James White knows more New Testament Greek than I do. The reason for that is that he’s put a lot more work into it. (I’ve chosen to invest in other things.) The reason for that is that he seems to think that, at least in the hands of such a quality man as himself, expertise in koine Greek is the golden key to correct biblical interpretation.
But no one should think that, as those at White’s level or even solidly above in their proficiency have been a mix of Catholic and Protestant, theist and atheist, Calvinist and anti-Calvinist, Liberal and Conservative, Orthodox, and yes, even unitarian Christian.
But now go back to my first sentence above. Because of this, I would accept correction from James White if I have said anything mistaken about the Greek New Testament. And if he offered such correction, and it was the sort of grammatical point a student typically learns in her first or second Greek class, I would be blameworthy for being too proud to accept an obviously right correction.
This is why I get salty on Twitter with James White. He has for more than two decades now ignored a vast literature which might help him to clarify his muddled thoughts on “the doctrine of the Trinity.” His way is basically to intone the required lingo as if that meant some one thing, when it demonstrably does not, while slagging “Philosophy.” He strides right past what are indisputably non-question-begging arguments and assures his audience that I only ever “assume unitarianism.”
But worse than that, he’s refused to learn some basic points about identity statements and identity arguments, points which are taught in the introductory deductive logic class at any modern university. Mind you, these are not views distinctive of me; he could have learned these from anyone trained in analytic philosophy, such as, for instance, these three Christian philosophers.
So I will set aside my saltiness and help him to analyze what he’s doing in his Trinity theorizing so he can work past the confusions and really engage the rest of us. Now it is his turn to swallow his pride and accept tutoring in argument analysis from someone he imagines to be a Bible-hating, terrible, proud, rude heretic, albeit, one who’s taught Logic and Critical Thinking courses at the university level. To be clear: in the rest of this post I will say what I would say if I were a Big Fan of Dr. James White and his work.
First, watch this short video put together by our mutual friend Jake the Muslim Metaphysician:
Some observations:
.01 This is a basic issue facing any Trinity theorist. “The Father is God” (etc.) is ambiguous. The most obvious options are that these are identity statements, analogous to “Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens” or predications (descriptions) like “Mark Twain is a human.” In other words, are we saying that the Father and the one God are one and the same (numerically identical), or are we saying that the Father is fully divine (has the divine nature). Trinity theorists are split here. In general, the one-selfers and the positive mysterians take the first (identity) option, and the three-selfers (a.k.a. “social” trinitarians) take the second.
Trouble lies either way.
- Since it is self-evident that things identical to the same thing must therefore be identical to one another (for the demonstration see here), the first option logically implies that the Father just is the Son. (And more generally: any trinitarian Person just is any “other” – call it Person-collapse.)
- In contrast, if “The Father is God” and the “The Son is God” means that the Father is fully divine and so is the Son, and we add in the required trinitarian claim that the Father and Son are distinct (notice how this claim employs the concept of numerical identity), then we’ve got two things/realities, each of which has all it takes to be god. Why is that not two gods? (There are things a trinitarian can say here, but White doesn’t say any of them.)
:13 Dr. White chooses neither option, claiming each is “irrelevant.”
Now, as I said above, it is unclear that these are the only two possible meanings for “The Father is God” etc. Another would be a claim of constitution, e.g. “The Father is constituted by the divine nature.”
But White does not say that. (But see Forgotten Trinity p. 168.) He seems to think that he’s discovered his own special meaning. Here he launches into his standard language: shared “being” between the Persons (i.e. divinity). But then he says this,
Scripture tells us that, for example, the Father is identified as Yahweh, the Son is identified as Yahweh, and the Spirit is identified as Yahweh.
Note the talk of “identity” here. What is White asserting? It is hopeless to urge that three numerically distinct things (which as a trinitarian he holds the Persons to be) are each numerically identical with some one thing. That is a manifest impossibility. For those interested in logic, let me pause to give the proof, to assure you that this is not at all “just Dale’s opinion.” I’ll simplify it to two things, to keep it brief.
- not-(f=s) Premise for reductio: It is not the case that the Father just is the Son.
- f = g Premise for reductio: the Father just is God
- s = g Premise for reductio: the Son just is God.
- g = s Inference from step 3: = is a symmetrical relation: God just is the Son.
- f = s Inference from 2 and 4: = is a transitive relation, like the relation bigger than. If a > b and b > c, then also a > c. And so if a = b, and b = c, then it follows that a = c. That is: The Father just is the Son.
- 1-5 entail a contradiction (1, 5)
- Therefore at least one of 1 – 3 is false. from 1-6 by the argument form reductio ad absurdum or indirect proof.
There are mad-lad metaphysicians and logicians who will try to urge that something goes wrong in this argument, or even embrace the contradiction, but for trinitarians educated in philosophy and/or logic a more common view is that any Trinity theory committed to 1-3 is doomed to incoherence, and so could not be true. So generally, trinitarians conversant with logic will deny at least one of 1-3.
Now, one may object that I’m being uncharitable to White in quoting him as above, as instead he must have meant that:
Scripture tells us that, for example, the Father is identified as “Yahweh,” the Son is identified as “Yahweh,” and the Spirit is identified as “Yahweh.”
Do you see the difference from what is above? Those quotation marks make a huge difference. Now by “identify as” he just means “is called,” that is, is called by the name “Yahweh.”
I don’t think Dr. White usually distinguishes between these two meanings. And I suspect he may cite the second (being called “Yahweh”) as evidence for the first (in some sense being Yahweh). At any rate, he’s committed to in some way identifying each of the Persons with God – but he seems to think he’s hit upon some special sort or way of being one with, a way that is different than numerical identity as commonly understood. That is why he declines to take either option at the start. More on this below.
:47 White tells Jake that his question – identity or predication/description – “conflates being and Person.” But this seems a red herring. Jake has not said anything which presupposes there is no difference between being and Person. I think White here is just falling back on a standard accusation, whether or not it makes sense or is relevant. It’s not relevant here. Of course Jake knows that White wants to say both that each Person “is God” and that those Persons really are numerically distinct things. He’s trying to see if White will go down the doomed path of 1 – 3 above! But White’s basic point here, I think, is that Jake is assuming a false dichotomy: there is some other sense in which a thing can “be God” where this is neither identification with God nor simply being divine/having the divine nature. But what is this third way? He doesn’t say, really.
Now, White earlier had said that the three share the divine nature – but that would be to endorse the predication option for “is God.”
But he seems to think he’s doing some third thing. What? No one knows. That’s the point so far. He just imagines that by following Scripture (unlike the rest of us rubes) he’s hit upon a sense of “is God” that is something other than predication, identity, and I assume also, constitution.
1:09 Jake quite reasonably complains that White hasn’t chosen an option. Or, I would add, clearly expressed any third way.
1:15 Jake asks the question again. Again, White chooses “neither.”
1:34 Cue our mutual friend and White mega fan, evangelical apologist Chris Date. He complains, quite reasonably, that the question is relevant, not irrelevant as White has said. He urges that it is no good to stand up for what seems to be a logically incoherent view – as, I would add, nearly all parties agree that all contradictions are false. But why does Date think White’s view seems logically incoherent? He doesn’t say here, instead droning about how the good guys focus on the New Testament, while the bad guys like me supposedly don’t, instead choosing “Logic.” (Yawn!) But he’s right about this: on the face of it, a trinitarian ought to be competent in defending his view as coherent, and this will require understanding identity claims and arguments involving them.
Dr. White, it’s really all here and here. Study to show yourself approved. The above linked textbook would help too. This may equip you to at least understand, if not respond to, what is going on here.
But here’s what Date does not bring out. Not only has Dr. White failed to intelligibly express any third way (any meaning of “is God” which is neither predication nor identity) in fact his own arguments commit him to “The Son is God” (etc.) being identity statements. Let me explain. And again, here I speak simply as someone tutored in recent logic; there are no distinctively “unitarian” opinions here.
In The Forgotten Trinity (p. 72, rev. edition), White makes this argument. (And most apologists make similar arguments.)
- Only God should be worshiped.
- Jesus should be worshiped.
- Therefore, Jesus is God.
Let us start with the positive: this is indisputably a valid argument. Any argument with this structure will be valid, which is to say that if 1 and 2 are each true, then it must be that 3 is also true. Modern predicate logic with identity brings out how this (and any similar argument) is valid by going past the grammar to reveal the structure of the claims being made. Putting it into the language of logic we have (and I paraphrase off to the side):
- (x) (Wx -> x = g). For anything whatever, if it should be worshiped, then it just is God.
- Wj Jesus should be worshiped.
- Therefore, j = g. Therefore, Jesus just is God.
Notice the logical form of 1: it employs the concept of = (numerical sameness or identity / being the same thing) in its latter portion. This is how it expresses the sense of “only.” The first part, as it were, gets triggered by 2. The conclusion that follows is that Jesus and God are one and the same (and vice-versa). This implies that Jesus and God can’t ever differ in any way. (Uh oh!)
By making such arguments, White has implicitly committed himself to these claims:
- f = g
- s = g
- h = g
Which is arguably a theological disaster for any trinitarian.
That he imagines he is also or instead making some other claim is irrelevant. Suppose that he is, that somehow his exegetical acumen has led him to a heretofore unknown meaning of “is God” which is neither identity nor predication. It doesn’t matter if that’s so. (Of course, if the rest of us are going to believe that, he’ll need to say more about what he means!) Even if that’s so, still, he’s committed to the three claims above, as he argues that each Person has qualities which only God could have – i.e. which only a thing identical with God could have. But then, it follows that each Person is himself identical with God. And so, they’re identical with one another – oops, the very thing a trinitarian must deny.
Now, other things White says, e.g. Forgotten Trinity Ch. 12, point #3, suggests that White should also agree with each Person “being God” in the sense of having the divine nature / being divine (predication). I’m not sure why he denies this in dialogue with Jake. I guess he’s just imagining that he’s found some third way – a way which he tries to express by invoking the Person/Being distinction – but honestly, that’s as clear as mud. No such claim has been made; all that White has done is to gesture in the direction of there being some such claim.
Whereas he disavows both options (each Person “is God” as identity, or as predication), in fact it would seem that he’s already committed to both options. In fact, you might think that each option should imply the other. If someone “is God,” meaning, identical to God, well surely God has the fullness of the divine nature, right? If so (and I must advise you that some trinitarians deny this), then someone who “is God” in the sense of identity will also be God in the sense of predication. And consider the other way. If someone is fully divine, doesn’t that entail being a god? And since there’s only one god, this will imply being identical with the one God himself. So plausibly, if someone “is God” in the predicative sense, he will also be God in the sense of being identical with God.
I assume that Dr. White ought to agree with the preceding paragraph. If so, the answer to Jake or whoever next time ought to be: “both,” not “neither.”
But then Dr. White also inherits the problems of both: Person-collapse – that things identical to the same thing are identical to one another, and tritheism – distinct things each of which has all it takes to be a god, must thereby be three gods. But of course by definition the trinitarian must say there is only one god, and that the Persons are district.
Now, Dr. White assures us that “the doctrine of the Trinity” is neither “inherently contradictory” nor “irrational.” (p. 173)
OK, it’s fine to say that, but we’ve just seen that his own Trinity speculations seem to rather directly imply contradictions. Saying that it’s all coherent and carrying on about being vs. Person – well, it’s just not to the point.
What would be to the point?
Dr. White has three ways to go, as I see it.
- One way would be to embrace true contradictions, like this Reformed logician. I don’t recommend that, and I assume Dr. White will (correctly) stick to his conviction that all contradictions are false. On this I suspect that we (and Date and Jake too) agree.
- The only other obvious way I see is the work of Dr. James Anderson, who has put forward an elaborate theory on which any talk about God will involve us in merely apparent contradictions, but not in real ones. How does that work? It’s rather involved, but I summarize it fairly enough in this paper; and of course Dr. White can read his book (reviewed here). Mind you, I don’t think it works, see the paper for why, but it does give Dr. White something on topic to say about why he’s not just peddling shabby contradictions. Anderson replies to my critique here.
- There is a more radical way, but it would require Dr. White to cease saying things and making arguments that commit him to e.g. “The Son is God” being either an identity statement or a predication. (I doubt he’s willing to pay that price.) This would be the aforementioned way of what I’ve called Constitution Trinitarianism (see 2.1.3 here). I don’t recommend this for numerous reasons. But it does have this virtue: it would be an intelligible “third way” that White seems to want, on which “The Son is God” means that he is constituted by the divine nature.
In short, White needs to up his argumentative game. His fellow Reformed apologist has shown a way. I’m not saying it’s the only way, but it seems to me to be the way most consonant with Dr. White’s work on “the Trinity” thus far.
It’s no good to ignore obvious implied contradictions even when exegeting. When you reach the dead end of a real contradiction, you go back to the interpretive drawing board, so to speak. Surely Dr. White does that on other topics, e.g. Catholic vs. Protestant issues, or Calvinist vs. anti-Calvinist issues. What he can’t do is just hand-wave that he understands e.g. “The Son is God” in way that none of the rest of us have thought of. He’s not expressed what that might be, but more importantly, it’s irrelevant, as he is, as I show above, committed to “the Son is God” understood as an identity statement, and as understand as a description of the Son as divine – each of which generates obvious coherence problems for any trinitarian.
“one who hates correction is stupid.”
Proverbs 12:1
That is my sincere advice. Dr. White, should we meet, can pay me for this help in the form of an IPA, or perhaps he will bless me back with some correction(s) in his field of competence, biblical Greek. Dr. White, if you think there must be some hidden trap here, I advise you to ask Dr. Anderson about all of this; I’ve never met him and haven’t talked to him about this post, but I’ll wager that he would agree with quite a lot of it, and I’ve found him in our communications to be a humble and serious and kind guy – more so than either of us.
