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Listen to this post:
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I’ve been harping on modalism about the Son (thinking of the Son as a way God is) for a long time, even giving what I think is a convincing argument against it. Still, what if it is false? Why do I care? Why do I think it matters?
Son-modalism has a couple of very unacceptable consequences. If Son-modalism is true, then:
1. The New Testament writers are either incompetent metaphor users, or they’re just mistaken about Jesus and God. Jesus is described in the New Testament as a “priest” and as the “Son of God”. Those metaphors would be inappropriate if Jesus were a mode of God. Again, the Son is supposed to me a “mediator” between God and the rest of us. But if a mode of God is the “mediator,” it would have turned out that God has a friendly, approachable side – no mediation required! So if Son-modalism is true, the New Testament writers who use that metaphor are either ill-informed or are incompetent metaphor users. I resist both conclusions. Why? Because the authors of the New Testament were all, directly or indirectly, taught by Jesus, and I hold that Jesus was a competent teacher.
2. If Jesus is a mode of God, then he is not a human. Every human is a substance/entity/individual thing, and no substance in this sense is a mode of any other substance, so no mode of anything is a human. Ergo, if Son-modalism is true, Jesus isn’t a human being. This is inconsistent with the New Testament, as well as with other things that Christians want to say about Jesus. Yes, I know – “two natures.” If only such speculations left us with a clearly human Jesus!
3. Jesus can’t be a mediator between God and us if he’s just God being or acting or appearing in a certain way. A mediator can’t be either party which he’s mediating. And human beings feel that we need such a mediator – the holiness and glory of God demand it. How about Mary? Or maybe, a priest? Maybe a patron saint? So much for the Pauline vision of Christians accessing God through Christ, a kingdom filled with “priests” with no need of other, merely human intermediaries. I suggest that Son-modalism was a big factor in the development of the cult of Mary, the manifold forms of saint-worship (honoring – whatever), and the strongly bishop- and later priest-oriented direction that catholic Christianity took. You can even see this in medieval and modern art – Jesus is portrayed as God himself in images like this. Emperor-like, he reigns with no one above him.
Conversely, if you believe that Jesus is your “advocate” with the Father, then all these other suggested intermediaries are superfluous. But this requires Son-modalism to be false.
4. Again, if he is a mode of God, Jesus can’t realistically be a model for us to imitate. We can’t imagine ourselves into the place of an essentially all-knowing, all-powerful, and untemptable being. We’re humans, and we need a genuinely human example to imitate. Faced with a Jesus who is basically God in disguise, we’ll go looking for other examples of faith, hope, and love, and many will be far inferior to the Lord Jesus himself.
How do you know if someone is a Son modalist? In a church context, the main way is this – they throw around the terms “Father,” “God,” “Jesus” with no discernible rhyme or reason. They may start a prayer with “Father,” address the object of prayer two sentences later as “Jesus,” then end with “in your name,” leaving unclear which is meant. If those three terms refer to one and the same thing, then there’s no point in being picky about how they’re used. The modalist or one-self Trinity theorist thinks there is but one self (agent, intelligent being) between the Father and the Son. Even if “Father” and “Son” refer to different modes (ways God is), they both equally refer to God (via his various modes). That’s what a modalist thinks.
But they should think again!
I agree with you on the inconsistency of trinitarianism and modalism. How do you make sense of this statement made in point 3 above? “A mediator can’t be either party which he’s mediating.” So is Jesus neither God nor man? I have heard this statement before, and it doesn’t work for either the trinitarian, modalist, or unitarian views.
““A mediator can’t be either party which he’s mediating.” So is Jesus neither God nor man? I have heard this statement before, and it doesn’t work for either the trinitarian, modalist, or unitarian views.” Jayson – good question. I meant that a mediator can’t be *numerically identical to* either of the parties he is serving as the mediator for. This is true. Think about the simplest case – a mutual friend is going to mediate between you and me in some dispute. That friend can just be you or me, or else we would be dealing with one another directly, and not through mediation! Of course, a mediator can be similar to each party (whether a single self or a group), and even be a member of each group-party. E.g. Someone with dual Russian-American citizenship serves as mediator and brings about the end of some war between Russia and America. So there is nothing incoherent about Jesus being a unique mediator between God and humans while himself also being a human. Of course, he can’t be in the group of gods – as there is only one god, and so no group of them. Nor can he be God himself, or else God would just be dealing directly with human beings, and not through a mediator. In my forthcoming debate book with Chris Date he and I get into this; I claim that the concept of mediation rules out a mediator being numerically the same with either party. He pushes back, but I think not successfully. For more about the concept of numerical identity, you can check out this post: https://trinities.org/blog/apologetics-blind-spot-numerical-identity/
Final comment here, I promise.
In objection 4, you write,
“We can’t imagine ourselves into the place of an essentially all-knowing, all-powerful, and untemptable being.”
There are good reasons I argue, that this is not necessary. I might not know anything about the place of Seneca let alone imagine myself in his place. But Seneca may still be a model for me to emulate. There are respects in which any object can serve as a model. Indeed, it may be metaphysically impossible for me to imagine myself in the place of Rufus the bat with respect to psychology, but it is meaningful to say that Rufus is a model for me with respect to behaviour — I might hang upside-down in a cave for example.
So with respect to behaviour, we have to agree that even if Jesus is God, or a bat, Jesus can serve as a model with respect to behaviour. Indeed, if there is univocity with respect to moral predicates pertaining to God and humans, then there is a broad sense in which God can serve as a model for behaviour. Be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect.
Further, your claim seems to be self-defeating. If God is not a model for emulation by virtue of being untemptable, does this not preclude any person from being a model, if that person did not suffer intrinsically sufficient temptation? Intrinsically sufficient temptation being a state of affairs S where,
If x is in S, x will p.
Of necessity, we can agree that Jesus never was a recipient of intrinsically sufficient temptation. Yet, plausibly we have been.
So it must be denied that in order for Jesus to be a model for us, he must have experienced the same KIND of temptation. There are ofcourse different kinds of temptation. Greed is not the same kind of thing hatred. Can Jesus be a model for someone tempted by way of greed, if Jesus did not experience greed? If we agree that Jesus need not have experienced temptation for a particular sin p, in order to be a model for how to relate to p, then either:
Jesus is a model for p, if Jesus was tempted to q. Or,
Jesus is a model for p, even if Jesus was not tempted to sin.
The former does not seem correct. It is difficult to see why being tempted to commit adultery, is sufficient for one to be a model for relating to the sin of murder. But suppose for the sake of argument, one kind of temptation is sufficient to be a model for another kind of temptation.
Is there any coherence in the idea of God experiencing a different kind of temptation than we do? This seems plausible. For considering the concept of ordered desires, if God enjoys multiple substances (including a physical substance), God may experience a desire with respect to one substance but not the other. Surely if Jesus experienced temptation but was not immoral, then there is no ethical incompatibility between God being morally perfect and experiencing temptation.
This is coherent just if there is a possible world where a person has an identical physical substance but does sin. Ordered desires abound in philosophy of action, such as the case of a heroine addict who at one level has a desire for heroine, and yet at another level has a desire to stop drug abuse.
In the case of Christ, he may have experienced temptation with respect to his animal faculties. For example, a desire not to suffer scourging. Yet he may have had a higher order desire to experience scourging in order to achieve some rational end. In the case that Jesus never experienced a countervailing desire to p where p would be a sin in a counterpart possible world, God plausibly could have a physical substance (body) as an accidental part, and with respect to this substance experience a desire to do p where p would be a sin in a counterpart possible world.
Agreeing that Jesus is a model, his own model for morally significant behaviour is the Father when in the Sermon on the mount, we read, “But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you,that you may children of your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous.”
We might further argue that if ee are morally obligated to be perfect such that we would freely do good in every possible world in which we exist, then Jesus serves as a suitable model iff Jesus freely chooses to do good in every possible world where Jesus exists. Jesus is a model only if Jesus is transworld morally perfect.
But Jesus is transworld morally perfect only if Jesus is essentially perfect. But any person who is merely human, ie., is composed of only human substances is not essentially perfect (for any mere human, there is a possible world where that human does sin). If Jesus is also God, ie., is composed of human and divine substances, then those desires with respect to his divine substance may countervail against his human desires in every possible world.
Regards
“you write, “We can’t imagine ourselves into the place of an essentially all-knowing, all-powerful, and untemptable being.”
There are good reasons I argue, that this is not necessary. I might not know anything about the place of Seneca let alone imagine myself in his place. But Seneca may still be a model for me to emulate. There are respects in which any object can serve as a model. Indeed, it may be metaphysically impossible for me to imagine myself in the place of Rufus the bat with respect to psychology, but it is meaningful to say that Rufus is a model for me with respect to behaviour — I might hang upside-down in a cave for example.”
I agree that a model needn’t be like us in all respects. I mean, we might seek to emulate, say, a fictional rabbit. But it seems to me that most powerful model for us, though, will be one of our own, in plights like we face, whom we believe to be real, and to have already prevailed.
“if there is univocity with respect to moral predicates pertaining to God and humans, then there is a broad sense in which God can serve as a model for behaviour. Be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect.”
Sure, e.g. in remaining faithful to our promises.
“Further, your claim seems to be self-defeating. If God is not a model for emulation by virtue of being untemptable, does this not preclude any person from being a model”
No self-defeat, because no, I’m not claiming that God can’t be a model of any kind for us. But I am claiming that a human model – one of Jesus’s heroic proportions – is more powerful for us. We can imagine ourselves into his place, whereas he can’t do this to do, not to the same degree.
“Is there any coherence in the idea of God experiencing a different kind of temptation than we do? This seems plausible.”
I deny it. It seems to me that a perfect being can’t have a motive to do something wrong or otherwise on the whole not choice-worthy.
“For considering the concept of ordered desires, if God enjoys multiple substances (including a physical substance), God may experience a desire with respect to one substance but not the other.”
Don’t know what you mean here. To be tempted because one “has a substance” (essence?) is to be tempted (full stop).
In reply to 3,
We agree that Jesus is a man, and as such his belonging to the class ‘Man’ does not hinder his being a mediator for that class.
If it is suggested that Jesus mediates on behalf of ‘others’, we might ask what relevance his being a man has to do with his being a mediator. For — Jesus is not a member of that class ‘others’. The obvious relevance of Jesus’ identity as a man to his being a mediator, is that his identity as a man is coordinate eith the substance or natural kind of those ‘others’.
We might politely turn the tables on your argument:
Jesus is a mediator for mankind, iff Jesus is also a member of the class mankind.
Prima facie, we have good reasons to suggest not only that it is possible for a mediator to be a member of a party being mediated, but necessarily so. That is,
we have prima facie reasons to believe that Jesus is a mediator between God and mankind, iff Jesus is a member of the class mankind, and the class God.
But you do hint at an argument — a mediator is necessarily a 3rd party. That is, distinct from the parties being mediated.
I don’t think this is necessarily so. Rather, we have clear cases where a proper part of an object can mediate for the whole. A customer service representative being a proper part of a company, can mediate on behalf of that company.
Regards
“In reply to 3, We agree that Jesus is a man, and as such his belonging to the class ‘Man’ does not hinder his being a mediator for that class.”
Yes.
“We might politely turn the tables on your argument:
Jesus is a mediator for mankind, iff Jesus is also a member of the class mankind.
Prima facie, we have good reasons to suggest not only that it is possible for a mediator to be a member of a party being mediated, but necessarily so. That is, we have prima facie reasons to believe that Jesus is a mediator between God and mankind, iff Jesus is a member of the class mankind, and the class God.”
Sorry, but this is patently false. There is no such prima facie reason. A person might, e.g. negotiate peace between the Americans and the Russians while being neither an American nor a Russian but, say, a Dane.
The most that can be said here, I think, is that it is a catholic tradition to suppose that for some reason or other, Jesus had to to also be divine in order to save us. Reasons for this have varied in catholic speculation: e.g. he must be divine to divinize us, or he must be divine and so of infinite value to atone for sins against an infinite God, etc.
Again, you say: “Jesus is a mediator for mankind, iff Jesus is also a member of the class mankind.”
The L to R part – mediator only if he’s human – that may be true. It’s not obvious that it has to be that way, but that may be most fitting. But the R to L direction (iff goes L to R AND R to L) – Jesus is a man only if he’s a mediator – is patently false. Do you see why?
“But you do hint at an argument — a mediator is necessarily a 3rd party. That is, distinct from the parties being mediated. I don’t think this is necessarily so. Rather, we have clear cases where a proper part of an object can mediate for the whole. A customer service representative being a proper part of a company, can mediate on behalf of that company.”
That’s not a counterexample to my claim. Being a third party requires not being numerically identical to either of the mediated parties – whether these are groups or individuals. A proper part of thing is *by definition* not identical to the whole. In your example, yes, clearly an employee can mediate on behalf of her company (to which she is not identical, though of course in some sense she is a part or member of it).
In response to 2 (a mode of God can not be human), do you imply a denial of substance dualism, or atleast do you deny that a singular person can have multiple substances? In the case of bodies, it seems correct to say that if a ball touches my foot, that ball touches me. Yet, it is also reasonable to suggest that my substance is distinct from my foot. Atleast, we might say that my foot is an accidental part of my substance.
In this case, “I” that is my substance can rightly be called ‘ footed’, which is no more controversial than the claim that I have feet. We surely agree that the substance of God, that is if God is a singular person, then God can have a body.
To avoid the claim that embodiment by a non-natural substance “I” is merely possession, I would reply that:
That doesn’t seem to be necessarily so. Atleast, we can agree that merely having a non-essential part (a body) does not entail mere possession (as in like demon possession).
Further, we can argue that possession entails there being a possible world such that,
X is possessed in the actual world by substance I, iff there is a possible world where X is a person-body composite, and x is not possessed. Simply, possession intuitively suggests possessing ‘someone else’s’ body. If there is no pre-possession person to whom the body belongs, then there doesn’t seem to be a case of possession.
Or one might argue that embodiment in the case I suggest, is mere animation rather than possession. This rides on a distinction between proper and improper bodies. An improper body, is a body improperly animated which means it is animated by a substance that to whom is not a proper kind.
This is where the causal efficacy of the Holy Spirit is significant in entailing that Jesus animates his body properly, no less than the person of Adam properly animated his own body by the breath of God.
Regards
“In response to 2 (a mode of God can not be human), do you imply a denial of substance dualism, or atleast do you deny that a singular person can have multiple substances?”
No, neither.
Dale,
I wonder about your thoughts concerning a perdurantist analogy for a logically plausible model of the Trinity. Namely,
For any number of distinct objects O, O are identical at t where they share an identical temporal part at t.
This entails the possibility of distinct objects being identical in one respect though distinct in another. A logically equivalent distinction for the Trinity I suggest is that the persons themselves have proper parts (or merely distinct potential parts), and they share identical parts in a respect. That is, in rigidly designating the object at this part, is to designate on object identical with all persons of the Trinity.
This avoids I suggest, the retort that the persons merely overlap at their identical part since perdurantism if plausible, entails that overlapping can prima facie be equivalent or identical to shared identity.
Thank you for any reply
“I wonder about your thoughts concerning a perdurantist analogy for a logically plausible model of the Trinity.”
It ain’t going to go well, as perdurantism about physical objects (or any other kind) is not true.
“Namely, For any number of distinct objects O, O are identical at t where they share an identical temporal part at t.”
*Distinct* object*s* – and you’re saying they’re identical (i.e. numerically identical) at some time. Stop there; we’re talking nonsense. Do you see why?
“This entails the possibility of distinct objects being identical in one respect though distinct in another.”
You’re talking about qualitative sameness now, not about numerical sameness. This post may help: https://trinities.org/blog/apologetics-blind-spot-numerical-identity/ Of course, things may be similar in some ways and different in others. e.g. “Identical” twins look very similar, but one loves the Patriots and the other hates them.
I can’t make sense of the rest of this comment – sorry.
Alex
I’m surprised that you chose such ‘weak’ verses to ‘show’ that Jesus is God!
Isaiah 9v6 does not refer to Christ- it describes King Hesekiah.
Scholarly modern bibles – such as NAB cast considerable ‘light’ on the subject.
The verse was written in the PRESENT tense
The text does not say “he is’ it says ‘they name him.’
Christ was never called’ Everlasting Father’
The text does not refer to “God’ – it says something like “wonderful in counsel is our God Warrior’
Evangelical web-sites perform the usual contortions and gymnastics to ‘get out’ of this one – including challenging the Hebrews interpretation of their own scriptures. What a shame!
Matthew 1,v23
Again an allegedly prophetic verse which refers to contemporaty events. The truth is out there – mixed up with the persistent objections of the evangelicals. You just have to read the full chapter to see this was not Christ being referred to. I won’t labour the point but where was Christ ever called “Emmanuel”?
John Chapter 1 is completely analagous to Genesis 1.
Notice that 9 verses of Genesis 1 begin with the words “God said” – it was by his WORD that God created the heavens and the earth. No much wonder that the word was with God – it was HIS word!! Simple!
John 1 v 18 envisaged that some people might misinterpret verses 1 -17 and clarifies the situation “‘no man has ever seen God”
John Chapter 17 vv1-4 shows quite clearly that Christ’s Father is the only true God.
Note – 2 persons in this diagogue!
And finally John summarises Christs mission by stating (Chapter 20 v 31) “Now these are written that ye may come to know that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God.”
I am a relative newcomer to these blogs – but almost every Trinitarian theory I encounter strikes me either as a form of modalism- or disguised tritheism.
Blessings
John
Hello,
My fiancee linked me to this blog today, and I am compelled to write about it here.
You’re interpretation of modalism is wrong. Well, not completely wrong, as there are some modalists that believe the way you describe it, but there are some that do not, just like in trinitarianism, there are are some who believe in subordination, and others who do not.
On your first point, you are actually placing yourself in a heretical position. The Bible clearly states in multiple places that Christians believe in one God, not two or three (Deuteronomy 6:4, 2 Samuel 7:22, Nehemiah 9:6, Isaiah 43:10-11, Mark 12:29-34, Romans 3:30, 1 Timothy 2:5). If Jesus is a separate entity from God the Father, then you would at least be a binitarian, or a bitheist, depending on how far you separate the Father from the Son.
We learn through the last verse I gave, 1 Timothy 2:5, that Jesus had a human component, however that looks. We also read in a few passages that Jesus was also God (Isaiah 9:6, Matthew 1:23, John 1:1-18), manifest in flesh. So, from here we have a few options. We could say that Jesus was just a very good man, or that Jesus was a perfect human mediator between humanity and God, or Jesus was fully God, or, we could have a fuller understanding of mystery and say that Jesus was the fullness of God dwelling in a man.
Of course, I would have to go with the last option, and I’d hope you would, too.
Now, how does that work into Jesus being the Son of God? Well, God is spirit, not flesh, and as the Bible says, spirit reproduces spirit, and flesh, flesh (John 3:5-6). So, is Jesus the flesh-Son of God? No, Jesus is the spiritual Son of God, which does not negate Jesus’ role as being absolutely one with the Father. In fact, we could say that Jesus’ Spirit was in fact the fullness of God the Father! Now, you could disagree, but I don’t think you could disprove that with scripture, so it’s up to you on your interpretation.
This same logic defeats your second point. Jesus’ Spirit was a “mode” of God, if that’s how you want to put it. But the flesh was just that, flesh, a man, who was obedient to the Spirit’s will unto death.
Within the constructs of my pre-supposed dual-nature of Jesus Christ, His flesh-man can certainly mediate between the Holiness of God, and the sinfulness of man.
Again, this logic also allows us to be imitators of Christ within reason. In fact, your logic for being able to emulate Jesus, in either regards to His perfect humanity, or His absolute Holiness as God, we will always fall short, because we have not been perfected yet (unless I missed something and the resurrection already happened). However, we are children of the Most High God, and no longer carry the title of sinner (although we may still fall into sin)!
Honestly, I don’t fall into the main category as a modalist, but more-so the category of Oneness theology, which is a subset of Monarchical Modalism.
Anyway, that’s my two cents, I hope you enjoy the read.
-Alex
No, I am by no means a modalist. I am a resolved Trinitarian who has a bit of know how when it comes to modern modalists. Please visit Grassrootsapologetics.org and feel free to examine some of the articles and debates present.
While the Son is indeed God in the Oneness mind, He is purely the manifestation of the divine monad existing in spirit/flesh union. Thus this unique existence renders the Son capable of subject object relationship… Or so they say.
“modern modalists see the Son as the unique existence of a unitarian God in the form of inseparable union of deity and humanity they have no problem”
Hi Michael,
Thanks for the comment. I take it, you’re a Oneness Pentecostal? Or, just a modalist?
If Jesus is “the existence of” God, that just means, does it, not, that Jesus just is God himself? If not, what does it mean, in your view.
Actually, because modern modalists see the Son as the unique existence of a unitarian God in the form of inseparable union of deity and humanity they have no problem any of the issues you brought up. Perhaps these claims would be true of primitive modalists. I’d like to invite you to my site. There you may find the articles and debates useful.
Hi reality checker,
Yes – I’ve wondered that myself, whether or not Lateran IV of 1215 is blatantly modalist.
Based on conversations I’ve had here, I can see how they might think f, s, and h to be distinct, and yet each shares d, the simple divine nature. You think of them as modes, in the sense of ways that d is, which include more than d – the modes are like facts or events. So the f-mode would be d + something. And s-mode would be d + something else. Etc. But each would just “be” d – not identical to d, but rather, a think in which d is the only… component? Of course, then, you worry about those distinguishing somethings…
You’re certainly right – if each one = d, then each of the three just is each of the others as well. And this, of course, is wrong, if ever something’s true of one that isn’t true of the other.
Scott or JT may want to weigh in on this. Gents – how do you read Lateran IV on the Trinity?
Dale,
Taking one of your readers suggestions to heart, I’m commenting on a much discussed subject that you covered in detail within a number of your blogs, Modalism. After reading the definition and descriptions of several modalistic theories I’ve come to the conclusion that the fourth Lateran council described the trinity in modalistic terms. Here is the section I found on Fordham University’s website “Medieval Sourcebook” at
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/lateran4.html
“But we, with the approval of the holy and general council, believe and confess with Peter (Lombard) that there is one supreme entity, incomprehensible and ineffable, which is truly Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, together (simul) three persons and each one of them singly. And thus in God there is only trinity, not quaternity, because each of the three persons is that entity, namely, substance, essense, or divine nature, which alone is the principle of the universe and besides which there is no other.” (emphasis added)
I don’t know latin so I am relying for the correct meaning on the English translation. The English rendering appears to indicate the IS of identity, not of predication. This correlates each singly as the divine nature. Since the “is” of Identity is reflexive F = DN, DN = F S=DN, DN = S, H = DN, DN =H. This appears to me to indicate that each of the three ‘persons’ is a mode of the essence, in other words, it is not 3 entities IN a Divine Nature, it is the Divine nature AS three entities. The only difference between this Catholic Modalism versus Sabellian Modalism would be that CM would be coincident, yet SM was sequential.
Shedd, within his extremely detailed systematic theology article on “trinity in unity” made a similar description and claim, stating unequivocally that each of the persons were modes of the essence, even defending this term against SM. One difference between Shedd and the Lateran Council description is that he claimed that each of the persons was ALL of the Divine nature, which is pretty hard to swallow if he’s speaking simulataneously since he also upholds that the persons are distinct from each other.
Getting back to the Lateran council description, are my logical conclusions reasonable or tweeked?
Dale,
What needs working out is a theory of the Incarnation in addition to a theory about the Trinity. The Incarnation is a very tricky thing to explain metaphysically. You may like to look at Richard Cross’s book _Metaphysics of the Incarnation: From Aquinas to Scotus_. That might be fodder for discussion.
To say ‘Jesus’ cosignifies two natures, human nature and a divine nature according to Athanasius and many many others (i.e. Def. of Chalcedon). That is a starting point for a much longer conversation….
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All of your points (1-4, and you’re “How” answer – prayer style) I related to every day trinitarians. Also is Jesus is “fully God” as the creeds declare – all your points against modalism are true against orthodox Christianity – against the creeds themselves.
You’re convicting yourself of your own trinitarianism. Jesus cannot be God without all this baggage and contradictory propositions.
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