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podcast 64 – Dr. Mark C. Murphy on Anselmianism about God

anselm of canterburySt. Anselm was the Roman Catholic archbishop of Canterbury, and an important medieval Christian philosopher. He defined the concept of God as “that than which no greater can be thought.” Using this concept, he argues that there must actually be such a being; this is his famous “ontological” argument for God’s existence. And he also deduces that this being must be eternal, and omnipotent (etc.) – otherwise, he would not be that than which no greater can be thought. Present-day philosophers call this sort of reasoning “perfect being theology.”

But what is the key concept? Is it the concept of the greatest being there could possibly be? Or should we argue from the concept of an absolutely perfect being? Or should we start with the concept of a being who is truly worthy of human worship?mark c murphy

In this episode, Dr. Mark C. Murphy, professor at Georgetown University, discusses these deep issues. He argues that the important concept for the Anselmian is absolute perfection.

Here are Dr. Murphy’s slides; it is recommended that you view this episode on youtube, as the video there syncs his slides with his talk.

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4 thoughts on “podcast 64 – Dr. Mark C. Murphy on Anselmianism about God”

  1. Pingback: The 59-Second Apologist: Perfect Being Theology

  2. Good, having established that, now we can safely proceed to the analysis of the hypothetical concept of id quo nihil maius cogitari potest. A “methodological” approach, as you say, rather than ontological, or epistemological.

  3. Mario, nothing in this talk presupposes that Anselm’s ontological argument is cogent or sound. It’s really methodological, about perfect being theology.

  4. @ Dale

    Before spending time on Murphy’s criticism of Inwagen formulation (“not demanding enough”) or Nagasawa’s ?revisionist Anselmianism”, it would not be a bad idea to provide the caveat that Anselm’s “ontological argument” has no rational cogency whatsoever.

    As already remarked here at trinities.org (with no objections from you) …

    “I am not aware that Mackie [or any other ‘leading atheist, discussing the arguments at length, without the idea that Kant decisively refuted them all’ – Dale’s words] conclusively (or simply persuasively) argues against Kant’s basic objection that the existence of anything (be it God or the Fortunate Isles) cannot be the object of a necessary demonstration.” (Mario’s comments of October 14, 2014 at 9:12 am, at “podcast episode 57 – Richard Swinburne on the Trinity”)

    Once you have conceded that in no way, from the hypothetical concept of id quo nihil maius cogitari potest can one deduce its existence, we can go on to examine, for instance, if the traditional divine attributes (omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence …) are mutually compatible.

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