Dialogue with the Maverick Philosopher: God is a being, not Being itself – part 1

Thanks to the Maverick Philosopher, Dr. William Vallicella, for an excellent, deep post following up on a recent face-to-face conversation we had (which was a follow-up to this). In this and follow-up posts, I want to interact with his discussion. I only get through part of it here.

Yes, I affirm that God is a being. As a Christian, I hold that “God” is a god, and of course the god, the unique or “one true” god. By definition, a god is a being. So God is a being.
Is God a being “among beings”? I take it that the idea is that he’s not as dissimilar to other beings as some would have it. I think that yes, in trivial ways, he is like other beings. He exists. I exist. We’re like in that respect, even if you suppose that he also exists in a greater way, or to a higher degree.
And as Bill says, in my view, God is literally a self, a self who is all-powerful and all-knowing, for instance. I too am a self, but am extremely limited in knowledge and power. I don’t think of being a self as having a property, but rather as being a certain way, so as to satisfy the concept we have of a self. God is a who, not a what (and, not a they); in other words God is a personal being.
God and I (and you) all exist. Does it follow that we all three of us exist in the same way? Well, we all satisfy the concept existing, but God also satisfies the concept necessarily existing, which is just to say that he exists, and it is absolutely impossible for him to not exist. (In the jargon which is so common: he exists “in all possible worlds.”) We all exist, yes, but God necessarily exists (which entails his existing). So I think it can be misleading to say that “God is in the same way that creatures are.” This suggests that God and creatures aren’t importantly different as respects their existence. But creature can not exist, whereas God can’t not exist. That’s a big difference.
Now Bill says that in my view, “God is really distinct from his properties, and that his properties are really distinct from one another. God is in this respect no different from Socrates.”
- I would add that this may be worrying if properties are fundamental in the universe. If having a property is being appropriately related to a universal property, so that it is “in” one, or one “exemplifies” that property, then it seems that God will be dependent upon other things (universal properties) for his being, e.g. powerful, or loving. But I don’t grant that there are universal properties. It seems better to me to just accept that there are brute similarities between concrete things. God, like any being, has modes, but those in a sense depend on him, being ways he is.
- So is God distinct from, e.g. his wisdom? Sure, they are not identical. God is a being, a self and a god, but God’s wisdom is merely an intrinsic and essential aspect of him, and so not itself a self. God ain’t an aspect of himself, or so it seems to me. So, they (God and his wisdom) are numerically distinct. But as Bill notes, it doesn’t follow that God could exist without his wisdom, or vice-versa.
- Is God’s wisdom different than his love? Of course they are. That in virtue of which he satisfies our concept of wisdom is a different aspect of him than that in virtue of which he satisfies our concept of being loving. He’s complicated – not in having many parts or ingredients or components, but in having a great many aspects. By “aspects” I mean intrinsic modes, ways he intrinsically is. I don’t see why God would be dependent, in any objectionable sense, on such modes, given that he absolutely can’t be otherwise. Loosely, in more common lingo, they are among his “essential properties.”
Now Bill says, “God is in this respect no different from Socrates. …And both items have their properties by instantiating them.” I don’t see how anything in this theology of God as a being commits one to belief in universal properties which must be “instantiated.” But yes, I think it follows that God is not, in my view, simple – not in the way that ancient and medieval theologians and philosophers meant. He may be (and in my view is) nonetheless partless. But simplicity is meant to exclude even different aspects or facets or modes of a thing.
And I think Bill is correct also that in my view “God is really distinct from his existence.” His existence, I want to say, is just that in virtue of which he satisfies our concept exists. Of course, anything has that – I mean, its own existence. But this doesn’t entail contingently existing, as far as I can see.
Bill concludes, “If [Dale] is right, then God cannot be Being itself.” I think this is right. But more must be said about this thing which God, in my view, ain’t. Just what is it that we’re considering denying here?