson ref. I’ve looked at some of his other stuff, and I always find him worth reading. Of course, it’ll have to be bounced off the texts in the end… someday.
I agree–there are lots of details to be discussed. Suffice it to say, in the divine case, those scholastics who want to use a psychological explanation for the production of the Son and Holy Spirit generally avoid saying things like, ‘the Son is produced ad intra by a productive act of the Father’s will’, and ‘the Holy Spirit is produced ad intra by a productive act of the Father and Son’s intellect’. Even Henry wishes to avoid such statements …
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Scott — it’s true that scholastic thinkers like to characterize the intellect as a power that operates involuntarily, but there are other views besides the scholastic one, views where the intellect is a volitional power. (Besides, even scholastic philosophers think that certain intellectual acts — like pondering something I heard yesterday — are voluntary/volitional activities.)
JT,
Aside from liking most of what you’ve said thus far, I’d probably re-state
‘Suppose we said that person-making properties are volitional powers like intellect and will,’
as
‘Suppose we said that person-making properties are ‘natural’ powers like intellect and will’. Henry has a nice ‘concise’ (of all things) discussion of four meanings of the word ‘natura’ in the beginning of SQO 60.1. To use ‘volitional’ to modify ‘power’, suggest that both powers are ‘free’. But, the basic difference btwn. intellect and will is that the former acts by necessity, and the latter acts freely. And, we can say that each power has its own mark (nature in a broad sense): acts by natural necessity, and acts by freedom.
But, besides that little point, I like what I’m hearing/seeing.
JoBeth:
What do you make of the vital importance of the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body? The aim of Christian life isn’t to be a dis-embodied spirit ‘seeing God face to face’, but to be a resurrected body ‘seeing God face to face’. Still, I appreciate views like the substance dualism you advocate insofar as not wanting to be reductionist about human persons as being only extended matter, nonetheless, I don’t see substantial dualism as a necessary metaphysical doctrine b/c there are other metaphysical doctrines that also make sense of the body/soul complex, e.g. a variety of Aristotelian positions.
3. As to your third question, Athanasius never says, as far as I know, that F is a constituent of S. A specialist might tell me that for Athanasius, the F and S are numerically distinct entities in the way that JoBeth has suggested a human parent and child are. I’m inferring the view I’ve explained here from Athanasius’ comments about (a) the Son’s natural generation, (b) his reactions to Arius, and (c) his comments that the Father shares his substance with the Son (but not vice versa).
But I should note that I myself find Athanasius’ comments very ambiguous sometimes, so take my comments as an abstract analysis of a possible view rather than a close textual reading. Besides, I’m no specialist. I’m really a scholastic guy, and the only bits of Athanasius I know are the bits I teach. =)
While I’m on the topic, I might as well point out that this interpretation of Athanasius is derived from Harry Wolfson (Wolfson may have derived it from someone else, I don’t know). And everybody I’ve read who interprets Athanasius this way — e.g., Linwood Urban, Richard Cross, and Colin Gunton — cite Wolfson almost exclusively in the footnotes for this view.
Can Wolfson be trusted? Well, he has the idea that the divine substance is a ‘substratum’ for the persons, and he seems to detect this idea in most major patristic thinkers (including Augustine). I think he’s probably seeing more than what’s actually there. A ‘substratum’ might be a little too specific, which is why I try to think in terms of constituents (that way, it could be a substratum, or it could be some other kind of constituent — an immanent universal, for example). But Wolfson’s book certainly helps bring to light what some of the philosophical issues might be in these discussions.
2. As to your second question, yeah, the fathers often wanted to say that the Son is produced ‘voluntarily’. That could mean ‘freely’, or it could mean ‘by the will’. But exactly what ‘freely’ means is a difficult question. I don’t think many fathers would want to say that S is produced contingently or that F decides to produce S but could have done otherwise. Most want to affirm that S’s production is necessary. Many classical authors take ‘freely’ or ‘voluntarily’ to be ‘without external compulsion’, and I suspect that’s what most fathers have in mind. The old standard example is getting hungry. That’s a necessary thing, but it’s ‘free’ (without external complusion) because nobody but our own nature makes us hungry.
But I don’t know what Athanasius would say about that. I know this discussion in the scholastics, but I haven’t looked into what Athanasius would say about it. Anybody know?
Dale — sorry, this is going to be a bit verbose. I’ve tried to rewrite it to make it much briefer, but I haven’t had enough coffee yet.
1. As to your first question, yes, I think what you’ve pointed out here is an issue for all versions of a derivation view. Athanasius is definitely opposed to the view that the Son is ‘less divine’ than the Father, so he wouldn’t want his view to go there. But there are strategies to avoid such subordinationism. For example, one might deny that having divine properties admits of degrees (so having divine properties is sufficient for being fully divine). But I don’t know if Athanasius tries to solve this problem explicitly. He probably does somewhere, but I haven’t read enough.
As I see it, an important issue here is the identity of D and S. We can’t say that D is identical to S, because if D = F and D = S, then transitivity would get us F = S. (This is the thrust of Sabellian charge you mentioned). So to avoid that, we’re pushed to say that D is not identical to S. And that would mean that S isn’t, strictly speaking, divine. Only D/F would be divine.
Suppose we try to establish some kind of numerical sameness between D and S. Take the bronze statue analogy. If we said that Lumpy and Athena are, say, NSWI (B-R’s numerical sameness without identity), then what would it mean to say ‘Athena is bronze’? Or, perhaps better, what would it mean to say ‘Athena has bronze properties (like being shiny, meltable, and so forth)’? Would that just mean that Athena is NSWI to the thing, Lumpy, that is bronze or has bronze properties? Would it be the case that Athena is not, strictly speaking, bronze herself, nor does she have bronze properties. Rather, she’s just numerically the same as (without identity) the thing that is bronze/has bronze properties?
Likewise, if we said D and S are NSWI, what would it mean to say ‘S is divine’ or ‘S has divine properties’? Would that just mean that S is numerically the same as (without identity) the thing, D, that is divine/has divine properties? If so, I think Athanasius would want to say that S is divine/has divine properties in a stronger way than that, so I’m not sure he has a way to get there.
Or suppose we took Scotus’s view of real sameness without formal identity (i.e., when x and y are inseparable but not formally identical), let’s cal it RSWFI. If we said that D and S are RSWFI, then what would it mean to say ‘S is divine’ or ‘S has divine properties’? Would that just mean that S is really inseparable from the thing, D, that is divine/has divine properties? Again, I think Athanasius (and Scotus too) would want to say S is divine/has divine properties in a stronger way than that (actually, Scotus has a way to get past this, but that’s a different story).
We might ask the same question about person-making properties. Suppose we said that person-making properties are volitional powers like intellect and will, and that those properties are, strictly speaking, among the properties that belong to D. Again, then, if S and D are NSWI/RSWFI, what would it mean to say ‘S is a person’? Would it mean that S is numerically the same as or really inseparable from (but not identical to) the thing, D, that is a person? I think Athanasius would probably want to say S is a person in a stronger way than that. So yeah, I’m not sure he can really get to where he wants to go. Maybe he can, and I’ve just not read enough.
This is a silly topic.
It is like asking, “Is my soul a constituent of my body or is my body a constituent of my soul?”
The answer of course is Neither.
My soul inhabits my body. My body is merely a temporary “house” for my soul. It’s not even really a part of me any more than my apartment or my job is a part of me. My apartment is where I live and my job is what I do. It’s all temporary. Don’t you know that we will one day be absent from our bodies (2 Cor 5:8)?
Even my children (and my parents and my siblings) only share half of my genes. They are not me or any constituent part of me. Although we may share some genes and physical similarities, we are very different souls.
Luke 11:48 (TEV)
You yourselves admit, then, that you approve of what your ancestors did; they murdered the prophets, and you build their tombs.
As if those prophets were still there!
Hi JT,
Nice post, man. Some questions and comments.
You say: “This does not mean that the Son and Spirit have a lesser kind of divinity, nor does it mean that they are not God/divine.” No, but it does mean that they are divine in a different, and moreover a derivative way. They’re divine because of the Father, but the Father is divine a se. So, in that sense, the Father is more divine than, and indeed greater than the other two, for it’s greater to be divine underivatively. Again, if divinity implies existing and having all one’s essential properties a se, then in that sense, only the Father is divine.
I wonder – are there other strands in Athanasius’s thinking on the Trinity, which are not (near?) subordinationist in this way? I remember that he, or specifically his reading of Nicea, was repeatedly accused of Sabellianism… the kind of stuff you’re exploring probably wouldn’t draw that charge.
Second, in some of the early Fathers, there is a theme that the Son was begotten by the will of the Father. (freely?) Is there room for that in this scheme? You might think that if D/f just is a constituent of s, and this is an eternal fact, and moreover one necessitated by something about D, then it won’t at all be up to f that he beget s. If so, some would say that this reduces the appropriateness of the natural generation analogy. (Or is it a mere analogy? I assume he doesn’t think biological generation and s-generation belong to a common genus – though you sort of suggested that this was his view.)
Third, does he ever say that the Father is a constituent of the Son? Or or you attributing that to him based on the reading that D=f for him?
Thanks!
I wouldn’t think this view entails either absolute or relative person constitution any more than the generic view does. It could accommodate both.
Call me a monkey’s uncle, but do you think Athanasius’ view entails ‘absolute person constitution’?
In short, is the first divine person a person, and then he generates the Son? In other words, if the divine essence is identical with the Father (properly speaking), is this property ‘being identical with the divine essence’ enough to constitute the first divine person as a person, or does Ath. has a clear cut statement about a personal property constitutive of the Father that is not formally identical with the divine essence?
Ha ha, it’s a reference to an old SNL commercial: Philadelphia: Action Figure ™. (As in, the old Tom Hanks movie). To make it cooler, they gave the Philadelphia Action Figure a lazer gun and a little dinosaur pet they labeled ‘dyno bud’.
Before I leave a real comment, I must say that JT is THE MAN for finding a pic of a Q action figure. But what is a “dyno bud”? (Was this in a STTNG episode I forgot?)
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