Podcast: Play in new window | Download
Subscribe: Spotify | Email | RSS
Can metaphysics show how trinitarian theology is coherent? Against suspicions that somehow trinitarian theology is incoherent, many philosophers have suggested interpretations of the orthodox formulas which are designed to be coherent. This work is ongoing, and sometimes seemingly new strategies are explored.
In this talk from the recent Eastern Division meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers held at Rutgers University in October 2016, Aaron Arinder, a PhD student in Philosophy at Syracuse University, explores an interpretation of the Trinity in terms of what metaphysicians call “ontological pluralism.” This is the view that not only are there fundamentally different kinds of things, but that there are fundamentally different kinds of existence. If this is true then we ought not refer to just the sum total of things that exist (full stop), but rather, we should talk about “all,” “none,” or “some” relative to various fundamentally different domains of realities, each a domain of things existing in a certain way. In the talk he refers to the domain including the “divine Persons” of the Trinity as “Delta” and the other domain, the one which includes the one God, “Omega.” In his view, there exists (in one way) one God, but in another way there exist three gods. But it doesn’t follow that there in any sense are four gods.
Here’s his handout for this talk.
Thanks to Aaron Arinder for letting us all “sit in” on his session, and thanks to all the questioners for allowing me to include their questions in this episode.
Links for this episode:
- podcast 2 – the “Athanasian Creed”
- relative identity Trinity theories
- rational reconstructions (reinterpretations) of Trinity formulas
- Wainwright on monotheism
- present-day defenders of ontological pluralism (in metaphysics)
- Quantifiers and Quantification
- Quantification theory
- podcast 68 – Dr. Harriet Baber on Relative Identity and the Trinity
- This week’s thinking music has been “Paper Planes“ by Durden, featuring Airtone.
I wonder if this paper is just about saying, in a more complicated way, that there are two different ways of being ‘fully divine’. A being can be ‘fully divine’ if it is in the domain Omega and is the triune God, and there is only one being that satisfies that condition. A being can also be ‘fully divine’ if it is in the domain Delta and is one of the three divine ‘Persons’ mentioned in the NT; and there are exactly three beings that satisfy that condition.
If this is so, this idea seems to run into the sort of problems identified by Daniel Howard-Snyder in his demolition (IMO) of Craig and Moreland’s ‘Trinity Monotheism’. In particular, there is the problem of ‘diminished divinity’, in identifying what it means to be ‘fully divine’.
And what DOES it mean to be ‘fully divine’, anyway?
Arinder’s paper does not address this issue.
Basically he needs the two domains the Delta/Omega – to be two distinct domain that perfectly overlap without collapsing into each other. If they collapse into a single domain the incoherence arises.
The two problems that arise :
Why wouldn’t perfectly overlapping domains collapse into each other?
What connects/ties these two distinct domains together?(this is a issue if we are to have the 3 in 1 and not 3 and 1.)
Hi Raymond. What does it mean to ‘perfectly overlap’?
That they overlap (ie have elements in common), or that they do not?
What would be the problems if they overlap?
Why would they collapse into each other?
To stop the overlap, he would have to say eg that Domain Delta is perhaps the domain of all persons and that Omega is the domain of all triune gods.
He could not say that Omega is the domain of all gods, because then there would be an overlap with Delta, ie all the gods who are persons.
David,
Perfectly overlapping domains: domains which range over the same exact things. What is in one domain is in the other and vice versa, and what is not in one domain is not in the other as well. They “share” all the same things. It is a very intuitive idea that two domains that share all same things and include nothing other than those shared things are identical(indiscernible) and could be considered one domain(collapse into one).
Arinder needs the domains to overlap, to be somehow tied together- if your going to get a Trinity( a Triune God); otherwise all you have is monotheism and polytheism, each fundamentally existing in its own unique domain; what you do not end up having is fundamentally one God existing as three persons(what Trinitarians actually want to say about God).
However, even though he needs these domains to overlap, he recognizes they must remain distinct- otherwise you run back into the problem of incoherence(the problem he is trying to resolve)-the contradiction of stating that there is one God and there is three Gods ( if in the same domain).
Basically, Arinder solves the logical problem of the Trinity by destroying it. He destroys the Trinity by reducing it to its parts. We end up with something, that doesn’t resemble anything with which we can have a relationship (epistemological issues aside).
Thanks Raymond. I think I disagree. I think Arinder’s model requires precisely the opposite, that the two domains do not overlap at all, that the quantification is over different kinds of things.
But it is a pity that he cannot be here to clarify. Also a pity that the audio on the Q&A was too poor for me to get what they were saying (I think they were talking about this problem).
I think he needs Delta to be all (single) persons, and Omega to be all multipersonal (more than one person) beings, so that there is no overlap. He can then assert using biblical evidence that the three individual divine persons identified in Delta are some sort of parts of the single tripersonal being identified in Omega. But that is not an overlap.
David,
Yeah the audio on the Q&A kept going in and out. It would be nice to have some clarification- maybe Dale can help us out here.
The Domains cant have anything other than divine stuff- if there are other things than divine stuff- those things would be equally fundamental; that cannot happen due to aseity/sovereignty issues.
If the domains are distinct and do not overlap, all you have is monotheism and polytheism- you would not have Trinitariansim(the ontology he is trying to defend).
If the overlapping idea is rejected, then the domains still need to be tied or connected in someway – to get to Trinitariansim. Without any connection you do not have Trinitarianism.
What I find troubling is that this thesis suggests that you can go past God to his nature. In other words, God exists in his most fundamental level as parts not a whole..
Thanks Raymond. Yes I agree that Arinder, for a complete account, would have to show how these three distinct divine entities in Delta are connected to this single divine entity in Omega. And of course he does not do that in this sketchy presentation. So he has not yet succeeded in showing how the Trinity can be represented by a logically consistent model.
This was a fairly abstract discussion of the Trinity, Once you start talking about existential quantifiers and domains relative to the existence of things- here we go!
Such formal language often seems far removed from what we normally want to say about God.
With that being said:
I thought it is was interesting that the attribute of Divine Simplicity (DS) could be used to defend this thesis about God existing in 2 fundamentally distinct domains.
I would think divine simplicity would speak against such an idea. The whole impetus for divine simplicity is not the “no parts” thing, its the idea that God is the Ultimate Reality-you are not able to go beyond God in any regress of explanations; you can’t even attempt to go beyond God to his nature, because God is his nature.
Because Divine Simplicity entails that God is his existence, then Gods existence would be the most fundamental level there is- you can’t go beyond to a more fundamental level. If God is a Trinity in Unity, and a Unity in Trinity- then that ontology should be at the most fundamental level. But instead, with Arinders proposal we end up with 2 things, in 2 distinct domains, existing at the most fundamental level. In other words, if simplicity is indeed an attribute- you should have one simple thing existing at the most fundamental level of reality, not 2 simple things in 2 distinct domains, existing at the most fundamental level- that latter idea goes contra to the idea of God being a singular simple thing at his most fundamental level.
Hi Raymond:
What combination of biblical verses teaches divine simplicity? I must have missed them;-)
~Sean
Hi Sean,
I never said the bible teaches divine simplicity. During the podcast- mention was made toward divine simplicity giving this ontological theory more plausibility. I simply saying the way I understand that Doctrine- it might be otherwise.
“I never said the bible teaches divine simplicity. During the podcast-
mention was made toward divine simplicity giving this ontological theory
more plausibility. I simply saying the way I understand that Doctrine-
it might be otherwise.”
Yeah, I realized that, Raymond. It was a rhetorical question offered in good humor that was meant to poke fun at the philosophers whose huge Olympian brains just aren’t satisfied with the relatively simple teachings of Christ. So they invent doctrines that would cause Jesus and his followers to scratch their heads incredulously, and then they have to spend the rest of their lives engaged in mental gymnastics, writing impenetrable papers, theses, and books in a doomed effort to avoid a doctrinal stalemate.
~Sean
Sean,
Good points. 🙂
Thanks, Rivers:-) Years ago I read an article in the Catholic Encyclopedia defending the notion of a divine mind with three relations, and my only question was: How long ago did the writer loose his Bible? There was scarcely a syllable that resembled what the Bible teaches.
Sean,
I don’t think there’s anything wrong with “philosophy” but the real skill when interpreting scripture is exegesis. Philosophers seem like “armchair quarterbacks” who can come up with some useful observations and interesting speculations but aren’t really playing the game.
Hey Sean,
Sorry, I thought you were being serious when asking that question. 🙂
I understand your points. We have to remember that these type of efforts are in a long tradition of “Faith seeking Understanding”. And the “FSU”- programme is not so much an apologetic effort as it is a transmutation project. The project of transmuting belief into knowledge or faith into understanding; and philosophical tools are used in this. Sometimes you help clarify, sometimes you just muddy up the waters even more.
Even though increasing the clarity of issues by de-conflating concepts or ideas is always the goal, I think just as important is the attempt itself. So I cannot fault anyone for making attempts at understanding their faith more deeply- even when I disagree with the results.
This was a fairly abstract discussion of the Trinity, Once you start talking about existential quantifiers and domains relative to the existence of things- here we go!
Such formal language often seems far removed from what we normally want to say about God.
With that being said:
I thought it is was interesting that the attribute of Divine Simplicity (DS) could be used to defend this thesis about God existing in 2 fundamentally distinct domains.
I would think divine simplicity would speak against such an idea. The whole impetus for divine simplicity is not the “no parts” thing, its the idea that God is the Ultimate Reality-you are not able to go beyond God in any regress of explanations; you can’t go beyond God to his nature, because God is his nature.
Because Divine Simplicity entails that God is his existence, then Gods existence would be the most fundamental level there is- you can’t go beyond to a more fundamental level. If God is a Trinity in Unity, and a Unity in Trinity- then that ontology should be at the most fundamental level. But instead, with Arinders proposal we end up with 2 distinct things existing at the most fundamental level. In other words, if simplicity is indeed an attribute- you should have one simple thing existing at the most fundamental level of reality, not 2 simple distinct things existing at the most fundamental level- that latter idea goes contra to the idea of God being a singular simple thing at his most fundamental level.
Comments are closed.