This unfortunate woman crashed her vehicle, injuring herself and fatally injuring her husband. But what’s interesting is what’s happening now: she’s going to sue herself, to get money from her own insurance company.
A Utah woman will be the plaintiff and the defendant in a wrongful death lawsuit that has legal experts scratching their heads. … a Utah court has ruled Bagley, the representative of her late husband’s estate, may sue Bagley the driver in the fatal accident for wrongful death.
How can a person sue herself?
The lawsuit boils down to the definition of ‘of another.’ … Bagley the driver is a separate party from Bagley the estate representative. Bagley the driver is represented by her insurance company and the suit, according to one legal expert, is likely an attempt for her to collect on an insurance payout.
“So basically she’s suing herself so that the insurance recovery can follow,” Shima Baradaran, a University of Utah law professor, told ABC4 News.
Baradaran called the case rare and “pretty ludicrous.”
Oh Professor Baradaran, we theologians can get a lot of mileage out of the ludicrous. It all depends on how you describe it. Here’s how your viewpoint would be shot down in flames court, after we theologians advise Ms. Bagley’s lawyers. Let’s call the two lawyers L (for “ludicrous”) and T (for “theologically informed”).
L: Your honor, we urge dismissal. No one can sue herself for damages!
T: We object to that language, your honor. Our opponents don’t understand how a woman can legally sue herself, but it is insanely overconfident to argue that something can’t be done just because it is rare, or because you don’t understand how. There are many things we can’t understand. And the court said it can be done.
L: Rare? Try non-existent! And we do understand that the plaintiff and defendant here are the same person.
T: Same person, yes. But different party. We don’t say that “she’s suing herself.” We say that she is one person, one lady, in two parties.
L: What does that even mean?
T: Just because ordinarily there is a one-to-one correspondence between parties and persons, it doesn’t follow that it must always be so.
L: But a legal “party” just is a certain person. And it’s the same lady!
T: Of course it’s one lady. But she is two parties. Let me put it differently: Bagley as estate representative is going to sue Bagley as driver.
L: That language just obscures that we’re dealing with one lady here. You’re not talking about two ways to sue, are you?
T: No.
L: And Bagley-as-estate-representative isn’t a different person than Bagley-as-driver, is she?
T: No. Look – I never said I was going explain this to you. I just said this is another way to put it. I can’t fix your small-minded refusal to allow us to describe our own case.
L: Your honor, this is egregious nonsense. I again move for dismissal.
T: Your honor, do major philosophers seriously discuss egregious nonsense? Two words: relative identity.
Powerfully argued, eh? I sense a win (and a loss) in Ms. Bagley’s future.
Here’s a song which she can sing to herself.
It is not said how exactly the insurance contract is formulated, but, presumably, it is in the name of Barbara Bagley (or in the joint name of Barbara and her late husband Bradley), and it covers her civil responsibility, in consequence of herself (or perhaps also someone else) driving the car covered by the insurance. In any case, unless the subscriber to the insurance policy is a corporate person, but Barbara Bagley herself (the physical person), the policy covers the responsibility of Barbara Bagley, and I don’t see how Barbara Bagley can be split in two “parties”. Besides, if the distinction was accepted, there would need to be distinguished not just 2 but even 3 parties: driver (whose responsibility would be covered by the insurance), estate representative (who inherited the responsibility, covered by subscribing to the insurance), but also wife of the deceased who has been damaged.
” I don’t see how Barbara Bagley can be split in two “parties”.”
Yeah, me neither.
For the record, I don’t think there is such a thing as relative identity (I mean, which isn’t analyzable in terms of “absolute” identity).
So, really, theology is of no help at all to the defendant/plaintiff. It could help the lawyer in confusing the matter, though. 🙂
I used to think the same: no such thing as RI. In fact, bearing in mind that relative is the opposite of absolute, I used to think that the expression “relative identity” was nothing but an oxymoron.
Unfortunately for Aristotle and also for Leibniz (and others), without Relative Identity (essentially, the claim that it can and does happen that x and y are the same G and yet x and y are
not the same F – see SEP > Relative Identity > 3. Relative Identity), there are serious problems even with the most simple of statements.
Consider this simple example. Let,
x = this acorn
y = this oak tree
G = genetic makeup
F = morphology
With RI we can legitimately (and most satisfactorily) say:
[RIao] “This acorn and this oak tree are the same genetic makeup and yet this acorn and this oak tree are not the same morphology.”
Without RI, we simply cannot …
Please spare us all the pettiness of affirming that, in proper English, we would normally say, “have the same genetic makeup/ morphology” …
… but, if you feel like ignoring my advice, then enjoy this:
[RIao1] “This acorn and this oak tree are genetically identical and yet this acorn and this oak tree are not morphologically identical.”
“I used to think the same”
You still should. Your predicates F and G above are not sortals. There is no problem in two things being the same in genetic makeup and different in morphology, or vice versa. But there is a problem with two things being, e.g. the same king and different men, or different plants but the same tree. Dr. Baber briefly talks about this in her talk: https://trinities.org/blog/podcast-episode-68-dr-harriet-baber-on-relative-identity-and-the-trinity/ Here’s the issue in all its gruesome, technical glory: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sortals/
“[RIao1] “This acorn and this oak tree are genetically identical and yet this acorn and this oak tree are not morphologically identical.”
I think this is attempt at comedy… but anyway, there is no problem with it – I mean, it doesn’t require a basic concept of relative identity. It concerns qualitative sameness,not numerical sameness; it says that the acorn and oak are the same in one way, and yet different in another way.
To clarify one other thing, the majority of philosophers believe in such relations as “same man as” or “same king as” – which you can call relative identity relations. But we just think that they should be understood in terms of qualitative predication plus “absolute” identity. To take the last case, “x is the same king as y” just means that x is a king, that y is a king, and that x=y – that x and y are numerically one. e.g. King James I and King Jimmy
So you resort to censorship, once again. Poor you …
http://lmgtfy.com/?q=definition+%22censorship%22
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