Skip to content

response to Hays’s “review” of What is the Trinity?

When I first read Double agent for the dark side, I was inclined to ignore it. It’s an inaccurate, viciously unsympathic quasi-review of my What is the Trinity?, containing his usual shameful slander and point-missing verbal diarrhea. But since he’s posted it on Amazon, I will respond, so that the interested reader is not misled.

I recently read What is the Trinity? by apostate Dale Tuggy, a self-published propaganda piece in defense of unitarianism, written in a duly serpentine style (“Come on–jump off the cliff. It won’t hurt a bit. Promise!”).

“Apostate” is a wicked slander, as has been pointed out to him. I was born again and baptized in 1978, and have been following Christ in various churches since then. I have never at any point left the faith or denied my savior. “Propaganda” is vicious slander. The book is deadly serious, and is based on more than fifteen years of professional scholarship on this topic, with many peer-reviewed publications. It is packed with historical information and (I hope) helpful analysis.

His “jump off the cliff” reference refers to the first chapter, where I urge the Christian reader to not be afraid to think about these topics.

It is at best a foolish mistake, at worst a lie, to say that the book is “in defense of unitarianism.” That is my theology, biblical unitarian, which I don’t hide. But the book doesn’t argue for it, but only lays out a number of helpful historical and logical and theological distinctions which I claim can help Christians to make up their minds on this difficult topic. I have actually argued for my views on the basis of scripture in other places, like here. But my aim in this book is really to stimulate Christians to informed, critical thinking on this topic, and ultimately, to re-visiting the scriptures with these distinctions in hand.

1. In the Bart Ehrmanesque intro, narrating his deconversion, Tuggy mentions how influenced he was by reading Arian polemicist Samuel Clarke during his postgraduate program. This indicates that Tuggy was already a double agent for the dark side at the time he was tapped to contribute the entry on the Trinity for the SEP.

“Deconversion” is a vicious slander. So is the comparison with the arch-anti-evangelical, ex-evangelical agnostic scholar Bart Ehrman. By many the common criteria, I am an evangelical Christian. There is no deconversion part of the book. This is where my family and I currently fellowship. Readers curious to hear more about my theological journey can see what I actually say in the book, or look at this longer, more detailed series of blog posts. Hays is a mean sectarian, and if you don’t accept his sort of theology, what he deems essential – you’re not a real Christian – you must have left the faith. But in truth, my several theological adjustments have strengthened my faith, and helped me to better follow Christ.

To call the great English philosopher-theologian Dr. Samuel Clarke an “Arian polemicist” is ignorant. He was a far greater scholar and Christian than our blogger here. While some have (inaccurately) described his views as “Arian,” he was not influenced by those ancient catholics, but rather by pre-Nicene catholic theologians like Origen, Novatian, Tertullian, and Irenaeus. I have learned much from him, though I disagree with him on much, and am not ashamed to own him as an influence, stimulating me to a closer look at the scriptures.

To call me a “double agent for the dark side” is a silly slander. My SEP entry on “Trinity” fairly discusses a wide range of (especially) “analytic” work by recent Christian scholars trying to make sense of the traditional trinitarian formulas. Many people have found it helpful, and have never, to my knowledge, complained of some wicked agenda therein. It fairly reviews recent work by many recent trinitarian theologians.

2. In chap. 1 he ominously mentions people who converted from Christianity to Islam because the Trinity made no sense to them. Although that’s tragic, Islam is no worse than Tuggy’s unitarian alternative.

Not really relevant to the book, though I think any Christian should be concerned about people who fall away because their questions go unanswered.

3. In the same chapter he has a theory about how many Christians don’t reflect on the Trinity because the damnatory clauses in the Athanasian creed deter them. But how many Christians–especially evangelicals–ever think about the Athanasian creed?

Well, Reformed and Anglican evangelicals have that creed in their official sources. And I believe that at least once in a while, they recite it, although surely the “Nicene” creed – discussed and analyzed in great detail in What is the Trinity? is more central to such traditions. Christian philosophers very often, strangely, start with this creed, as it sets up an apparent contradiction for them to try to solve.

4. In the same chapter he says children, the illiterate, and mentally handicapped can be saved without affirming the Athanasian creed. But what is that supposed to prove?

This misses the point. What those folks can be saved without, nearly all Christians agree, is believing in “the Trinity,” which that creed says you’ll be damned unless you do. (pp. 10-11) This is reflected in nearly all Christian practice, and in particular, in evangelistic presentations, e.g. in how they coach volunteer counselors at Billy Graham crusades.

The same groups can’t grasp Paul’s intricate reasoning in Romans, yet that doesn’t mean we should disregard Romans. Of course, we make allowance for the cognitive aptitude of individuals.

Not the point. To continue,

5. Two chapters (2,7) devote time to expounding key words in the Nicene creed.

Someone actually serious about the topic would dwell on the in-depth analyses in these chapters and in chapter 6 on rival understandings of “Persons” in the Trinity, and with my suggestions about what the creed-makers must have meant and not meant. But our “reviewer” instead launches into his own irrelevant opinions:

I agree with Tuggy that the language is ambiguous and leaves tensions unresolved. As I’ve said on more than one occasion, I think there’s room for improvement in Nicene theology. That said:

i) Creeds tend to be consensus documents that exclude some parties but paper over other differences. Creeds prioritize and compromise.

ii) Creeds aren’t philosophical treatises. They affirm some things, and disaffirm other things, but they don’t defend their claims. That’s not their purpose or genre.

iii) The Nicene creed was a blunt instrument that accomplished its purpose by squeezing out the Arians. And that was a very worthwhile achievement.

Not a lot to say about this, other than that the Nicene creed is commonly held up as an important, unifying standard of belief. That’s what it has become, although yes, its main purpose in 325 was just to throw out a catholic faction.

6. One of Tuggy’s demagogical tactics is to confound issues that are clearly separable.

i) Take the question of whether the Bible teaches the Trinity. If you mean, does the Bible teach a philosophically articulated doctrine of the Trinity, finessing how God can be three persons in one, then the answer is no. There’s precious little philosophical theology in Scripture on any subject. Rarely does Scripture define its terms.

As the book makes clear, I think every Christian, and in particular Protestants, must wrestle with whether the Bible teaches the Trinity (not explicitly, or “philosophically” – but at all, in any way, even implicitly). Hays prefers to change the subject to “Does scripture contain a philosophically articulated doctrine of the Trinity?” To which the answer, all agree, is: “Of course not. ‘Cause the authors weren’t philosophers!” But, who cares? The initial question stands, its importance undiminished.

ii) However, the NT clearly teaches the deity of the Father and the Son. There’s less material on the Spirit, but what there is is analogous to what is said concerning the Father and the Son. What is more, to possess even one incommunicable divine attribute entails possession of them all, so it isn’t necessary for the Bible to check every box regarding the Holy Spirit to imply his deity and personality. Some things necessarily go together.

I think he’s trying to gesture at a “Yes” answer here to our question. But he doesn’t get very far, does he? If the Bible teaches “the deity” of Father, Son, and Spirit, and we distinguish these from each other, why isn’t this a doctrine of three gods? Does that sound correct, that the NT presents us with three gods? I discuss Hays’s sort of facile apologists’s argument from the NT to the Trinity in chapter 10, and painstakingly explain why it doesn’t do enough. Naturally, he ignores that bit.

iii) Likewise, does the Bible teach the Incarnation? If you mean, does the Bible teach philosophically articulated doctrine of the hypostatic union, then the answer is no. But the Bible can and does teach the two natures of Christ, without using philosophical jargon or explaining how, exactly, they are interrelated.

This is not germane to a review of What is the Trinity?, which barely mentions this topic, in the Epilogue.

As a unitarian, that’s not how Tuggy reads the Bible, but he’s not the touchstone for evangelicals.

Irrelevant. The book is not about “how Tuggy reads the Bible,” but rather about what various Christians have meant by “the Trinity,” going back even to pre-trinitarian times. With this information in hand, it is up to the reader to determine what she thinks the Bible is presenting for our belief.

iv) This goes to the question of what Christians have always believed. But there’s lots of individual variation in what Christians believe throughout the centuries, depending on their literacy, education, access to theological alternatives. That variation is not unique to the Christology. So Tuggy’s objection either proves too much or too little.

Not relevant to a review. But as discussed in chapter 5, there was a time before creedal trinitarian language was mandatory. Ch. 5 describes, in part, that change. Also highly relevant is ch. 3, on earlier and later uses of “Trinity.”

7. In chap. 4, Tuggy complains about equivocal usage regarding “deity”, but he himself concocts bogus contradictions by resorting to equivocal language.

Ugh, such a poor reader, and such a careless charge. Chapter 4 explains why “the deity of Christ” and “the Trinity” are really two different topics, though often confused together. It does also, yes, point out the convenient ambiguity of talk of “deity” or “divinity” in theology and christology, as this sloughs over many different ideas discussed in chapters 6, 7 and 9.

8. In chap. 5 he makes the trivial observation that Greek MSS don’t distinguish “Spirit” from “spirit”, since everything is in capital letters. But that applies with equal force to “God/god” (theos).

Dreary point-missing. The point of ch. 5 is to explain how history shows it is at best misleading to say that “Christians have always believed in the Trinity” (p. 43). Our “reviewer” is devolving now to his typical tactic of trying to catch me out in some silly error. He’s not a serious enquirer, sadly.

9. In the same chapter, he says the eternality and full divinity of Jesus and the Spirit weren’t “obvious” to some Christians back in the year 200.

i) But to begin with, some of them are simply heretics. They’re opinion is not the benchmark.

As I explain in the chapter, people like Origen and Tertullian were considered leading lights and leading defenders of mainstream, catholic Christianity in the first half of the 200s. But both are demonstrably “subordinationist” by later standards, and non-trinitarian. E.g. Tertullian thinks there was a time when only the Father existed (pp. 47-48), and Origen thought that the Logos was a second god, less divine than the Father (p. 49). Our reviewer shrieks “heretics” – hoping this’ll be enough to distract you from thinking through the implications of these facts. But I think we need to look these clear historical findings in the eye. At that time, they were not viewed as heretics, not in their views on God, his Son, and his Spirit.

ii) Moreover, the ante-Nicene Fathers he cites don’t believe Jesus was just a human being. So how does that hurt Trinitarians without hurting unitarians?

To point out that such theologians held to different forms of “logos theory” about Christ – that is not relevant to a review of What is the Trinity?

iii) In addition, what’s “obvious” is person-relative. That’s makes the reader the standard of comparison rather than the text, as if the text has no objective meaning. Tuggy’s resorting to reader-response theory rather than authorial intent, as if that’s the yardstick. But there are different kinds of readers. Good readers and poor readers. An author writes with more than one audience in mind: an ideal reader as well as an ordinary reader. Authors may say things a well-informed reader will catch that uninformed readers may miss. That’s the nature of mass communication.

Rambling irrelevance, not reflecting anything in the book, or my views otherwise.

10. Chap. 6 reviews different definitions of “person”.

i) The word has different connotations in patristic usage than modern usage. Modern usage is more psychological or Cartesian. And debates over AI have highlighted the first-person viewpoint as a defining feature of consciousness. In formulating the Trinity, I myself prefer the modern connotations of the word.

Nothing relevant to a review; just more windy opinionating.

ii) Tuggy says the modern definition poses a “tough dilemma” by “compromising” monotheism, which is supposed to be “nonnegotiable”.

What? What is this dilemma? Our intrepid reviewer doesn’t say.

Of course, for a unitarian like Tuggy, monotheism means the Father alone is God. However, OT monotheism creates no presumption that the Father will be God rather than the Son (or Spirit). In the OT, Yahweh isn’t the Father in contrast to the Son. In the OT, Yahweh is a father to Israel. It’s a statement about his relationship to some of his creatures. It doesn’t single out the Father as Yahweh, in contrast to the Son. It doesn’t operate with that comparative framework. An explicit Father/Son comparison is something reserved for NT revelation. The OT fosters no expectation that the Father is Yahweh or God instead of the Son.

The NT does identify the Father with Yahweh, the one true God. (e.g. John 17:1-3, John 5:44, Acts 5:30) But again, this rambling doesn’t connect with the arguments or other material in the book.

11. Chap. 7 reviews different definitions of “substance”.

Well that’s interesting, as that is the key term in the Nicene creed! What might be in that chapter? What nine (!) possible interpretations does our learned author lay out, and which does he rule out as what the creed means, and why? Nope, none of that is of interest to our “reviewer.” He instead gasses off the cuff, at length:

i) Although I affirm that Father, Son, and Spirit are “consubstantial”, I don’t think “substance” is the best word to employ. It has different connotations in modern usage than patristic usage. A complex linguistic evolution. There’s what ousia means in patristic usage. I doubt it has a uniform meaning in patristic usage. Substance is a translation term for ousia, and is therefore a Latin word with a Greek meaning. But it then acquires additional layers when filtered through Thomistic or Scotist metaphysics. Same factors apply to hypostasis/persona.

ii) I prefer to say that Father, Son, and Spirit are “consubstantial” in the sense that they share the same nature or attributes. Tuggy will object that this only gets you generic unity rather than numerical unity. But other issues aside, the question isn’t whether “consubstantial” is sufficient to define the Trinity, but a necessary element. No one word or category will be sufficient. Like some other doctrines, the Trinity is a theological construct with multiple elements.

iii) They don’t share the same nature in the sense that each one is a property-instance of a common property. They don’t exemplify a generic universal. Rather, it’s like mirror symmetries where the whole image is contained in each reflection, rather than samples.

Ah… “mirror symmetries.” Wait… what? Anyway: not in the book.

12. Chap. 8 is the most intemperate chapter. Paradox gets Tuggy riled up.

Back to the slander. I think this is one of the deeper and more original chapters, and you’ll search in vain for “intemperate” remarks there.

i) Unsurprisingly, Tuggy misstates the role of analogies in Trinitarian analysis. You can state the elements that comprise the Trinity without resort to analogy. Analogies are a second-level reflection that provide philosophical models for the Trinity. An attempt to explicate the relationship.

“The role” of analogies in all of this is controversial. Some think models of the Trinity, reflecting some straightforward understanding of the formulas, are possible, so that analogies are dispensable, and probably not needed at all. Others think any model construction is impossible, and so at bottom, trinitarian thinking rests upon analogies, all of them, in a sense bad or barely adequate analogies. This is the view of Augustine, for instance. Some modern authors even discourage their use altogether, as they think all do more harm than good. On the other hand, pop sources merrily continue on with clovers, eggs, ice, chords, etc. Ch 10 addresses multiple sorts of appeals to “mystery.” It is very silly for a unqualified polemical blogger to try to “school” me on this topic, telling me what “the role” is. I know, from many years of reading, that the role of analogies is controversial. Problems with mystery-appeals vary, depending on the nature of the appeal.

ii) It’s trivially easy to concoct a bogus verbal contradiction. Take a question like, “Are three sugar cubes one substance or three substances”? The answer is both. That’s not even paradoxical. Yet you could arrange that claim in a way that makes it look contradictory. One of something can’t be three of something! (unless it can!).

No connection to the book here. Moving on,

iii) Tuggy has a simplistic grasp of identity. If A and B are identical, what makes them identical? One way to unpack that might be intersubstitutability. A point-by-point matchup between A and B.

So, I’m a professor of Philosophy, an ivy-league PhD who has taught Logic, and Metaphysics at the university level, and this blogger, with the philosophy skills of a C student, loves to shriek about how “simplistic” my views are here, as I don’t buy into some of his confused suggestions. But my views on numerical sameness are about as uncontroversial as philosophical views can be; they are more or less what is taught in a standard into to Logic course. More in this post and in this one. Steve Hays persistently confuses qualitative sameness with numerical sameness, and theories of personal identity through time with the more basic issue of numerical identity for any sorts of things. I’ve tried to help resolve his confusions, and have pointed him to helpful sources, but he, ridiculously, prefers to shriek that I am confused on this topic, though I am not. I’ve concluded that he’s unteachable on this topic.

But compare that to reflection symmetries. A corresponds at every point with B, yet there’s a residual, irreducible difference between A and B because a right-handed image is not equivalent to a left-handed image.

Characteristically, he thinks he is making a point about numerical identity/sameness, but he is not – he’s talking about a special case of similar things (note the “s”), things which are qualitatively “the same” in a sense. This is a beginner’s mistake. Numerical identity is a relation that can’t possibly obtain between things which are (at one time) different. It’s a relation that a thing can only bear to itself, and it doesn’t come in kinds of in degrees. It is a fundamental human concept, not definable in terms of others.

13. In the same chapter, Tuggy recycles the same obtuse objection he’s been touting for years: It’s “uncharitable” to impute a contradiction to a writer.

Not a controversial point, actually. This principle of charity is carefully observed, especially by scholars working in the history of philosophy, reading, e.g. Aristotle, Kant, or Mill. Hays doesn’t get it, so it is “obtuse.” He proceeds to gas about how he rather likes apparent contradictions, ignoring that fact that we all consider them to be strong evidence of falsehood – except, perhaps, when defending pet speculations.

i) Speaking for myself, I don’t find the Trinity paradoxical, but even if I did, Bible writers have no control over what God is like. They simply report what they witnessed, or what God revealed to them. If that struck them as paradoxical, they’d still have to record it.

ii) In addition, given the number of tenacious paradoxes in math, logic, and physics, paradox may well be an intractable feature of how humans perceive and process reality. That’s what happens when finite minds encounter truths more complex than their finite minds. That’s not unique to Christian theology, but a common phenomenon of human experience.

14. In chap. 10, Tuggy alleges that many Protestant theologians pay lip-service to sola Scriptura but in practice treat some of the “ecumenical” councils as inviolable. I agree with him. Ancient creeds should be scrutinized.

15. In the same chapter (pp133-34), Tuggy has a set of loaded questions. But there are no good answers to bad questions.

This last is a vicious lie. What makes the questions “loaded”? Are we supposed to think they’re somehow like, “Have you stopped beating your wife?” Here are questions 1-3 from p. 133.

  1. Does the NT in any sense appeal to “mystery” about the Trinity or the trinity? [See ch. 3 on that important distinction, passed over in silence by our “reviewer.”] If so, what is meant by “mystery” there?
  2. Does the NT anywhere mention or refer to a Trinity, or only to a trinity?
  3. Does it teach that there are three eternal, equally divine Persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who all together in some sense “are” the one God, Yahweh?

The reader is invited to answer these, and five more questions for herself.

In sum, the book supplies some important logical, theological, and historical points that can help her to eliminate a lot of confusions on the way. If you’re looking for some badly needed clarity, you’ll find the book helpful, whether or not you agree with my theology overall. It is offered in the spirit of helping my brothers and sisters who are finding all of this rather difficult. If you’re looking for comforting “pat” answers and confident but abstract assertions, and you value conformity and social safety over truth – there are a lot of other introductory books on the Trinity that you’d rather read.

Let me conclude by relating that in the process of writing this book, I asked three long term, godly, trinitarian, evangelical Christian friends to read it, as well as a brilliant and well educated internet friend who I think would call himself a trinitarian, as well as an evangelical Christian. All supplied helpful comments, written or spoken, on various drafts. Three found the book stimulating, informative, and interesting. One found that he disagreed with some things in it, although I think to a large degree he wasn’t sure what to make of it; he sort of let the matter drop. They all thought it was pretty well written. But none of them were offended, thought their faith was being assaulted, or thought the book was in any sense “propaganda.” I pray that it’ll be more use to you than it was to our “reviewer” here. God willing, some more worthy reviewers will step forward, ones interesting in actually wrestling with these topics. I welcome any future dialogue with those!