STAGE 1. In this stage, Richard wants to show that God’s perfect goodness somehow requires that God is perfectly charitable. I say ‘somehow requires’ because the logical relation here is not clear. Richard is saying ‘God’s goodness _____ perfect charity’, but what fills in the blank? Is it ‘entails’, ‘presupposes’, or some other logical relation?
Here’s the actual quotation, with the particular claims marked in brackets.
‘[T1] there is [in God] fullness and perfection of all goodness. [T2] However, where there is fullness of all goodness, true and supreme charity cannot be lacking. [T3] For nothing is better than charity; nothing is more perfect than charity’.
Let’s look at T1, T2, and T3 in turn.
(T1) God is perfectly good, so there is as much goodness in God as possible.
Let’s take this as a given, since Richard has already established it earlier in De Trinitate.
(T2) For any x, if x is perfectly good, then x is perfectly charitable.
What exactly does this mean? I see at least two options.
(a) Perfect goodness and perfect charity are two distinct features that are necessarily instantiated together, similar to, say, being human and being able to laugh.
(b) Perfect charity is what makes something perfectly good, i.e, charity perfects goodness, as if something can be really really good, but it won’t be totally good until it becomes charitable.
(T3) Nothing is better than perfect charity.
The thrust of this is also rather unclear. There seem to be two things going on here.
(a) Richard is saying that perfect charity is the best possible feature to have.
(But why perfect charity? Why not cold, hard justice (like what the legendary ‘soldering iron of justice’ issues out)? Or why not being infinite, having aseity, or any other of God’s perfect attributes?)
(b) Richard appears to be stating T3 in order to buttress or prove T2.
(But it’s not evident exactly how T3 is supposed to buttress T2. Is it God’s goodness or God’s perfection which requires that he have all perfect features, the best of which is perfect charity)?
A thought. If God is perfectly good only if God is perfect love, then it seems that perfect goodness is better than perfect love. Why? B/c perfect goodness requires perfect love rather than the other way (perfect love requires perfect goodness). Or again, if perfection has something to do with nothing more able to be added, but if x is partially good w/o perfect love, and then x is perfectly good only if x is perfect love, then love perfects (completes) goodness. In which case, perfect good is the last attribute (as it were) and perfect love is a necessary condition for this to obtain.
But, (T3) suggests another interpretation. Namely, perfect goodness entails perfect love. But who knows.
The real answer is less gel, more blow dry.
Palamas, it could be both, for sure. And of course, as Dale points out, it could be a nonsensical question anyways, given divine simplicity and perfect being theology.
Bonaventure, inspired by Richard, argues that it’s God’s goodness that ‘explains’ the production of the persons. Henry of Ghent and Scotus will also develop their own versions of this stuff. But for those 13th and 14th century cats, there is such a thing as Aristotelian ‘explanation’, so even though some F and G may be identical, one of them ‘explains’ the presence of the other.
I was just wondering if Richard had a similar idea, i.e., if he were thinking, as Scott nicely put it, that a really good dude will be loving, or if he was thinking that a really perfect dude will be loving.
But then again, he may not have such ideas at all. I know next to nothing about the 12th century.
JT: Your question is:
“[I]t’s not evident exactly how T3 is supposed to buttress T2. Is it God’s goodness or God’s perfection which requires that he have all perfect features, the best of which is perfect charity)?”
I think this question assumes that it’s an either/or situation. Why can’t it be both? Why can’t his charity be overdetermined?
As I see it, I think being an (1) infinite, eternal, a se substance are necessary conditions for omnipotence. And, (2) omnipotence is a necessary condition for perfect goodness. (Though Richard suggests that (1)-(2) are jointly sufficient for perfect goodness; but I need to look again at Bk. 2 b/c perfect wisdom plays a role too) And, (3) perfect goodness is a necessary condition for perfect charity. So, (1)-(3) for Richard are supposed to be jointly necessary and sufficient for perfect charity (if we toss in perfect wisdom too). But there is nothing further to add to (our logical construction of) the divine essence. So, perfect charity is the top of the line, as it were. This is what I take Richard to mean by (T3).
I grant that perfect goodness might require perfect charity as a necessary condition; but I’m not certain this is how Richard thinks of it. I think he supposes that if a dude is really good, then it follows he’ll be quite lovely and loving.
I’m just unclear on the relation between T2 and T3.
Dale,
I see what you means, nevertheless, there is a point to the question. Suppose you were a Klingon and were talking about your god, and you thought your god was ‘simple’. But you didn’t think your god was a ‘lover’. So, you could say your god is simple and not love. But Christians like Richard do think his god is simple and is good and is love. You might say Richard’s god’s love presupposes his goodness, even if there is just one simple divine essence. Otherwise, we could say Richard’s god is simple but neither good nor loving (e.g., maybe Richard is a Manichean and likes the evil god?).
“So what do you all think about my question (b) for T3: is love/charity a perfection of God simpliciter, or is it a perfection of God’s goodness? Is love a feature of God, or is it a feature of God’s goodness? Or does that even matter?”
Hey JT – to me, this question makes no sense. JT is smart, but it makes no sense to say that JT’s sense of humor is smart. Only substances can be smart.
But IF divine simplicity is true, wouldn’t the two claims you state be logically equivalent? (One is true if and only if the other is.)
My guess is this: Richard starts by asserting perfect wisdom and omnipotence; these two ‘features’ (which are the very same divine substance) are arrived at by (A1). Then, he infers that God must be an infinite, eternal intellectual substance. (Early in Book 1 he argues that there can only be one eternal substance that is not (efficiently) causally from another substance.) At this point we ‘know’ that God is maximally wise, omnipotent, infinite, eternal and a substance.
And so, it seems that perfect charity must presuppose that there is (i) a substance that is (ii) omnipotent, (iii) wise, and (iv) good. If we delete any of (i)-(iv), then an inference to perfect charity from (i)-(iv) seems questionable or at least is not self-evident. If we want there to be an entailment relation, Richard suggests that the conjunction of (i)-(iv) entails perfect charity, or at least implies it, or at least is very probable.
So, in this particular case, I’m inclined to think that Richard adopts the (A2) maximal proposition, and not the (A1) maximal proposition.
So what do you all think about my question (b) for T3: is love/charity a perfection of God simpliciter, or is it a perfection of God’s goodness? Is love a feature of God, or is it a feature of God’s goodness? Or does that even matter?
Scott: That seems right to me. I shouldn’t attribute to Richard the claim that at least with respect to personal beings, it is better to have love than not to have love. But I do think this makes the argument better (at least with respect to being an argument).
Dale: Yes, Richard thinks the divine substance is goodness itself, omnipotence itself, etc. He’s got a healthy dose of divine simplicity articulated in Books 1 and 2.
A thought. There are perhaps two basic claims in Anselm’s perfect being theology.
(A1) For person p and property X, it is simply better that p have X than not have X regardless of the kind of thing p is.
For example, one might think it is simply better to be wise than not to be wise.
(A2) For any person p, property X and property Y, it is better for p to have X than to have Y.
For example, one might think it is better for a rational being to be wise than not to be wise.
Or, one might think that it is better _for lead_ to be lead than to be gold. Or, one might think it is better _for wine_ to be sweet than to be bitter. Let’s call (A2) the species restriction on properties; for a given kind of being it is better to be X than to be Y.
My guess is that Richard affirms (A1) and when convenient accepts (A2). In Book 1.20 he makes clear the ‘maximal proposition’ (which Richard likely got from Abelard. E. Stump describes a max. prop. as “a strategy or line of argument or tack to take”) here:
(Translation by Jonathon Couser)
Book 1, Chapter XX
“For investigators and those disputing about God it is customary to use a maxim and, as it were, a common concept of the soul. 10 It seems to happen almost as an endowment of nature that practically everybody, both the erudite and those less erudite, are accustomed to hold this almost as a rule. That is, they judge that whatever is best should unhesitatingly be attributed to God. What the exercise of reason does not teach them about this perspicuous rule, their devotion persuades them without the uncertainty of 15 doubt. Hence it is that even those who do not know that it can be proven, unhesitatingly affirm that God is himself immense, eternal, incommutable, most
wise, omnipotent. And so it is a maxim for the erudite, it is almost universally as a common conception of the soul, to attribute to God whatever human estimation most highly attains.28 Even the greatest teachers everywhere begin 20 their disputations with this solid certainty and as it were intimate foundation of truth when they intend to discuss the divine properties most highly and
most reverently.”
And, earlier in Book 1, chapter 12: “But where there is no rational substance, wisdom cannot inhere at all; 15 for wisdom can belong only in a rational substance. And so the highest of all is also a rational substance, in which the highest wisdom inheres.”
In this passage Richard seems to argue like this:
(R1) “There is a highest wisdom”
(R2) “Wisdom can belong only in a rational substance”
Therefore, (R3) “there is a highest rational substance” (which is God).
Richard starts with the notion of perfect wisdom, and then infers what else must be the case. I take this as a case of working from (A1). If Richard went with (A2) I’d expect him to argue something like this:
(R3) There is a highest rational substance.
(R1) There is a highest wisdom.
But, (R2) highest wisdom belongs only to the highest rational substance.
Therefore, (R4) the highest rational substance has/is the highest wisdom.
If we start from a species restriction (a kind of thing), and then infer what would be perfect for that kind of thing, this would be (A2). But Richard doesn’t seem to go with (A2).
However, Richard does make a peculiar inference in Book 2, ch. 16. He argues very quickly like this:
(R5) Whoever is truly omnipotent can lack nothing (including plenitude and perfection).
(R6) Whoever is omnipotent is the highest good, a good to himself, and is happy.
Therefore, (R7) God, who is omnipotent, is the highest good and is happy.
What is questionable is (R6); why should we think that a really really power dude is good, and a good for himself? Clearly Richard didn’t consider the Machiavellis of the world. In this case, Richard seems to slide into (A2)– assume that God is a certain kind of thing (good, wise) and see what argument you can make.
So, he might be arguing something like this. (What is between _ _ expresses the species restriction).
(R7′) God is an _infinite intellectual substance_ that is omnipotent, is the highest good and is most happy.
(R5′) Whoever is truly omnipotent cannot lack highest goodness and highest happiness.
Therefore, (R8) God – an infinite intellectual substance – who is omnipotent, cannot not be the highest good and cannot not be most happy.
At least, this is what seems to be the case.
Palamas: I still think Richard intends that the claims that nothing (no attribute) is better than love and nothing (no attribute) is more perfect than love are two ways to say the same thing. The only modal note here is that as I’m sure Richard would agree, each claim is if true a necessary one, though he doesn’t explicitly say this.
Dale:Good point about being-greatness and property-greatness. I don’t think the argument depends on getting this straight. But there’s definitely something that needs saying here about the relation between these two. Which one determines the other and how?
Re: love (caritas)
One might think ‘love’ can also refer to an emotion, but perhaps you intended emotion to be covered by (2). One might also think ‘love’ can refer to a relation, but again perhaps you intended (2) to cover this.
In any case, I wouldn’t include (1). The concept or idea of love is a concept or idea, but love itself is not a concept or idea.
‘Love’ here if it exists or holds implies the existence of a lover and a beloved, which seems to make it a relation. So if any of (2)-(5) don’t imply this, we can rule them out as candidates for what love is.
On Joseph vs. Palamas – It seems to me that Richard is doing perfect being theology. It’s just that he has a badly abstract way of putting things. Though his case really turns on intuitions about being-greatness, he’s wont to put it all in property-terms. I assume this is because he is a realist about universals. So, he thinks that from God being perfectly good, it follows that “goodness” itself is present in God in the highest degree (and I’ll assume also that he thinks God is goodness itself).
The problem with putting it in terms of properties is, as Palamas’s comment shows, that we’ve got a concept of being-greatness, and now also one of property-greatness, and it’s not clear how exactly to relate the two.
Perhaps at this juncture we should start to wonder what he means by “charity”. On the face of it, it looks like this word can name
(1) a concept or idea
(2) a character trait
(3) a (physical and/or mental) action
(4) the result of an action
(5) an event which includes one agent (in some sense) giving something which another receives
Am I leaving any out?
I don’t have a Latin text available to me; is Richard using ‘perfectio’ and related words? Perfectio does allow for degrees in the way our ‘perfection’ does not: it’s still much closer to its original etymological meaning of the proper completion or good finishing of something, and while it’s not usually taken entirely literally in this sort of context, it hasn’t rigidified into the maximum that we think of. (So much so that when Aquinas talks about God’s perfection he still has to address the issue of applying to God a term that suggests what you attain to after being incomplete in some way.)
With respect to T3, I discern at least two types of interpretations. According to the first, Richard is making a descriptive claim. According to the second, he is making a modal claim. I also think we need to break T3 into two parts, namely, T3 “Nothing is better than charity” and T3* “Nothing is more perfect than charity.” The reason I think we need to make this distinction is that T3 is coherent both in its descriptive and modal form. However, when T3* is given the same interpretation as T3, it turns out to be incoherent in both its descriptive and modal form. The only way T3* turns out to be coherent is to give it a different modal interpretation than T3 and, thus, pace Joseph, T3 and T3* cannot mean the same thing. Let’s look at T3 first.
As I see it, T3 is either saying:
Descriptive
(T3D) For any two attributes X and Y, where X is charity and Y is some attribute other than charity, X is better than Y.
Modal
(T3M) For any two attributes X and Y, where X is charity and Y is some attribute other than charity, it is possible that Y be either worse than X or Y be just as good as X, but it is impossible that Y be better than X.
Moving on: As I see it, T3* is either saying:
Descriptive
(T3*D) For any two attributes X and Y, where X is charity and Y is some attribute other than charity, Y is less perfect than X.
Modal
(T3*M) For any two perfect attributes X and Y, where X is charity and Y is some perfect attribute other than charity, it is possible that Y be either less perfect than X or Y be just as perfect as X, but it is impossible that Y be more perfect than X.
Neither of these (i.e., T3*D or T3*M), however, make any sense; for while it is possible that one perfect thing can be just as perfect as another perfect thing, it is impossible that one perfect thing be less or more perfect than another perfect thing. Perfection does not come in degrees. It’s all or nothing. Something is either perfect or not. Suppose, for instance, that Jesus had a twin brother Jebus, who also was sinless. It would make no sense for Jebus to say to Jesus, “I, Jebus, am more morally perfect than you, Jesus!” Nonsense! Both are equally morally perfect.
Considering this, then, perhaps we should interpret the modal claim as
(T3**M) For any two perfect attributes X and Y, where X is charity and Y is some attribute other than charity, it is possible that Y be just as perfect as X, but it is impossible that Y be either less or more perfect than X.
But if we interpret (T3*) as (T3**M), then, it is not saying the same thing as T3 in either its descriptive or modal form.
Now, as Joseph pointed out above, it does seem that Richard is engaging in Perfect Being Theology. And, as I see it, PBT is concerned with modalities. Thus, it seems to me, that we ought to read Richard as claiming (T3M) and (T3**M).
Of course, this is just my over thought opinion at the moment. It could just be that the Madonna album that I am listening to while writing this has caused me to go completely crazy! I hope I’m not too much off my rocker. La Isla Bonita!
Richard is doing perfect being theology here. So T1 is true as a matter of definition: God is that than which nothing better can be thought and so is perfectly good.
I think we have to take care not to worry too much about the literary devices Richard uses. He seems to like to say very much the same thing in slightly different words and from different angles. So, for example, I don’t see any distinction between the claim that nothing is better than love (caritas) and the claim that nothing is more perfect than love.
I think you have T2 right. It’s not his aim here to talk of the metaphysics of divine attributes. However we put this together with the doctrine of divine simplicity, relative to personal beings, it must be that everything perfectly good is perfectly loving. And the reason for this is as you say T3. Again, relative to personal beings, nothing is better than personal love, and not just personal love of oneself (important though that is), but personal love of another person. He’s not saying that relative to personal beings it is the best attribute, but that no attribute is better. How do we know this by our natural lights? I think the idea is that this is supposed to be self-evident on sufficient reflection. Consider two personal beings that are as much alike as can be save that one has personal love of another and the other doesn’t and all else such a difference may involve. We should be able to see that the first is all things considered a better person or at least better off.
I’m very sympathetic to this whole line. And this has important implications for theism. For it implies that an Anselmian-type divine personal being couldn’t exist on its own.
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