This is the start of a series where I give some unsolicited advice based on things that make me want to throw the book across the room when I’m reading recent theologians. I’ll avoid naming names, but will sometimes use actual quotes. I offer it in love, though I admit I’m pretty cranky about it all. If you’re a philosopher or theologian, these are a series of “don’ts” – things to avoid. If you are a reader of theology or philosophical theology, these are some things to watch out for. If you detect a high density of them in what you’re reading, you may well be wasting your time in that book.Memo my theologian friends: please, stop saying “grounded”.
Examples:
- The doctrine of the Trinity is thoroughly grounded in the Bible.
- The unity of the persons is grounded in their perichoresis.
- All of systematic theology is grounded in the doctrine of the Trinity.
- The threeness of God is grounded in salvation history.
Why? Because you are faking it when you say things like this, and everyone who paid attention in maybe two college classes in philosophy knows it. Let me explain. When you say “X is grounded in Y”, at most, all you mean is that Y is some sort of basis for X. Sometimes, I think theologians simply mean that X and Y have something important to do with each other. But more commonly, I think they mean that from Y, that is, assuming Y, one may infer X. Y provides us with a good reason to believe X.
Well, dandy. If this is what you mean, then kindly show us how this works. “Grounding” is just a metaphor – it’s as if Y is literally underneath X, holding it up. This metaphor needs to be converted to the hard currency of literal, rational discourse. Some options:
- X can be deduced from Y. (It’s impossible for Y to be true while X is false; it would be inconsistent to affirm Y but not X.)
- Assuming Y (and usually, some other background assumptions), X is highly probable, X is more probable than not, X is to be expected, X is likely to be true, etc.
- The best explanation of Y is X.
Do you have any respect for your reader? If so, provide her with a reason to believe X. Show her how, assuming Y, she can infer X. Give her a reason she can understand, and thus be moved by. Don’t just assert that “X is grounded in Y”. What – is she supposed to just take your word for it, because you’re a PhD and she (probably) isn’t? You big faker. Are you just lazy? Or are you afraid that she’ll call your bluff once she understands what you’re saying? That’s just a risk inherent in speaking (writing) clearly.
Naughty kids can be grounded. Electrical appliances can be grounded. Broken airplanes can be grounded. But doctrines or facts – they can be explained, expressed, asserted, and argued for – but discard this vague “grounding” talk, please.
The same goes for “rooted in” (only plants are rooted in things) and “built on” (structures are built on foundations). Don’t talk about doctrines like you’re transplanting seedlings or stacking bricks. Tell us how, if doctrine 1 is true, that gives us a reason to think that doctrine 2 is true.
I agree that metaphorical speech is important, but in theoretical contexts, it can also be a crutch.
But this, again, doesn’t seem to me to have anything to do with metaphors as such; it is something that happens with any terms in common use, metaphorical or not.
I think you are way too easy on philosophers with the “plausibly necessary assumptions”; for one thing, most philosophers who are not actually doing logic are not making their arguments in fields where there are any plausibly necessary assumptions. I do agree that philosophy is better off than theology on these points, at least at this point in time; it’s exactly why I, who had originally intended to go into theology, went into philosophy instead. There is a real difference; but I think it is less than you are suggesting. And somewhat better than theologians is a very low standard at this point in time.
I have my Van Inwagenish moments, but I think I’m less skeptical than you are about modal epistemology.
Ouch! 😛
I think that’s fair enough, as long as we also have philosophers stop using ‘implies’ and ‘suggests’ and ‘presupposes’, which are ways of doing exactly the same thing. ‘Implies’ is a particularly dangerous term; it can have a precise meaning, when it means ‘entails’ or the only slightly less precise ‘entails, given a few basic assumptions’. But it only does so in formal contexts, and when you are aware of this, it is surprising how often we are never told how, or on what analysis, or given what formal background assumptions, one thing implies another. I think everyone would benefit from both the recommendations in the post and dropping ‘implies’ and ‘suggests’ and ‘presupposes’ (difficult as it may be, since they get used out of habit).
(But I’m not too thrilled about most of the ‘just a metaphor’ part of the argument. Most of our ways of connecting claims with their supports are metaphors; implies is one, as is entails, etc. It’s not that they are metaphors that cause the problem; it’s that they aren’t precise metaphors in the relevant contexts.)
Point well taken. There’s a difference, though, which is that philosophers are often assuming what are plausibly necessary truths. Yes, it can be a matter of controversy, but there are plenty of clear cases. Theologians, as a rule, are not trained in logic or argumentation, and so quite often they’re thinking it is just obvious that Y follows from X (’cause we *say* it does), although they have no idea how to construct any valid argument connecting them.
I agree that metaphorical speech is important, but in theoretical contexts, it can also be a crutch. When theorizing, one ought to be able to say why or in what way certain metaphors are appropriate. e.g. Christians calling themselves “sons” and “daughters” of God.
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