podcast 243 – Response to Branson Part 1 – The Orthodox Doctrine of the Trinity
Most Orthodox theologians agree with Catholics and most Protestants that the one God is the Trinity.
Most Orthodox theologians agree with Catholics and most Protestants that the one God is the Trinity.
A famous manifesto of unitarian Christianity from 1819
We had our first post here or 6 / 19 / 06 – over 350 posts ago! Thus, we are 5. Ready for Kindergarden, evidently! 😉 Many thanks to J.T. Paasch, Scott Williams, and Joseph Jedwab for their excellent posts! And thanks to the many great commenters here; we’ve had some vigorous discussions, and only very rarely have things gotten a bit too “hot.” You folks are awesome. A… Read More »trinities turns 5
Continuing our yarn from last time, imagine that our guru Opi changes his strategy. Now he instead tells his disciples that “Opi is the dopi” means that Opi is eternally the uniquely smartest teacher, and also that eternally, there is a teacher smarter than Opi. Here, he teaches them to believe an apparent contradiction, that eternally, Opi is and is not the smartest teacher. But is… Read More »10 steps towards getting less confused about the Trinity – #3 Take the mystery out of appeals to “mystery” – Part 3
Theologian-apologist-philosopher Dr. James N. Anderson of Reformed Theological Seminary has posted his new entry for IVP’s New Dictionary of Theology on “Paradox” – that is, on apparent contradictions. Saith Dr. Anderson, Various approaches to theological paradoxes have been proposed, including: (1) The paradoxes involve real contradictions, but God is not bound by ‘human logic’. (2) The paradoxes involve real contradictions, and therefore some traditional doctrines need to be… Read More »Dr. James N. Anderson on Paradoxes in Theology
In his sixth and final installment of the debate, Bowman turns in his finest performance, making a number of interesting moves, and getting some glove on Burke. First, he tweaks his formula (here’s the previous version): The doctrine of the Trinity is biblical if and only if all of the following propositions are biblical teachings: One eternal uncreated being, the LORD God, alone created all… Read More »SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – ROUND 6 Part 2 – Bowman
This post is sponsored by the letter “R”.
In my forthcoming “On Positive Mysterianism“, I first locate what I can “mysterianism” within a classification of various ways religious thinkers respond to apparently contradictory religious doctrines, i.e. ones which in their view they have some reason to believe.
In that paper I was discussing apparently contradictory beliefs about the Incarnation and Trinity doctrines, but it seems to me that this scheme is applicable to any religion.
The chart is just below. Read More »Need More Rs
Dr. Beall explains and defends his suggestion that Christ is a contradiction.
A paper on the rationality of believing apparent contradictions in theology.
In this episode Dr. Beall explains why he doesn’t accept five consistency-preserving ways to understand the divinity and humanity of Christ.
0.75x 1x 1.25x 1.5x 2x 0:0000:23:50 podcast 36 – Interview with Dr. Bart Ehrman about his How Jesus Became God – Part 2 Apple PodcastsGoogle PodcastsPlayer EmbedShare Leave a ReviewListen in a New WindowDownloadSoundCloudStitcherSubscribe on AndroidSubscribe via RSSSpotify Is the author of John confused about Jesus and God? Does he think that two different beings – the Father, and the man Jesus – are numerically… Read More »podcast 36 – Interview with Dr. Bart Ehrman about his How Jesus Became God – Part 2
Here. It’s an excellent, substantial discussion, posted in December 2014. If you don’t know who Dr. Rea is, he’s a leading Christian philosopher, specializing in metaphysics, and co-coiner of the useful term “analytic theology.” Here’s a rough guide to the interview, in case you want to skip around, or review after the fact, with a few sparse comments in italics. 1-12:20 Randal reads quotes about how difficult a… Read More »Dr. Randal Rauser interviews Dr. Michael C. Rea on the Trinity
Jesus is God, and God can’t be tempted… yet Jesus was tempted?
Can someone with two natures be essentially immortal and die?
For a few of the most serious and clever among us, mystery-mongering dies hard. They will stubbornly resist my previous attack on positive mysterianism about the Trinity, kicking back hard. I knew all along that the Trinity was going to be mysterious. And so now that I’ve discovered one way in which it is mysterious, well, I do celebrate it. You can rub my face… Read More »10 steps towards getting less confused about the Trinity – #3 Take the mystery out of appeals to “mystery” – Part 4
“Classic” (i.e. mainstream catholic, Platonic) Christian theism holds that God is timeless, and so incapable of any change whatever.
And they add: the Word is God, and the Word became flesh.
Sounds like a change, doesn’t it? First, the Word is simply divine, and a moment later, he’s entered into a “hypostatic union” with a “complete human nature.”
Reformed philosophical theologian James Anderson takes a crack at this one. (HT: Triablogue.) I much like his set-up. I’m less keen on the solution. Short answer: it’s a mystery (apparent contradiction). You’ll have to read his post to see why I chose this pic.
A few quick comments: first, I’m with Read More »Linkage: Did God the Son change in becoming incarnate?
Like most Christian philosophers, I think David Hume (1711-76) was brilliant, but mistaken about most of the important religious topics he wrote on. Though he says some silly things earlier in the chapter, I could not help but be impressed by this powerful blast of rhetoric from chapter 11 of Hume’s Natural History of Religion (1757). He speaks with all the bitterness and bile of an Enlightenment philosopher raised in a human-reason-hating form of Calvinist Christianity. In the end it is just rhetoric; I don’t see any interesting argument here against mysterians.
But I do agree with Hume that humans have an appetite for “mysteries” – be they apparent contradictions or simply very unclear but profound-sounding claims. I’ve commented on this, I think, as far back as 2003, before reading Hume on this. Philosophical faults aside, he is always an insightful observer of human nature and human history.
I’ve added some emphases and explanations in brackets and a link below. Full text is here.
But [in contrast to polytheistic traditions,] where theism forms the fundamental principle of any popular religion, that tenet is so conformable to sound reason, that philosophy is apt to incorporate itself with such a system of theology. And if the other dogmas of that system be contained in a sacred book, such as the Alcoran [the Qur’an], or be determined by any visible authority, like that of the Roman pontif, speculative reasoners naturally carry on their assent, and embrace a theory which has been instilled into them by their earliest education, and which also possesses some degree of consistence and uniformity. But as these appearances are sure, all of them, to prove deceitful, philosophy will soon find herself very unequally yoked Read More »David Hume vs. Mysterians
In the preceding chapters, Richard has been arguing for the impossibility of only one divine person. If there’s one, there must be more than one; more than that, there must be at least three.
To do this, he’s used Anselmian perfect being theology – arguing that since God is absolutely perfect, and it would add to his perfection to have certain features, he must indeed have those. It seems that he prefers a three parallel arguments, from perfect goodness, perfect happiness, and perfect glory. (See, e.g. chapter 5.)
As the book goes on, though, it seems to me that he prefers the argument from happiness. Here, in chapter 21, he sums up his case, because he feels some pressure here at the end of the book to explain why all this should be considered monotheism, and not polytheism. More on that next time. Here’s what looks like his summary of his argument:
The fullness of supreme happiness requires fullness of supreme pleasure. The fullness of supreme pleasure requires fullness of supreme charity. The fullness of supreme charity demands fullness of supreme perfection. (p. 393)
This last part isn’t easy to see, but as we’ve been over it, I let it go here. In chapter 21, Richard assumes that perfect being reasoning should be applied to each member of the Trinity. If we do this, then we prove the existence of equally perfect beings, such that “all coincide in supreme equality. In all of them there will be equal wisdom, equal power, undifferentiated glory, uniform goodness, and eternal happiness…” (pp. 393-4, emphasis added)
This, he asserts, meets the requirement of the “Athanasian” creed,Read More »Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 21 (Dale)
Philosopher Graham Priest is notorious for his claim that there are true contradictions. I have to confess that when I first heard this years ago, I thought the people telling me were pulling my leg. But, they were not. Priest is deadly serious, and has developed paraconsistent logics – logical systems which allow some true contradictions. And he’s vigorously defended his claims against all comers, as in this recent book.
No, he doesn’t say that all contradictions are true – only some of them. And the ones which are true are also false. He claims that this thesis of dialetheism solves the liar paradox and others.
Very rarely, some theologian will come along, and assert that the Trinity doctrine is a true contradiction – not a merely apparent contradiction, but a real one.
Most Christians, though, eschew such a claim. Mysterian James Anderson discusses and rejects this approach to Christian mysteries in his book Paradox in Christian Theology.
Much to my surprise, I recently found a move like Priest’s in Gregory of Nazianzus (d. c. 390), in his Third Theological Oration.
Gregory is considering an argument by Arians, a premise of which is that the Son who the Father begot either was or was not in existence – I take it, prior or “prior” to his being begotten. (It is clear at the end of this section that Gregory takes them to mean literally before.)
Gregory asserts that this claim “contains an absurdity, and not a difficulty to answer.” He then gives a non-too-clear time example, which I’ll skip. Then he argues,
…in regard to this expression, “I am now telling a lie,” admit one of these alternatives, either that it is true, or that it is a falsehood, without qualification (for we cannot admit that it is both). But this cannot be. For necessarily he either is lying, and so is telling the truth, or else he is telling the truth, and so is lying. What wonder is it then that, as in this case [of the liar paradox] contraries are true, so in that case [concerning the Arians’ premise above] they [i.e. both alternatives] should both be untrue, and so your clever puzzle prove mere foolishness?
I take it that the “contraries” he mentions would be: “the man is lying” and “the man is telling the truth”. Contraries are often defined nowadays – I’m not sure how they were defined in his day – as claims that can’t both be true. But here, Gregory asserts that both are trueRead More »Gregory of Nazianzus – an early dialetheist? (Dale)