Here’s where we stand. Bill urges that we should say that God’s essence = God’s existence because this (and only this) explains why God necessarily exists (and this not because of any other being).
Me, I don’t grant that it’s even coherent to suppose that something’s essence just is its existence. So last time, I took a shot at a different argument for that conclusion… and missed the target! Faithful readers helpfully pointed out that my conclusion wasn’t the right one – I was aiming at the wrong target. Thanks, guys!
Now, I think there is something I was getting at there. (I’ll explain in a post tomorrow.) But before I get to that, let me raise the topic of modal ontological arguments for God’s existence. These work, essentially, as follows.
God exists in no possible world or in at least one possible world. (Which is to say: either God’s existence is impossible/contradictory or not.) But there is no contradiction we can find in our idea of God; as best we can tell, this idea is coherent, like the idea of a unicorn and not like the idea of a square circle. So at least one “world” – actual or not. But God is defined as the greatest being there could be. And it is greater to exist necessarily (to exist and be such that one can’t not exist) than to exist contingently. Thus, the idea of the greatest being there could be implies necessary existence, existing in all possible worlds. But then, God exists in this world, in the actual world. God exists. Put that in your pipe and smoke it, Mr. Atheist.
Never mind whether or not this is a successful “proof” of God’s existence. Even if it is not, it is very plausible that being perfect or the greatest being there could be requires necessary existence. Thus,if God exists and is the greatest being there could be, this does imply that God exists necessarily.
But it strikes me that God’s existing and being the greatest being there could be doesn’t explain God’s necessary existence. Rather, the other way around. Part of the explanation why God is the greatest being there could be, is that God has necessary existence rather than contingent existence. Explanation, I think, requires that the explainer not be logically or metaphysically posterior to what gets explained. But God’s being the greatest being there could be is posterior to his being necessary, I think. So, that won’t do.
Next time: my second try to show that if God exists, it is necessary that God exists.
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It might be contradictory to imagine God as a necessary being. God being a me essaying being would have to imply that it is impossible for God to not exist, but if we can imagine a possible world where God (as a necessary being) does not exist, wouldn’t that imply that he cannot exist in any world (as a necessary being)? So the idea doesn’t really work.
It’s impossible to imagine (properly) that a necessary being exists in any world if it is also possible to imagine a possible world in which God does not exist, and I don’t think it’s a stretch to imagine a possible world in which God does not exist.
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