Randal Rauser Roundly Rips “Rahner’s Rule.” Result? R.I.P. Really.

Check out this 2005 article by Randal Rauser, a theologian at Taylor Seminary in Edmonton, Canada. I have to say that I was really impressed with “Rahner’s Rule: An Emperor without Clothes?” Rauser obviously knows a lot of philosophy (the whole alphabet worth? 😉 ), and he writes clearly and concisely, and with even with a touch of Plantingian humor. And to my eyes, this looks like real theological progress.

I’ve often run across theologians expounding on Karl Rahner‘s much-discussed statement that “The ‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ Trinity, and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the ‘economic’ Trinity.” I’d scratch my head at these alleged profundities; I wasn’t clear on what was being said, or why it was supposed to be important. Rauser helpfully canvasses three (I’d count them as four) interpretations of what Rahner is asserting, and argues that none of them is both important (non-trivial & insightful) and possibily true. Here’s the quick rundown (except where noted – these are my summaries):

1. There’s only one Trinity, not two of ’em (i.e. two sets of three, for a total of six divine persons).
2. [quoting Bruce Marshall] “the divine persons have the same features because they enact the economy of salvation as they would have had if there had been no economy of salvation…”
3. God really is as the [mainstream, trinitarian] Christian tradition portrays him.
4. It is unintelligible to wonder about a realm of reality beyond all human experience; we only have epistemic access to human history. Hence, all theorizing about God must be confined to God-in-relation-to-us.

Like a pro bowler making a strike, Rauser then knocks the whole set down. Again, in my words (except where noted), his replies to each of the four in turn:

1. No duh! But no one has ever wanted to say that.
2. This is contradictory, and hence, false & not even possibly true.
3. OK, but if this is all Rahner is saying, then [Rauser says] “the Rule is simply an obtuse restatement of a Christian dogma which provides no new insight into it at all.” (p. 87) No insight here, people, move along.
4. To the contrary, rather than misguidely attempting to solve our epistemological worries at one stroke by making such implausible declarations, we should just admit that it is possible for us to be mistaken about God’s nature.

There’s really a lot to interpretation #4 and the problems with it, and here is where Rauser really shows his philosophical aptitude. In brief, it seems that ideas like #4 are really what Rahner had in mind, as well as some theologians repeating his Rule. This fourth “antirealist” reading is, Rauser shows, the offspring of a lot of bad philosophy. I’m not going to stink up this fine summer day, though, by trying to explain this bad philosophy. See pp. 87-94 for how Rauser takes out the garbage. 🙂 Along the way, he actually gives a nice introduction to the whole idea of antirealism about truth. Readers interested in further, more detailed explanations of and objections to truth anti-realism should look at chapter 5 of this book, or (coincidentally) chapter 5 of this book. Some people outside philosophy are under the mistaken impression that truth antirealism has somehow been proven, or is the latest great discovery by philosophers (or scientists, or… someone). Folks should know that most analytic philosophers don’t give it the time of day. For many of us, the most interesting thing about it is: why would anyone believe something so mind-bogglingly implausible?

In any case, Rauser convinced me that we should retire this old chesnut. The issues that theologians want to discuss when they quote Rahner, it seems, could be better discussed without his famous dark saying. May Rahner’s Rule rest in peace.