In this post – what did the bishops mean when they declared for the first time that Father and Son were the same ousia? You’ll want to have this list of interpretations from part 1 in front of you. Importantly, some of possible interpretations of ousia imply others, most notably, the problematic 1. 3 and 4 imply 1 (though not vice-versa). But 1 should be unacceptable to any Christian, and we should be wary of attributing such claims to intelligent believers, as we must assume the attending bishops at the 325 council to be.
Put perhaps this seems too quick to you. Let’s focus then on 1, since 3 and 4 imply it. Did these bishops assume or assert the Father and Son to be numerically the same, to bear the relation to one another that you bear only to yourself? It would seem not, as they start by professing belief in “one God the Father all powerful… And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God…” That “and” seems important; these are different objects of Christian faith.
And they clearly imply differences between the Father and the Son. The Son is “the only-begotten begotten from the Father, that is from the substance of the Father,” but the Father, they are surely assuming, is not begotten at all, much less from himself, or from his own ousia, whatever that could mean. They go on to describe the Son as “true God from true God, begotten not made, consubstantial with the Father.” Note that there are two here being described as “true God,” and the assertion is that one is, eternally, from the other. The second “true God,” they go on to say, became human, suffered (on the cross), was raised from the dead and exalted, and is destined to be our judge. All in all, it is clear that they assume differences between the Father and Son; only the latter was eternally begotten, became human, died, and was raised and exalted. Only the Father, meanwhile, was unbegotten, remained non-human, and never died, rose, or was exalted by himself. Even though these bishops weren’t metaphysicians, we must charitably assume that their central claim that Father and Son are one ousia doesn’t have a meaning which implies the numerical identity of Father and Son. Thus, we should rule out 1, 3, and 4, leaving only 2 and 5-8.
Which of these might those bishops have meant, in deciding to renounce the christology of Arius in 325? They must mean at least 8. It is surely because of their similarities that both can be called “true God,” and they assume both to be eternal, and as they go on to say, both are incapable of “change or alteration.” (This raises obvious problems in the case of the Son, but let those slide for now.) Are similarities properties which the Father and Son just so happen to possess, or are they essential, defining properties? It would seem, the latter, as there’s a background assumption in the philosophy of this time that what is divine (“true God”) is so by its very essence or nature. Thus, they seem to commit not only to 8, but also to 2. Presumably, they don’t mean the Son to be “true God” using those words non-literally, and I suggest that they don’t mean him to be so “accidentally” (i.e. non-essentially). Rather, they mean the Son to be essentially divine, to have a divine essence (ousia), just like his Father, and also because of his Father, because of his Father’s mysterious act of eternally begetting him. And this is why the Son can’t change; divine beings can’t change, they assume.
What about 5-7? Would they add that the divine beings are composed of the same sort of matter, or even very same portion of matter? I assume not. It is true that some earlier catholics like Tertullian held God to be composed of a spiritual sort of matter, and that he generated the Son by sharing a portion of his matter with him, so that it simultaneously constituted the Son and partially constituted the Father. And it is true that Athanasius, the tireless polemicist on behalf of this Nicene creed often talked as if he had in mind an analogy with human reproduction, which was then understood to involve the man introducing the matter necessary for a baby into the woman, who provided only a suitable environment for it to develop. Similarly, Athanasius seems to imagine, God eternally produces the Son not ex nihilo (out of nothing, not by modifying any material or previously existing thing) but rather from his own substance (stuff?), making the to be a “true Son” of his Father. But these bishops, I have to assume, thought that anything composed of matter was subject to change, whereas God was not. And given the influence of Platonism, and its assumption that the ultimate reality is utterly simple, without parts or different components in any sense, I don’t suppose that most of them would have thought the Father to have any sort of matter at all. I suggest then that they could not have been asserting 5-7, and that the majority would deny all three if given the chance. But these points were not at issue between the majority and the minority “Arian” party.
What do you think about this? The scheme has two “Gods,” that is, two who are each called “God” and “true God.” But itself, this is compatible with monotheism. Monotheism is the claim that there’s only one god, not the claim that only one being can be properly addressed or described as “a god” or “God” or “true God.” But if I’m right that not only 8 but also 2 was meant, then we also have two beings with are by their essence divine, which is to say two gods. They seem to be implying that the Father is a god, and the Son is another god.
And yet they explicitly say, “We believe in one God the Father all powerful, maker of all things…” where as the Son is only the one “through whom all things came to be.” And they end their official document with, “Pray for us all that our decisions may remain secure through almighty God and our lord Jesus Christ in the holy Spirit, to whom is the glory for ever and ever. Amen.” The “to whom” here at the end is singular; their thought is that all the glory goes ultimately to the Father, who is the one God himself. It would be anachronistic to imagine here that “to whom” refers to the Trinity, to a god who is supposed to be tripersonal; there’s no mention of such a being anywhere here.
So, in this creed, at its beginning and end, we find explicit Christian unitarian monotheism, asserting the identity of the one god with the Father only, the only “Almighty,” and the unique ultimate source of all else, including the Son. But the creed seems, unclearly, also to imply that the Son too is by his essence divine, which is to say that he is not only called “God” but is in truth a god, and not the same god as the Father. Polytheism, then, seems to be implied, unless we back off on 2 and read the creed as only asserting 8.
Can you see now why this creed caused some much controversy from 325 until it was forcibly stopped in 381? It carries forward then traditional language, but combines it with other claims which seem inconsistent with it.
As best I can tell, by the 381 meeting, where this creed was ostensibly re-affirmed, but also revised, a majority was assuming that being “the same ousia” implied that Father and Son were (or were “in”) the same god. But wouldn’t the creed, read in that way, also imply 1? If so, it would pit itself against the New Testament, which assumes and asserts many differences between the two. But some sophisticates urge that Father and Son be the same god without being the same being/entity (that is, without being numerically identical). Some, for philosophical reasons we can’t go into here, dismiss our concerns about 1, and others now stump for trinitarianism now being understood in senses 5 and 6 above, whatever may have been meant in 325.
As observers of the United States Supreme Court know all too well, legislation may be passed under the assumption of one interpretation, yet a clashing interpretation may later be imposed on it and made into the official, statutory meaning of the old law. Once birthed, a law has a life of its own.
At least with respect to Athanasius, it is not the case that Athanasius thought that physical generation is a proper analogy for the generation of the Son, or that he thought of the Son sharing the Father’s “own substance (stuff?)”.
Athanasius goes to great pains to deny that the Father generates the Son as a human father fathers his child; his rejection of conceiving of the generation of the Word as material is a very common refrain in his works. (For texts on the subject, see Barry D. Smith, “The Oneness and Simplicity of God”, p. 36.)
To repeat what Athanasius says, the Father and the Son are not material beings, and it is precisely because of divine simplicity that the Son is divine. Fatherhood or sonship is not an accident, because God is simple and therefore does not possess accidents distinct from his essence. Thus, fatherhood and sonship belong to the essence of the Trinity, and we have a very typical conception of persons as subsistent relations.
It is, of course, not the case that the first Nicene council was simply an adoption of Athanasianism, as is sometimes portrayed, but that oversimplification is way more accurate than saying that the Nicene council endorsed the view that the Father and Son are two distinct beings. Arius thought that, certainly, and that sort of polytheism was a great part of why the term homoousion (and not merely homoiousian) was chosen. There was a great deal of discussion at the council about whether the Son was merely “like” the Father in essence (i.e., in the way that I am “like” you in my humanity), or whether the son was one with the Father’s essence–and the council chose the latter.
At the time, the dogmatic formulation of Nicaea I was perceived not as declaring the Father and Son to be distinct beings, but quite the opposite: the concern was that it went so far as to negate the notion that the Father, Son, and Spirit were distinct hypostases. (See, e.g., Ch. 1 of Khaled Anatolios’ “Retrieving Nicaea” or the contemporaneous writings of Eusebius in the aftermath of Nicaea I.) The interpretation advanced here is completely at odds with what was actually written and debated at the time, and, so far as I can tell, entirely neglects the historical work that has been done on the subject. It’s tantamount to suggesting that Plato was a moral nihilist because certain early Socratic dialogues on virtue end in aporia.
Thanks for the excellent comment.
“it is not the case that Athanasius thought that physical generation is a proper analogy”
Yes – and the word “proper” there may be important. We have to wonder, though, why he thinks it is so obvious that unless the Son is generated *from the ousia of the Father* then he’s not a genuine Son. What does this amount to? It may seem that he’s imagining something like what’s going on (they then thought) in human reproduction. But I’d assume he’d say there’s no *good* analogy.
“it is precisely because of divine simplicity that the Son is divine”
So, in your view, Athanasius would endorse, by clear implication, #3 in my previous post. https://trinities.org/blog/10-steps-towards-getting-less-confused-about-the-trinity-6-same-ousia-part-1/ OK, but then his opponents were right to complain of something like Sabellianism.
“It is, of course, not the case that the first Nicene council was simply an adoption of Athanasianism, as is sometimes portrayed”
That’s right – that would be a criminal anachronism. In my view, the language of the 325 council was deliberately vague, so as to form a coalition that would throw out the “Arian” catholics. Insofar as their statement had determinate meaning, I’ve take a stab at it here. But you, I think, read them as going farther, to where I think they only officially went in 381 – to endorsing 3 (and so seemingly 1).
“way more accurate than saying that the Nicene council endorsed the view that the Father and Son are two distinct beings”
It had long been part of the catholic tradition to *assume* them to be two beings, and the Son inferior in some ways to the Father, though “divine.” So “true God from true God” seems again to presuppose them two, and since one comes from the other and not vice versa, out of charity we must read them to be asserting them to be two, one from the other, not, incoherently, one being which is and ain’t from itself.
” There was a great deal of discussion at the council about whether the
Son was merely “like” the Father in essence (i.e., in the way that I am
“like” you in my humanity), or whether the son was one with the Father’s
essence–and the council chose the latter.”
Yes, in my terms from the previous post, they knew they’d all agree on the vague 8, but realized it wouldn’t suffice to offend the so-called “Arians”; they needed something stronger, so they adopted vague language which requires at least 2, which those “Arians” would reject.
“At the time, the dogmatic formulation of Nicaea I was perceived not as
declaring the Father and Son to be distinct beings,”
Sure, but that’s because the difference was part of the tradition, clearly seen in Justin and in Origen, not to mention in the NT.
“but quite the opposite: the concern was that it went so far as to negate the notion
that the Father, Son, and Spirit were distinct hypostases.”
Yes, because the language was new, and could be argued to imply 3 (and so 1), and not merely 2.
“The interpretation advanced here is completely at odds with what was
actually written and debated at the time, and, so far as I can tell,
entirely neglects the historical work that has been done on the subject.”
Well, that’s a heavy charge, isn’t it? It’s a wild potshot, I think, to deny that they meant both 8 and 2. You insist on 3, but to back that up you bring into only Athanasius, arguing about two decades or so after the 325 council. I would suggest that you’re reading 381 back into 325, buying the official line that 381 essentially reaffirmed 325. It did, of course, reaffirm the *language*, but in my view the meaning had evolved and become more precise. I’ve read Hanson and Ayers closely on this, and less closely, Behr and Anatolios, and this is still my view. I tend to think that history of catholic quarrels from 325-81 caused by the new “homoousios” language confirms my view that the 325 council was deliberately vague.
In response, I think you’re not adequately distinguishing between metaphor and analogy. Father:Son::human father:son is not a good analogy; but human fatherhood is perfectly fine as a metaphor, keeping in mind that it is a metaphor.
It’s certainly the case that Nicaea I opted for the same essence (homousion), rather than just a qualitatively identical essence (homoiousion). This latter was specifically discussed and rejected in favor of the former. It may or may not be right; but the council’s opinion is quite explicit on the subject.
With respect to the appeal to Origin and Justin Martyr, I’ll comment only on the former, since it has just been too long since I’ve read the latter (though a quick glance at ch. 128 and following of the Dialogue with Trypho certainly seems to contradict your characterization). It’s clearly not the case that Origin was a polytheist in the sense that he believed in multiple beings that fall into the genus “god”. This is such an established point, in fact, that M.J. Edwards–a thorough Origen scholar very quick to find erroneous views among other scholars–can casually remark that “no one doubts that Origen believed in a single Godhead.” In fact, that essay “Did Origen Apply Homousias To The Son?” would be a good historical corrective to certain of your characterizations of Origen.
It’s certainly the case that Nicaea I was vague on certain points, but it is just as certainly the case that Nicaea I did not contemplate two or three individual gods that shared a nature in a way that you and I do. If anything, Nicaea went in the other direction. And, I would continue to argue, it’s impossible to be historically accurate unless one has accounted for the theories of individuation current during this time period–else how will one understand how they are deployed in theological debates?
A final word on the issue of Sabellianism. That’s often brought up on this blog as though declaring the Godhead to be one in being is Sabellianism, but this is incorrect as an historical matter. What differentiates garden variety Trinitarianism from Sabellianism is that the former regards a real and permanent distinction as obtaining between the Father, Son, and Spirit, and the latter does not.
” I think you’re not adequately distinguishing between metaphor and analogy. Father:Son::human father:son is not a good analogy; but human fatherhood is perfectly fine as a metaphor, keeping in mind that it is a metaphor.”
I don’t think I am making that distinction, but how does it matter to the points at hand?
“It’s certainly the case that Nicaea I opted for the same essence (homousion), rather than just a qualitatively identical essence (homoiousion). This latter was specifically discussed and rejected in favor of the former. It may or may not be right; but the council’s opinion is quite explicit on the subject.”
Thomas, I’m pretty sure you’re making a mistake here. Homoiousios is translated “of like substance” or “of similar substance” – implying something less than qualitative equality. But “homoousios” is vague between 2 & 3 in my previous post, between a shareable universal kind-essence and an unshareable particular kind-essence. Perhaps you’re thinking that “homousios” just *means* the latter because this was,arguably, the interpretation that eventually won out.
“It’s clearly not the case that Origin was a polytheist in the sense that he believed in multiple beings that fall into the genus “god”. This is such an established point, in fact, that M.J. Edwards–a thorough Origen scholar very quick to find erroneous views among other scholars–can casually remark that “no one doubts that Origen believed in a single Godhead.” In fact, that essay “Did Origen Apply Homousias To The Son?” would be a good historical corrective to certain of your characterizations of Origen.”
Sorry, but this sounds like revisionary spin. He says that ho theos, the god / God, aka the Father, is unique. But there are many theoi which are divine because of the Father, the first among which is the Son. So, I agree that he was a monotheist. But he did not think that Son and Father were one God, although the first derived his divinity, in a Platonic sort of way, from the second. In short, for Origen the Son was a lesser god. I’ve looked really hard into this, at *almost* all the relevant texts. He said they were two hypostases/beings, and would’ve rejected the idea that they’re the same god. I’ve quoted and discussed many what you could call “subordinationist” texts is previous posts:https://trinities.org/blog/?s=origen
“Nicaea I did not contemplate two or three individual gods that shared a nature in a way that you and I do. If anything, Nicaea went in the other direction.”
Sorry, Thomas, but this is just contradicting the conclusion I argue for in this post. Where do you think my account goes wrong?
” That’s often brought up on this blog as though declaring the Godhead to be one in being is Sabellianism”
By “Godhead” I think you mean the trinity, the three of them. By “one in being” I think you mean that they share an individual essence, which implies that they are numerically identical, that f = s = h. It doesn’t matter to me whether we call that “Sabellianism” or not; I think it’s plainly false given the differences of, say, Father and Son, according to the NT. https://trinities.org/blog/a-formulation-of-leibnizs-law-the-indiscernibility-of-identicals/
Not all theologians would agree that only the duration of the Persons distinguishes trinitarianism from heretical “modalism,” but I’ll let that slide. 🙂
If I have time, I may respond at more length about the way in which it appears to me that you’re imposing assumptions on the Nicene period that distort what they were actually saying, since that’s hard to do in a comment on a blog.
I will say, though, that it’s hardly revisionary to say that Origin was not a polytheist. In fact, it would be quite a shock to Origin scholars to suggest otherwise. Further, the article I pointed you to shows that there is strong historical evidence that Origin not only pioneered the theological category of hypostasis, but also endorsed the language of homousios–making him probably the first major theologian to have distinguished three hypostasis that are homousios using that terminology. (Though there is some debate about the veracity of the fragment we have of Origen’s commentary on Heb. 1:3, the evidence is pretty solidly in its favor. The claim of being one in substance is also present in On First Principles I.2. See, again, the Edwards article I cited).
In any case, it’s clear from the debates prior to and at Nicaea that homoousios was not taken to mean that both the Father and Son shared in a prior, universal essence but were distinct entities–since virtually everyone rejected the notion that there was some essence prior to the Father. Homoisousios was proposed by the likes of Eusebius precisely to avoid saying that the Father and Son are identical in ousia. It is clear from the debates at the time that homoisouisos had the connotation that the Father and Son had similar essences much in the way that, say, a human father and son are alike in being essentially human (though, of course, without the connotation of a physical generation). Nicaea went much farther, and was understood at the time to posit the very same ousia in Father and Son, so much so that the problem with which the contemporaries of the time understood themselves to have is how to maintain a real distinction between the hypostases after asserting that the father and son are the same in being.
Do I smell a Rufinus rat.
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