Hays denies that Jesus died
The gospel commits us to more than: “Jesus died” is (somehow or other) true.
The gospel commits us to more than: “Jesus died” is (somehow or other) true.
Awhile back I provided links to some good, thought provoking commentary by Christian philosophers. Now, some other excellent pieces I’ve read, by philosophers and not. I think Christian philosopher Dr. Kelly James Clark hits the nail on the head: …many Christians mistakenly assume that two people worship the same God only if they have identical or nearly identical descriptions of God. This assumption, which may… Read More »another Doc Hawk / “one god” Wheaton controversy round-up
In a recent post I put forward my own preferred version of “Leibniz’s Law,” or more accurately, the Indiscernibility of Identicals. It’s a bit complicated, so as to get around what are some apparent counterexamples to the simpler principle which is commonly held.
Aside for non-philosophers: philosophers are usually after universal principles, truths which hold in all cases, rather than mere non-universal generalizations, i.e. rough rules of thumb which have exceptions. (An example of the latter: Boys love trucks.) Thus, when a philosophers makes a (universal) claim, other philosophers come along and try to show that it is false with “counterexamples” – real, or even merely possible, examples which show the principle to be false (as it doesn’t apply to them). For example, if someone says that all Texans love tacos, a counterexample to this would be a person who is from Texas and doesn’t like them. Just one counterexample is enough to show a universal claim to be false. When provided with a counterexample, of course, one will often refine, as it were, the original claim (e.g. All native Texans love tacos, or All Texans who appreciate Tex-Mex food love tacos) and the game goes on. This is all in the interest of discovering together what is true and what is false. (In my example, of course, those “refinements” would admit of easy counterexamples too.)
So my principle said, to paraphrase, that for any x and y, x just is (=) y, only if they don’t ever intrinsically differ. (I put this in terms of one having a “mode” at a time if and only if the other also has that mode at that time. Others would call these “intrinsic properties.”)
Here our friend, philosopher and blogger Brandon offered a counterexample, Read More »On an alleged counterexample to Leibniz’s Law – Part 1
In Part 1 I explained how vague it is to say that there are three divine Persons “in” God. In Part 2, I described some different things one might mean by “Persons”. In this third part, I’ll explain some of many things it might mean to say that the three persons are one “substance” (Greek: ousia, Latin: substantia). But before I do that, it is… Read More »“the” Trinity doctrine – Part 3
Deciding to call just one of the three selves in your christology “Jesus” doesn’t fix the fact that your theory has two too many selves.
“Come on, you tired little brain – don’t fail me now.” (No, I don’t really blog naked – serious thought requires having at least your underpants on.)
Joseph Jedwab does an excellent job (here, comments 3 & 4) pressing me for details, and taking a shot at defending the Brower and Rea theory. I wanted to chew a bit on some issues that Joseph and Ian raise before moving on, offering some corrections and other reflections. (And JT – I want to post your lengthy comment (the second one) as a guest post, so we can discuss the priority issue – email me if you object to this promotion. ) Any bold type that appears in quotes here has been added by me.
To non-philosophical readers: I apologize for the over-long load of philosopher-lingo that follows. You may want to skip this one! Read More »Constitution Trinitarianism Part 4: pausing and revisiting some issues
“…earliest believers treated the risen/exalted Jesus as they did only because they felt required to do so by God.”
Apologist explains what any theist can, declares victory for his own pet theory.
In this post – what did the bishops mean when they declared for the first time that Father and Son were the same ousia? You’ll want to have this list of interpretations from part 1 in front of you. Importantly, some of possible interpretations of ousia imply others, most notably, the problematic 1. 3 and 4 imply 1 (though not vice-versa). But 1 should be unacceptable to any… Read More »10 steps towards getting less confused about the Trinity – #4 “same ousia” – Part 2
It is impossible to ignore that prominently in the New Testament, two members of the trinity/Trinity interact in I-Thou, Me-You ways, as person to person, self to self. Thus, Jesus prays to his Father, and sometimes, the Father speaks about or to Jesus. This seems to presuppose that both Father and Son are selves. And in a few passages, “the Holy Spirit” is said to speak,… Read More »10 steps towards getting less confused about the Trinity – #5 “Persons” – Part 2
In the most recent post in this series, I plunged into some metaphysical issues about God, essence, existence, and necessity. As promised, I now discuss why is it impossible that God doesn’t exist. Let me start by saying that I know I’m out on a speculative limb here. This is uncertain business, metaphysics. But I’m going to state my views forthrightly. Refute them if you… Read More »Dialogue with the Maverick Philosopher: God is a being, not Being itself – part 5
Steve Hays has posted on my critiques of purely philosophical arguments from theism to the Trinity.
Kimel lampoons the biblical unitarian historical narrative, and urges that Irenaeus is a big problem for it.
What the priest was thinking in charging Jesus with “blasphemy.”
At his blog Faith & Scripture, my friend John interacts with the questions for the reader in chapter 10.
He tries his hand at a little ad hoc philosophizing about death.
Here’s part of a conversation I had recently with a guy in a Facebook group who when it comes to theology consumes almost only evangelical apologetics sources. I’m going to call him “Tim” here. The conversation illustrates a blind spot that I often run into, a blind spot which results from people who study apologetics being insufficiently trained in logic. All the non-theological points I… Read More »the apologetics blind-spot on numerical identity
In his sixth and final installment of the debate, Bowman turns in his finest performance, making a number of interesting moves, and getting some glove on Burke. First, he tweaks his formula (here’s the previous version): The doctrine of the Trinity is biblical if and only if all of the following propositions are biblical teachings: One eternal uncreated being, the LORD God, alone created all… Read More »SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – ROUND 6 Part 2 – Bowman
It seems I touched a nerve, judging by the word count so far (here, and here). First, let me make clear that I have no interest in mocking Catholic doctrine. I’m a non-catholic (and so non-Catholic) Christian, and am in sympathy with the Catholic tradition in many ways. I’m going to avoid some well-worn Catholic-Protestant battle areas here, and try to stick to what I… Read More »More on Loyola’s “white is black” passage