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Zarley on “worship” of Jesus in the New Testament

moon clip artTheology blogger / author / golf pro Kermit Zarley asks: Is Jesus Divine Because He Was Worshipped?

He answers in the negative. As usual, he highlights some important scholarship. In part,

When the gospel Evangelists report that someone performed proskuneo toward Jesus, Bible translators invariably reveal their Christological bias by rendering it “worship,” suggesting that that person thought Jesus was “divine” or “God.” But when the Evangelists relate that a person performed proskuneo toward someone other than Jesus, they translate it “bowed down,” “bend the knee,” or “prostrate.” So, they translate it “worship” when done to Jesus, but a physical act when done to someone else.

I agree that it is important that Christians should worship Jesus too, and not only God. The New Testament, in my view, clearly teaches this; it is a consequence of his being raised to God’s right hand. I also agree that this is not at all the sin of idolatry.

Keep in mind that the passages he’s discussing above concern Jesus before his resurrection and exaltation. He is  clearly worshiped in the fullest religious sense after. e.g. Philippians 2, Revelation 5, as well as prayed to.

Contrary to Mr. Zarley, I do think it is technically a violation of the command, now made out of date by the one who issued it, to worship only Yahweh (i.e. the Father). I would add that it’s simply not correct to define the sin of idolatry as worshiping anyone other than God.

I don’t think we can make much progress distinguishing kinds of (religious) worship. To say there are kinds of worship is one thing, but to display the differences is another. But we can distinguish indirect from direct worship, as the New Testament does in several places. We worship God (indirect object) by worshiping his Son (direct object).

Here’s another angle. In the NT, the justification given for worshiping Jesus is that this is our obeying the God who vindicated, raised, and exalted Jesus. Now, if we should worship Jesus because he’s fully divine, or because he’s God himself, or because he shares a divine nature with the Father… wouldn’t that be their main reason?

Below the fold, much better music than we usually feature on this blog. Read More »Zarley on “worship” of Jesus in the New Testament

Scott Williams’s “soft Latin” theory of the Trinity

Williams LT 1Here are a few observations on my co-blogger Dr. Scott Williams‘s recently published article in the Journal of Analytic Theology, called “Indexicals and the Trinity: Two Non-Social Models.”

There’s a lot going on in the piece – some terminology, some history of theology, and some interesting dialectic with one of the best philosophers working on this topic, Brian Leftow, which centers around the concept of an “indexical” term.

But in this post, I want to narrowly focus on the theory which Dr. Williams suggests to us. This comes in his section 4, pp. 84-8. He calls it “soft LT” (to contrast it with Leftow’s “hard LT”) and I would expound it with the chart here, which I made.

f, s, and h are, respectively the divine persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. d is the divine nature which they share, and which is one component in each of them. The other component in each is some “incommunicable personal attribute” (p. 84), respectively: begetting (b), being begotten (g), and being spirated (p). The ovals show the two parts or components of each divine person. (I take it that the model is committed to denying any classic doctrine of “divine simplicity.”)

None of f, s, h is identical to the divine nature, but each isRead More »Scott Williams’s “soft Latin” theory of the Trinity

Simplifying the Indiscernibility of Identicals

equals - greenI’ve posted quite a few times here before about identity, and about the principle often called “Leibniz’s Law” – the Indiscernibility of Identicals. This is often put:

Necessarily, for any x and any y, x is identical to y only if for any P, x has P if and only if y has P. (Compare, e.g. Colin McGinn, Logical Properties (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 4-7.

I agree with other philosophers that this has apparent counterexamples, if “P” can stand either for any predicate or for any property.

But in my view, the underlying metaphysical intuition – that a thing can’t at one time be and not be a certain way – is undeniable. (And of course, it has important theological implications.)

I would restrict the “P” above to intrinsic properties, if I believed in properties. But I don’t. So I’ve been putting the principle like this:

The Indiscernibility of Identicals: Necessarily, any A and B are identical only if they (1) never have differed, (2) don’t differ, (3) will not ever differ, and (4) could not differ.

This formula doesn’t import any assumptions about property-theory, either for or against. Rather, it uses only a primitive concept of differing, or being different – as to qualitative aspect or way of being, not as to number. I think this well captures the intuition and fundamental conviction noted above.

But it now strikes me that the formula is needlessly complicated. Why not just this?Read More »Simplifying the Indiscernibility of Identicals

Heretical “trinitarians” – evolution of a word

Following up on the previous post – the word “trinitarian” may be an adjective or a noun. The Oxford English Dictionary lists four adjective meanings: (here’s my editing of relevant parts of their entry, emphasis added) 2. Theol. Relating to the Trinity; holding the doctrine of the Trinity (opp. to Unitarian). In early use, Trinitarian heretic, one holding heretical views as to the Trinity: 1656… Read More »Heretical “trinitarians” – evolution of a word

podcast 48 – 2 interpretations of Philippians 2 – part 1

Does Paul’s letter to the Philippians, chapter 2 teach that Jesus is God himself, and that at certain point in time about 2,000 years ago, Jesus became a man, letting go of his equality with God, and thereby divesting himself of his glory, or the use of his attributes, to become a human like us, but obedient to the point of death? In this episode we… Read More »podcast 48 – 2 interpretations of Philippians 2 – part 1

Defining the concept of a Christian unitarian

Thanks to reader Mike Gant  for his question about my last post. As of now I think I’ve got a solid definition of the concept unitarian: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self and not to any other self. But I then tried to define the more specific concept of a Christian unitarian: someone who believes that… Read More »Defining the concept of a Christian unitarian

Refutation of “Oneness” Theology in Rap Form (Dale)

Man, if I don’t love youtube. Never thought you’d here the words “modalistic monarchianism” in a rap?

Yo. Check it out this rap “Godhead” by Flame. Comes with bonus sermon excerpts.

My favorite rhyme, from verse 3: “Pentecostalism” with “cost of living”. That was a hard one! Well played. 🙂 Second best: “Sabellius” with “belly is”. (Verse 2) He really should’ve worked in “Nestorianism” towards the end of verse 3, but I guess that would tax the rhyming skills of Snoop Dog himself.

The concern here is to refute “Oneness” folk. Take that, Winterband!!! Indeed – Sabellius was trippin.

After the break, the lyrics in all their glory, as posted on the youtube page, with the best bits bolded by me.

Read More »Refutation of “Oneness” Theology in Rap Form (Dale)

Philosopher Dr. Trent Dougherty

podcast 88 – Dr. Trent Dougherty on the Problem of Evil

In this episode Dr. Trent Dougherty of Baylor University tells us about his spiritual journey from secular, to evangelical, to Roman Catholic. Then we then discuss his general approach to what philosophers call “the problem of evil.” If God is perfect, and perfectly good, then why do so many terrible things happen?

podcast 21 – review of the Lewis-Rogers debate – part 2

In this episode, my evaluation of the case made by Shadid Lewis. Does he establish, on grounds which his opponent must affirm, that the Trinity implies polytheism? See Lewis’s arguments as analysed on the post for episode 17. What is the doctrine of the Trinity anyway? Are the persons members of an eternal group of wonderfully unified friends? Or are they aspects or personalities of… Read More »podcast 21 – review of the Lewis-Rogers debate – part 2

Counting Wives – a tale of three polygamists – Part 2

This time, the second and final part of our tale. (Part 1.) It features staggering scientific breakthroughs and moderate fool-pitying, so it should be suitable for all audiences.  Bill went on to serve for several decades at the Central Police Station, and often enjoyed regaling guests or fellow employees with tales of the two most confused polygamists he’d run across. “Probably too much of the… Read More »Counting Wives – a tale of three polygamists – Part 2

Counting Wives – a tale of three polygamists – Part 1

 Here’s a bit of fresh fiction, possibly part of a future paper or book some day. Of course, there is purpose behind the madness. (See 2.2.2 here.) It is dedicated to philosopher Bill Hasker. Enjoy. It was a quiet day at the Salt Lake City Central Police Station. Bill looked at the clock and fiddled with his pen. Two hours till quitting time, and he’d… Read More »Counting Wives – a tale of three polygamists – Part 1

Awesome... and yet, not awesome.

Gregory of Nazianzus – an early dialetheist? (Dale)

Awesome... and yet, not awesome.Philosopher Graham Priest is notorious for his claim that there are true contradictions. I have to confess that when I first heard this years ago, I thought the people telling me were pulling my leg. But, they were not. Priest is deadly serious, and has developed paraconsistent logics – logical systems which allow some true contradictions. And he’s vigorously defended his claims against all comers, as in this recent book.

No, he doesn’t say that all contradictions are true – only some of them. And the ones which are true are also false. He claims that this thesis of dialetheism solves the liar paradox and others.

Very rarely, some theologian will come along, and assert that the Trinity doctrine is a true contradiction – not a merely apparent contradiction, but a real one.

Most Christians, though, eschew such a claim. Mysterian James Anderson discusses and rejects this approach to Christian mysteries in his book Paradox in Christian Theology.

Much to my surprise, I recently found a move like Priest’s in Gregory of Nazianzus (d. c. 390), in his Third Theological Oration.

Gregory is considering  an argument by Arians, a premise of which is that the Son who the Father begot either was or was not in existence – I take it, prior or “prior” to his being begotten. (It is clear at the end of this section that Gregory takes them to mean literally before.)

Gregory asserts that this claim “contains an absurdity, and not a difficulty to answer.” He then gives a non-too-clear time example, which I’ll skip. Then he argues,

…in regard to this expression, “I am now telling a lie,” admit one of these alternatives, either that it is true, or that it is a falsehood, without qualification (for we cannot admit that it is both). But this cannot be. For necessarily he either is lying, and so is telling the truth, or else he is telling the truth, and so is lying. What wonder is it then that, as in this case [of the liar paradox] contraries are true, so in that case [concerning the Arians’ premise above] they [i.e. both alternatives] should both be untrue, and so your clever puzzle prove mere foolishness?

I take it that the “contraries” he mentions would be: “the man is lying” and “the man is telling the truth”. Contraries are often defined nowadays – I’m not sure how they were defined in his day – as claims that can’t both be true. But here, Gregory asserts that both are trueRead More »Gregory of Nazianzus – an early dialetheist? (Dale)

HoG: Intellectual Production of the Word (Scott)

laptop_desk_moving_model.jpg

“My god Spock! Is this the apex of human intellectual production?” “No Captain, look within, do you smell that?”

I apologize for the delay in posting. I have been busy with, among other things, my own work.

In the previous post, I enumerated 40 lines of premises and conclusions that generally summarizes Henry’s philosophical psychology of the Trinity. There are one or two things that ought to be clarified.

I have posted some responses to Dale’s post in the Comments section of his post.

I would like to elaborate on two issues in this post.

1. Why must the divine intellect be perfectly actual? (pace Dale’s 2nd objection)
2. Why must the divine intellect have two powers, an operative power and a productive power?

In regards to 1, Henry generally follows Anselm’s perfect being theology program. In this program, when we attribute some property to God we should follow the rule: ‘whatever it is simply better to have than not have we should attribute to God’. This property that it is simply better to have than not to have in medieval speak is called a ‘pure perfection’. A pure perfection is some property that it is simply better to have than not to have it. A pure perfection is some property x that is not considered as a pure perfection with regard to some species-nature. It is not a question of whether ‘it is better for my fish Nigel to be a Ninja or not’, but whether it is simply better to be a Ninja or not. A comparison to some species is not at issue here. For example, if it is better to be wise than not be wise, we should say that God is wise. If it is better to be loving than not to be loving, we should say that God is loving. If it is better to be stupid than not stupid, we should attribute ‘being stupid’ to God. But, our intuitions lead us to think that being wise and being just are simply better to have than not to have; yet being stupid is something we wouldn’t attribute to God because it is actually better to not be stupid, than to be stupid.
Read More »HoG: Intellectual Production of the Word (Scott)

The Latin Trinity Chart 3 – Henry of Ghent to the rescue

“Stand aside, puny moderns. Or postmoderns. Or whatever you are.”

I thought that Scott and Joseph made some really penetrating comments on the first two posts in this series. Here I want to recap them, so we can discuss how Henry of Ghent (c. 1217-93) a.k.a. The Solemn Doctor would interpret our chart (see the first two posts), specifically, the second, modalistic interpretation I offered.

First, Joseph comes in with some weighty objections to that model (summarized and expanded by me from his comments).Read More »The Latin Trinity Chart 3 – Henry of Ghent to the rescue

Plato: proto-trinitarian, or the Father of Arianism?

Back in 1983, the excellent scholar of early modern philosophy Sarah Hutton published an interesting little piece called “The Neoplatonic Roots of Arianism: Ralph Cudworth and Theophilus Gale” (in Lech Szczucki, ed. Socinianism and its Role in the Culture of the XVI-th to XVIII-th Centuries (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences, 139-45). Professor Hutton informs me that it will be coming out in a collection of papers on the Cambridge Platonists. I’ll just very crudely summarize the piece, and make my point about it.

 

Read More »Plato: proto-trinitarian, or the Father of Arianism?