One way apologists misunderstand theos in the New Testament

Christian philosophers who hope to contribute something useful to “the doctrine of the Trinity” often approach it as a puzzle presented by sentences required by some arguably orthodox confession, such as the so-called “Athanasian” Creed. Such sentences normally include these three:

1. The Father is God.
2. The Son is God.
3. The Father is not the Son.

The last seems to be a negative identity statement, meaning the Father is not numerically identical with the Son. (Logical form: ¬(f=s).) What about the first two sentences then? The logically savvy analytic philosopher knows that there is trouble brewing if both of these are also identity statements (positive ones). Why? Let’s first write out the three sentences above interpreted as so many identity claims:

1. f = g    (The Father just is God.)
2. s = g   (The Son just is God.)
3. ¬ (f = s) (It’s not the case that: the Father just is the Son.)

Identity is symmetrical: for any a and any b, a = b just in case also b = a. Thus from 2 we can infer:

4. g = s   (God just is the Son.)

Identity is also transitive: for any a, b, and c, if a = b and b = c, then a = c. Thus from 1 and 4 we can infer:

5. f = s   (The Father just is the Son.)

But 5 contradicts 3. We have shown that 1-3 logically imply a contradiction, and so can’t all be true. Thus any “doctrine of the Trinity” which implies 1-3 will contain at least one false claim.

No problem, says the analytic theologian. Let’s just interpret 2 and 3 as predications, that is, descriptions, rather than as identifications. In other words, the three claims would actually be:

1. Df   (The Father is divine.)
2. Ds   (The Son is divine.)
3. ¬ (f = s)   (It’s not the case that: the Father just is the Son.)

Thus interpreted, 1-3 no longer imply that the Father just is the Son and that this is not so.

It’s not clear though that all danger is avoided, for 1-3 imply that there are at least two things such that each one is divine. What is a divine thing if not a god? Don’t 1-3 imply that there are at least two gods? If not, why not? But let’s suppose for the moment that there is a good and well-motivated answer to this concern.

Granting that, what about God-talk in the New Testament as opposed to in the catholic creeds? In a recent discussion William Lane Craig seems to think there is guidance here in how to interpret New Testament god-talk, i.e. the application of the Greek word theos to the Father or the Son. He seems to reason like this:

The New Testament authors apply the word theos to the Father and to the Son in the same sense. That sense is either identification (a statement of the logical form a = b) or predication (a statement of the logical form Fa). If they identified each of the Father and the Son with God, then it would follow that the Father and the Son are numerically identical (f = g and s = g together imply f = s). But all New Testament authors are committed to the numerical distinctness of the Father and the Son (i.e. ¬ (f = s)), since they assume them to qualitatively differ. Thus, to be charitable to these authors (interpreting them as not contradicting themselves about the central subjects of their concern), we should not understand them to imply or assume the identity of either the Father or the Son with God. But then, since any applications of theos to them must be either identifications or predications, all such applications are predications, i.e. descriptions of either as being divine, as having the quality divinity.

Thus is an apologetic strategy for formulating Trinity creedal statements extended to interpreting the New Testament. We are being advised, whenever we see a New Testament author apply some form of the word theos to the Father or to the Son, to see him as describing that one as divine.

         Unfortunately this strategy is demonstrably misguided. It is patently false that every application of theos to either the Father or the Son in the New Testament is either an identity claim or a description of that one as divine. Consider for instance this verse:

“Do not work for the food that perishes but for the food that endures for eternal life, which the Son of Man will give you. For it is on him that God the Father has set his seal.”

John 6:27, NRSVUE

In Greek this is one long sentence; the translators chose to split off the last clause (“For it . . .”) and make it an English sentence. Here, all agree, “God” (theos) is applied to the Father. But the sentence is not asserting anything about God other than that he’s set his seal on the Son. “God” there is neither being used to identify the Father with God nor is it being used to predicate divinity of the Father (describe the Father as divine). “God” here is being used in what grammarians call “apposition.” The main function of singular referring terms like proper names and titles is to refer to something, as it were, to point at it. And sometimes authors, so to speak, point with both hands; they refer to something twice (or more) in quick succession, using two different words or phrases. This can be for clarity, if one word or phrase alone would be too ambiguous, or it can be simply a stylistic choice. Here the translators correctly render the Greek as “God the Father,” i.e. “God [that is to say,] the Father.” But in the Greek the words God and Father are actually separated by the verb translated as “has set his seal” (ho Pater esphragisen ho Theos).

         Another common use of “God” in the New Testament is in greetings. For example,

Grace, mercy, and peace will be with us from God the Father and from Jesus Christ, the Father’s Son, in truth and love.

2 John 1:3, NRSVUE

As I understand it, the author here is not asserting anything, but is rather performing an act of greeting and blessing on behalf of God and Jesus. If that’s right, then here in his use of “God” he is neither asserting the identity of the Father with God nor describing the Father as divine. What’s he’s doing with “God” and “Father” is using them in apposition (in Greek: theou patros). Why? Apposition seems to be a part of this author’s style; note his triple use for co-referring terms, the name “Jesus,” the title “Christ,” and the phrase “the Father’s Son.”

Although the common use of “God” and “Father” in apposition doesn’t assert their numerical identity or the divinity of the Father, we might well ask what this common practice presupposes, and why there is not a similar common practice with the terms “God” and “the Son” (or “Jesus” or “Christ”).

I think the answer is the assumptions that God and the Father are one and the same (numerically identical), and that this one is numerically distinct from the Son.

I can’t think of a plausible and Trinity-theory-friendly explanation. Can you?