Answer to Angeliqua’s “The 1-2 Punch Against the Charge that Trinity is Tritheism”

The following piece was posted in the trinities podcast Facebook group, and I thought it was worthy of some replies, which are interspersed in italics below.

Introduction:

It is common knowledge that NonTrinitarians often contend that Trinity is Tritheism or that Trinity teaches three different Gods. Trinitarians will often point out that NonTrinitarians who argue Trinity is Tritheism are making a Strawman attack. I propose an even stronger argument which completely refutes the idea Trinity is Tritheism. In this essay, I will use the Law of Identity and Categorical Reasoning as a 1-2 punch against the charge that Trinity is Tritheism. The reader will see that the Law of Identity and Categorical Reasoning will not logically allow Trinity to be Tritheism.

I think Angeliqua is right that critics of “the Trinity” can “Strawman” (i.e. uncharitably misconstrue) a Trinity theory by characterizing it is as intentionally asserting tritheism. That’s a mistake; but there’s more to the tritheism concern than that, as I’ll explain.

Notice our apologist’s assumption here, that “the Trinity” is one doctrine, one set of claims. That is far from true. I have never, in more than two decades of publishing about Trinity theories, said that “the doctrine of the Trinity” is a form of tritheism. But I have argued that some Trinity theories do, despite their authors’ intentions, imply the falsity of monotheism. It’s pretty easy to see how. It is standard for a trinitarian to adopt the anti-modalist premise that none of the “Persons” is numerically identical with either of the two others. (In other words, they really are three things.) And yet the Nicene claim is that each is fully divine, that each has all it takes to be a god. But then, we’ve just implied that each is a god, and they can’t be the same god, since they are not (as we just said) numerically the same/identical thing. (The assumption here: for any x and any y and any F, x and y are the same F only if x = y. In my view this is self-evident.) But if each is a god, and they’re not the same god, they are different gods – three gods. Now some Trinity theories are built precisely to have an answer to this problem. Does our friend Angeliqua understand “the Trinity” in a way which does?

Epistemology:

The Law of Identity is simply stated as A=A. In more layman’s terms, the Law of Identity long and short says an Identity can only be itself. So for example, A =/=C or an A cannot be the same as C. An Orange cannot be an Apple, a Rock cannot be a Whale, etc. Just to be clear, saying for instance Michael Jordan is human is not a violation of the Law of Identity. Part of the Identity of Michael Jordan or what makes him what he is in nature is that he is a human being. Arguing something like Michael Jordan is Magic Johnson or even LeBron James would however violate the Law of Identity. That’s because the Identities of say Magic Johnson and Michael Jordan are clearly different, as they are two different persons.

Angeliqua is entirely correct in saying that this relation of numerical sameness or identity can only hold between a thing and itself. But statements like a = b (I follow common logical conventions here in using lower case letters for singular referring terms) can be true – just in case what “a” refers to is the same thing as what “b” refers to – I mean, the same individual whatever. I’m not sure what the “law of identity” is supposed to be (Angeliqua may just mean that = is necessarily a reflexive relation, which is true) but I think that Angeliqua may be gesturing at the indiscernibility of identicals – roughly, of necessity, a thing can’t (at one time) differ from itself. So when we evaluate a claim like a = b, if we can find any simultaneous difference between a and b (or even a possible simultaneous difference) then we know it is false that a = b. If a and b really are one and the same, they (really “they” – get it?) can’t ever differ in any way. This is why we can be sure, e.g. that Jordan and James are truly two, not one and the same thing. How do we tell whether statements like a = b are true? There’s no simple answer for that, really.

Categorical Reasoning is where we use logic to determine whether or not X, Y, Z should belong to a certain category or a classification. That would be basic Categorical Reasoning for example to point out that Michael Jordan and LeBron James are categorically basketball legends. Both Jordan and James earned numerous accolades and achieved numerous accomplishments while in the NBA which would make them both Basketball Legends. Robins are categorically birds. Robins have the characteristics and nature that would make them birds.

Argument Stated:

Since A=A, that is impossible for an Individual Multipersonal God to be the same concept as Multiple Gods.

There is some confusion here. A statement like a = a is uninformative (anything whatever will be identical to itself). But consider statements like a = b (e.g. Mark Twain just is Samuel Clemens). These statements are about what may appear to be two things – it’s saying, no, really there is just one there. Nothing is being asserted about concepts; the claim is that the thing referred to by “a” just is the thing referred to by “b”. Many such claims are true and important, e.g. Paul = Saul, or in my view, the Father = Yahweh.

Likewise, even more specifically, it is impossible for an Individual Triune God to be the same concept as three different Gods. Even NonTrinitarians in general, at least from my experience, understand that One God cannot be the same as three different Gods.

Yes, who could disagree that if there are exactly three gods then it would be false that there is exactly one. And if there is exactly one, it would be false that there are exactly three. But I think I see what our friend is getting at here. (Angeliqua, if I’m wrong, please comment.) I think her point is that any “doctrine of the Trinity” by definition includes the claim that there is only one god (the tripersonal one). I completely agree. But that doesn’t solve the tritheism concern above. We all know that Trinity theorists intend to assert a theology which is monotheistic and which does not imply the falsity of monotheism. But despite that noble intention, some (not all) Trinity theorists in fact imply, despite themselves, that monotheism is false – as I explained above. So then, the defense – we mean to be self-consistently monotheistic – well, it just doesn’t address the problem I sketched, a problem that has been around since the time of Basil of Caesarea.

On a related point, categorical reasoning tells us that One God can categorically Unipersonal, Binitarian, Tripersonal. That is not a logical rule that a singular God cannot be categorically multipersonal. Even based on the Principle of Charity that scripture teaches God was Unipersonal, that would not mean an opposing God must necessarily be Unipersonal as well. A God by definition could be an impersonal concept such as what Leveyian Satanism or Pantheism teaches. Jewish Mysticism (the Kabbalah) teaches that God exists as a Decagogue. If one looks up any standard Dictionary, they won’t find a definition that states “a unipersonal Supreme Deity”. So no. A God by definition does not have to be unipersonal even if that were shown in scripture that the God of scripture is unipersonal. What one spiritual worldview teaches is not the ultimate determination of what others believe. Hence, those defending the idea Trinity is Tritheism have the burden of proof that a God must necessarily be unipersonal.

Angeliqua is undeniably correct here that some use the words “God” or “god” to mean something which is not a self. And yet, as I have argued here, I think we can see that our common concept of a deity does imply being a self. And (see, e.g. here) Scripture tells us who that is: in OT he went by “Yahweh” and in the NT he is “God the Father,” the god over Jesus, the one who Jesus is a unique Son to.

If a God does not necessarily have to be unipersonal by definition including being a nonpersonal concept, then an individual God could logically also be multipersonal as well. The point is that categorically speaking, a multipersonal God must be counted as one God by definition. The terms unipersonal, multipersonal, Bipersonal, Tripersonal, etc are just descriptions of how a singular God exists. So while that is categorically accurate to argue an individual Tripersonal could be a member of a Tritheistic pantheon, that is a categorical error to argue a Tripersonal God is a Tritheism of three different Gods. Likewise, a multipersonal being cannot logically be the same concept as multiple persons. Going back a little, the Law of Identity likewise will nor allow for such a position.

I think this is mistaken, given that the “God” of the Bible is obviously supposed to be a god, something which matches this concept which is found I think in all cultures. Still, since trinitarians generally won’t acknowledge this, I would grant what Angeliqua says here for the sake of argument, and then move on to what Scripture teaches about the one God and his human Son. And it is my advice to other unitarian Christians to grant these points too, for the sake of focusing on Scripture, which is more important to this disagreement.

Conclusion:

We have seen above that arguing Trinity is Tritheism does not only show the failure of NonTrinitarians to Steelman the Doctrine of Trinity.

Not really – “the doctrine of the Trinity” can be “steelmaned” (i.e. construed in a more precise and hopefully more plausible way) in multiple ways. It is the trinitarian’s job to pick one. I don’t know what our friend Angeliqua’s Trinity theory is, or even if Angeliqua has one (many apologists do not), so I don’t know whether or not it is liable to a tritheism objection. It could go either way, for all I know.

Additionally, we have seen above that NonTrinitarians that argue Trinity is Tritheism fail to properly apply the Law of Identity as well as basic categorical reasoning.

Rejecting the argument that Trinity is Tritheism does not mean one has to reject their NonTrinitarian faith. I would even contend that It’s unnecessary to try to demonstrate Trinity is Tritheism as it’s basically ‘extra work’. If Trinity were false, it should not then be necessary to demonstrate Trinity is Tritheism in order to demonstrate that the Trinity is unscriptural. If one can demonstrate only the Father is God and/or God is unipersonal in nature, then that that fact alone would refute Trinity. Going through the extra steps to come up with syllogisms and Nonsequitur arguments to ‘demonstrate’ Trinity is Tritheism should not even be necessary.

Agreed.

Unfortunately, in my 20+ years of Apologetics, I debated only two NonTrinitarians who rejected the argument that Trinity is Tritheism. Again, one of the reasons I have a difficult time accepting any NonTrinitarian faith is because of the poor illogical arguments used against Trinity.

Poor arguments can be found on all sides, I’m afraid. It is what best makes sense of Scripture that should count, I think we agree. Interestingly, in the best cases for a unitarian Christian position, charges of polytheism typically play a minor and non-essential part. E.g. here – I think it is all of one sentence! But I would be interested in your response to this.

Thanks for the article and your friendly and insightful arguments, Angeliqua. Let me know if you’ve posted somewhere are just what you think “the doctrine of the Trinity is,” and we can discuss whether or not it is liable to an objection that it implies that monotheism is false.

God bless,

Dale