William Lane Craig is a respected and extremely prolific Christian philosopher. I’d give you his c.v., but it might bring the internet to a standstill. He’s sometimes a bit pugnacious in print, but is very amiable in person. And he’s extremely sharp. His trinitarian co-theorizer, J.P. Moreland, is also influential and inhumanly prolific, and is one of the clearest, best organized writers around. He’s been called a “scrappy” arguer, which is apt, and he’s also a swell guy (I took classes from him at Biola in the early 90s, and I’m grateful for how he influenced me). A Willardite, he also writes books about Christian spirituality, such as this good one. Both Craig and Moreland are well known for their many forays into the popular area, in the form of books on apologetics, public debates and such.
Nice doggie… nice doggie… What’s Cerberus here got to do with the Trinity? Keep reading.
In a big, unique book of theirs Moreland and Craig offer a theory of the Trinity, in a chapter on that subject. They call it “Trinity Monotheism”. I’d call it a theory that sort of straddles the social/Latin divide. That is, it doesn’t fit to well with the medieval Latin tradition – but being conservative, Bible-oriented evangelicals, they’re more concerned to concoct a view consonant with the Bible and reason, than they are to come up with one that fits the medieval traditions.
So what is the theory? The best summary of it is given by Bill Craig in a piece in Philosophia Christi (8:1, 2006) which responds to a long and ruthless critique by Daniel Howard-Snyder in a previous issue. I’ll quote Craig’s summary below, but immediately before that passage Craig makes a very important point:
The strength of our proposal lies in the fact that it does not rest content with a merely formulaic understanding of the Trinity. Rather, we try to offer a model that actually shows how the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit can be three persons in one substance. (101, my emphasis)
This kind of courage needs to be applauded, and more importantly, emulated. What they’re saying is that they’re not resting content with inconsistent analogies, or affirming various traditionally required sentences about the Trinity. They’re actually trying to come up with a (literal) model. Put another way, they’re trying to present an intelligible doctrine, that is, one that can be understood. One such that one can’t say – “I don’t know what it means, but whatever it means, I sure hope it’s true!” No – you’ll know what it means (if you pay close attention), whether you agree with it or not. In doing this, they’re declining to hide behind hand-waving appeals to mystery, or to perversely turn the tables by claiming that unintelligibility is a virtue of their theory. By being so clear, they open themselves up to be refuted; they don’t have the easy out of simply accepting apparently inconsistent claims when it is convenient. No, of course they don’t think they completely understand God, or understand everything about him. It’s just that when it comes to the Trinity, they can tell you what they understand that doctrine to mean. This, ladies and gentlemen, is intellectual virtue on display: courage, honesty, and clarity. All the more so given that they’re aware of a certain type of shark who prowls the waters of conservative evangelicalism: the self-appointed heresy hunter. Should Trinity theories ever be widely discussed (currently they are not, beyond a few philosophers and theologians), these sharks will smell blood in the water – simply because of the fact that they’re offering a model at all.
Here is Craig’s summary (which immediately follows the above quote):
Here is the model: God is an immaterial substance or soul endowed with three sets of cognitive faculties each of which is sufficient for personhood, so that God has three centers of self-consciousness, intentionality, and will. … the persons are [each] divine… since the model describes a God who is tri-personal. The persons are the minds of God. (101)
… just as [the mythological three-headed dog] Cerberus is a single dog with three consciousnesses, so God is a single spiritual substance or soul with three self-consciousnesses. (104)
Next time: so, what’s not to like?
Technorati Tags: Trinity Monotheism, JP Moreland, William Lane Craig, apologetics, Cerberus, Trinity, theology
Pingback: The Genesis of Eternal Subordinationism — Part III of Tim Keller on Sex | bWe Baptist Women for Equality's Blog
Dale,
the latest post on Craig (“Craig on the historicity of the Adam and Eve story”) made me think that you have never seriously found fault with his and Moreland’s “Cerberus model” of the “trinity”. Perhaps you may think that your chosen expression, “self”, makes a big difference, when compared to “person”. Well, having made a thorough check, I am pleased to inform you that it doesn’t.
As for those people who may have nightmares with Cerberus, may I suggest the attached, more reassuring image.
“Perhaps you may think that your chosen expression, “self””
You don’t need to taunt to get attention, Mario.
If you think Dan’s piece is mere trifling, I assume you have not read it. Not everything there is equally important, to be sure, but there are important points there.
I have criticized this theory twice. Once, at the end of this series. https://trinities.org/blog/trinity-monotheism-part-9-some-final-thoughts-and-objections/
Again, in this paper. http://trinities.org/dale/HaskersQuests%20preprint.pdf I’m not satisfied with either, though. I don’t think that either time, I quite got to the bottom of what Dr. Craig is thinking. His treatments are too compressed to be really clear. I’ve been working lately on a book chapter, in which I think I now do follow what he’s thinking. I got some help by revisiting some brief feedback he sent me in 2010.
The Cerberus analogy doesn’t really bear any weight in the theory… in the end, it is just an device for exposition, and you could well present the theory without it. Dr. Craig pretty much says this here: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-there-a-good-analogy-for-the-trinity
I’ll probably share some of my new work on this on the blog soon.
Dale,
no “taunting”, just a reminder, in case you delude yourself to have disposed of … Cerberus once and for all.
I most certainly have read Daniel Howard-Snyder’s “objections”, not only as you report them in your various posts (in particular “Trinity Monotheism part 6: Attack of the Dan”), but, most of all, in the original (“Trinity Monotheism”, Philosophia Christi 5 – 2003, 2: 375-403). I find Craig’s response (“Trinity Monotheism Once More: A Response to Daniel Howard-Snyder”, Philosophia Christi 8 – 2006, 1: 101-13) most effective. I have also read your comment in your recent “Trinity” (§ 2.4, pp. 32-34), and it simply adds nothing to the debate. That you have “criticized this theory twice” does not mean that you have disposed of it (even if you may have “got to the bottom of what Dr. Craig is thinking”). I don’t see what would be unclear about what he says. That the “Cerberus analogy” is not essential to Craig’s theory is neither here nor there. The question, like for all models is: is it structurally and functionally adequate? You have provided no conclusive criticism on either account.
The question, as I have already indicated, is, to a large extent, in your delusion that your chosen word, “self”, makes all the difference, when compared to “person”. Once again, it is a DWAD (Distinction Without A Difference). At most, after psychoanalysis, one may say that “self” bears also an unconscious connotation that is not obvious for “person”. Trifling. Your DWAD has a certain affinity with the artificial differentiation between hypostasis and ousia that was literally invented by the theologians involved in trying to sort out the Arian Controversy in the 4th century. As everybody knows (should know), they succeeded … with that conjurer’s trick …
Pingback: trinities - Trinity Monotheism part 7: Bill fires back, part 1
Pingback: trinities - Trinity Monotheism part 5: “divine”
Greg,
Sorry for the delay but grading sucked up my time this month. I do agree that for Maximus there are three tropic wills in the Trinity, or three hypostatic employments of the divine faculty of will. So it is true to say that there are three wills in God and one will in God which cuts across dialectical formulations.
On Jn 6, I would respond by agreeing that the contrast is between Father and Son, but this does not imply a monoenergetic reading. It is perfectly compatible with a dyothelite reading for on the latter it is true that Christ using his human power of choice wills to preserve his life. The single hypostatic use doesn’t imply a single hypostatic will. The single subject Christology of Cyril requires that the “me†always be the divine Son, even though it doesn’t imply that the will be hypostatic. So I always affirm that the “me†is Christ. In fact, I’d say that it is true to say that Christ and the Father will both the preservation of his human life and the salvation of the world, though Christ in his human power of choice only initially in the Passion wills the former. Both are goods and hence not opposed to each other. Moreover, Christ’s willing the salvation of the world is directly linked in v.39 with the general resurrection, indicating that the will is natural which is why it affects all “instances†of that nature. If it were purely hypostatic, then the resurrection of Christ would not entail the resurrection of all. This has patristic support not only in Maximus the Confessor but also in Athanasius and Cyril-who are no small figures in Christian theology.
As for opposition, does any lack of conformity to God’s will imply sin? If so, that seems like opposition so that if the object of will is simple (and the will too), and the Father wills x and the Son y, then one of them is sinning. In any case, that seems to be exactly what you have in the Passion. And there, glossing the wills as hypostatic won’t help in terms of staving off opposition that is implied if the Good is simple.
As to heaven, since many things can be true of the one divine Son, the fact that he comes down from heaven to do his Father’s will and not his own, can be read in one of two ways, both of which are compatible with dyothelitism. First, it can simply be intended as denoting the Son as causally dependent on the Father rather than suggesting a different hypostatic will. Second, it can mean that the Son of whom it is true that he came down from heaven, to do his Father’s will, preserving the distinction of natural wills. As for thelema, I agree that is has to do with denoting the purpose of ones actions. If x is the Father’s purpose and it is not the Son’s purpose, the dialectical opposition (same/different) seems rather apparent.
As for a functional unity, this doesn’t seem to be what the East has in mind. It seems to be an acceptable practice to say something is “Eastern†without any significant demonstration that it is so. I think a serious reading of Athanasius, Cyril or Maximus will make clear that any functional unity is far too weak to do the kind of work they have in mind. Call me ignorant, but I can’t see how a functional subordinationalism could guarantee divine unity. Perhaps you have some suggested reading on the topic that spells this out.
I agree with a two intellect view, but if the intellect is a natural faculty it seems that there is only one of them between the three persons, on pain of there being three natures. I agree that God has three cognitive powers but I don’t see how this helps Craig’s view escape the problem of conflating person and nature. I suppose I’ll have to read him more fully.
Pingback: Trinity Monotheism Part 3: Their Set-Up, Part 2 at trinities
Hi again,
This is an argument that starts with his juvenile De Trinitatis Erroribus and is fully developed in his final masterwork, Christianismi Restitutio (soon to be published for the first time in English, BTW). For Servetus, God exists in only one hypostasis, so that God is visible through Jesus and communicates through the Spirit, but being as one, and not three different hypostases. That is why his theology has sometimes been defined as a form of Sabellianism (but not quite). On the other hand, the Trinity is defined as a single substance in a plurality of persons. These “persons”, according to Servetus, are not mere aspects, dispositions, or “masks” (original meaning of the Latin word “persona”, or “prosopon” in Greek, from theatrical masks to represent characters) of the One God, but three different hypostases, three entities, and therefore, three gods. He uses arguments by Athanasius, Augustine. Basilius and others and criticizes their defense of the Trinity. I cannot go here into full detail because the full argument is very complex, but this is a quick summary of it.
Jaume,
I understand the “hellish” connotations with the image and so I could understand Calvin’s objection for that reason. But this of course is not the aspect of the image that Craig and Moreland agree with or is even a part of the analogy that they are using–whether or not it is wise to employ such an image. But I am curious about Servetus’ objection to the Church’s use of “person.” Could you flesh out this objection of his more? Thanks.
Your explanation is quite correct, Greg. I would only add that it is not only about the image of a hellish monster, but also a direct attack by Servetus to the concept of “persons” beyond its ethymological meaning of “masks” or aspects or divinity. Because the doctrine of the Trinity was, in Servetus’s views, multiplying the divine hypostases through a bad use of the word “person”, and so there were three persons in one substance just as the Cerberus is one monstruous animal with three separate heads.
But the Cerberus and its connotations have not changed since Calvin’s and Servetus’s times. It has never been a “doggie”, and it will never be, and those who use the Servetian image of the three-headed dog of hell should be aware that the hellish image is what is subconsciously transmitted to the listeners.
Pingback: Trinity Monotheism part 2: their set-up, part 1 at trinities
It may be that Calvin condemned Servetus for calling the Trinity “a three-headed Cerberus,” but this phrase of his was used as a polemic against the traditional understanding of the Trinity. Servetus rejected the Trinity outright and used this phrase to describe the notion of the Trinity as a devilish invention. So, given the context, Calvin’s rejection of the Cerberus metaphor is not a rejection of some model for understanding the Trinity, but is a rejection of associating trinitarianism with Satanic origins.
Interestingly, Calvin condemned Servetus in Geneva because Servetus called the Trinity, among other niceties, “a three-headed Cerberus”…
Pingback: Guest Post: Jedwab on “Trinity Monotheism” at trinities
Dear Perry,
I tend to agree with you regarding the dyothelitist position now that I have been reading through the helpful article, “Synergy in Christ according to Maximus the Confessor,†that you linked to on your blog. However, what I meant by the will being attributed to the person and not the nature was really what Jones describes as the tropos. So it would correspond to what you are saying here.
To be consistent, would we not also have to assert that there are three hypostatic uses (tropoi) of a single set of natural faculties in the Godhead? (I will proceed under the assumption that you would agree here, but if you do not agree, please explain why not.)
However, when it comes to interpreting John 6:38, I would disagree with the typical dyothelitist reading, which interprets the contrast of wills as being between Christ’s humanity and God (or more specifically Christ’s divine nature). The verse says, “For I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will but the will of him who sent me.†I see no other way of reading this verse in the immediate context of vv.37-40 than as a contrast instead between the will of the Father and the will of the Son. Clearly, the “him†in the “him who sent me†cannot be anyone except the Father in this immediate context. Notice the corresponding clauses, “this is the will of him who sent me†(v.39), and, “this is the will of my Father†(v.40). Moreover, when Christ says “me,†referring to himself as the one who was sent from heaven (cf. v.33), it must only be in reference to Christ as a person and not merely his humanity. This is because his humanity did not come down from heaven; it was the pre-incarnate Word who was sent from heaven. Furthermore, I do not see how this interpretation could be judged as teaching anything near tantamount to “opposition†between the Son and Father, let alone one of them sinning. For someone to say that he has come to do someone else’s will and not his own does not entail opposition between them. Moreover, in this passage the “will†(Gk. thelema) would more appropriately denote the purpose of one’s actions.
As regards the unity of the divine will you wrote, “If the divine persons are not united in a single and natural power of will, one begins to wonder what constitutes their unity or what guarantees their agreement.†One idea that I posited which could guarantee their agreement is functional subordinationism within the Godhead. It was this idea that I was saying was especially Eastern. However, I did not mean that the Orthodox assert Craig and Moreland’s view of three divine minds and wills.
Now, when it comes to Jesus’ ignorance I would adhere to the Two-minds view, as espoused by Thomas Morris. His view obviously attributes the mind to the nature instead of the person. I do not believe that any other extant view than the Two-minds view could be affirmed regarding this issue if one wants to uphold Chalcedonian orthodoxy. Consequently, it would seem that the mind must be located in the nature in order to preserve an orthodox view, unless there is a coherent way of asserting that the three divine minds are attributed to the nature. In which case, it could be asserted that Christ has a human mind and a divine mind along with the assertion that there are three divine minds. Interestingly, in the quotation above Craig writes, “God is an immaterial substance or soul endowed with three sets of cognitive faculties each of which is sufficient for personhood†(101). It seems that Craig is saying that the divine nature has three “cognitive faculties,†just like my suggestion, which I believe is the only alternative view that could possibly be consistent with orthodoxy. I am not saying that it is consistent, only that I would need further explanation by Craig before judging it orthodox or heretical. Nevertheless, my point here is twofold. Firstly, to point out that Craig’s three-minds view need not be judged heretical at first glance. Secondly, that Craig does appear to be attributing the minds to the nature and not to personhood; although, it is clear that they are directly related to personhood (and seem to be presented as the logical basis for personhood).
The centers of consciousness view does seem to be rather anachronistic along Lockean lines. I don’t think the Cappadocians or Athanasius for that matter thought of the divine hypostases in terms of consciousness or even intellect. For them, intellect is a natural faculty employed by the persons, and so the same is true of will.
This is why we need to be clear concerning dyothelitism or dyoenergism. It is not quite right per the history of the debate to gloss the positions as one vs. two wills. On the dyothelite view, there is one natural power or faculty of will for each nature but each is used by the one person. The same goes, contra Hick, for intellect and so plausibly consciousness.
If the divine persons are not united in a single and natural power of will, one begins to wonder what consitutes their unity or what guarantees their agreement. Then we are pushed into reading specific texts, like the passion or jn 6:38 in terms of opposition between Father and Son, which seems to imply that one of the is sinning.
While Scripture does speak of Jesus willing, Scripture doesn’t obviously lend itself to a monothelite reading, or so I would argue. Scripture also speaks of Jesus’ mental activity in terms of ignorance. Are there two intellects in God, Father and Son, one of which is ignorant on the same principle?
I think it is quite a controversial claim that the kind of ST that Craig and others are proffering maps the Eastern model. In fact, most Orthodox theologians I know wouldn’t own it and in fact denounce it. I think we are owed a careful analysis of the Eastern model by ST before we purchase their claim that they are in fact within that tradition, because so far, as a philosophically inclined Orthodox Christian, I ain’t buyin’ it.
Hi Mark,
They’re using “soul” for a kind of “substance” (i.e. thing, entity, individual thing). You’re right – sometimes “soul” (mind) is used for a faculty of a substance instead, but that’s not how they’re using it.
I guess the reason why the words of the Bible aren’t stuck to in this discussion, is just that they don’t constitute any metaphysical theory of the nature of God (or of Jesus). So a phrase like “He is the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature” is surely intended to tell us how Jesus is, but it doesn’t tell us what does or doesn’t belong to his essential nature.
Hi JohnO,
Good question! Here’s a lame answer: the Cerubus pic has a body. 🙂
But it’s a real question whether or not their view amounts to modalism. If God has “three faculities of thinking” etc. how does that differ from God being able to think etc. in three different ways?
Greg – Thanks for the good comments.
I guess that the traditional reason for saying there are two wills in Christ is just that both natures seem to require one, and two different kinds, it seems. A divine being has a will, so if Christ has the divine nature, that includes a divine will. (Same thing again, substituting “human”.) You’re right, though, that the NT picture is of the man Jesus, with presumably one will, which at times differs from (without being really at odds with) God’s will.
I agree that M&C’s account is attractive. I’ll post some time soon on objections, but here’s a first pass and teaser: isn’t the only personal (personal being) in their account just God himself? That he has three “centers of consciousness” each sufficient for personhood, just makes his personhood overdetermined.
One other thing to add is that it seems curious to me why philosophical defences of the Trinity seem to often steer clear of the biblical imagery – there seems to me to be so much potential in something like Hebrews 1:3
How about using something like that as a way of getting to the unity rather than starting with three persons who seem to be pretty much the same?
I think my main problem with their view (I’ve only read your summary and a short exerpt from the book) is that it makes rather technical distinctions that are somewhat hard for me to go along with. What does it mean to have a soul vs to have a cognitive faculty? As far as I can see the two are somewhat inextricably intertwined, but maybe that’s because I haven’t read their definitions.
How is the picture of Cerebrus any different than the picture of the three faces which so typically characterizes modalism? I see no difference.
Although I’m subjecting myself to risk because you will probably point out faults I have not seen, I really do like this analogy! At first glance, the only significant things I see that are missing in the analogy are the clear functional distinctions for the persons. However, I do not think that this omission makes the analogy fail because an analogy is not exhaustive. Regarding the aspects of the doctrine they are addressing, it seems to correspond quite well.
Yet, I would like to point out that this view of the Trinity would seem to contradict the condemnation of monotheletism at the Third Council of Constantinople (680-681CE). This is because Craig attributes three wills to God, each to its respective person. When formulating the position that Christ had two wills–one human and one divine–it appears that the Church also made the judgement (whether or not it was explicit) that the will is accorded to the nature and not the person. I do not know much of the details of the history of the controversy, but it has been a topic of interest to me. This is because I’m inclined to disagree with the council and, instead, attribute the will to the person. Although I will not argue my case here, I would argue primarily from Scripture which makes distinctions between Jesus’ will and the Father’s and which attributes certain actions uniquely to the different divine persons, respectively. Secondarily, I would argue in accordance with the particular understanding of free will that I adhere to, namely the Agent Causal form of Libertarian free will.
Concerning “dyotheletism,” I recall that one of the major issues was to establish that the two wills would never contradict one another. This, if I can recall correctly, was established through analogies such as a horse and its rider. The rider (divine will) would tame, steer, and control the horse (human will). Apparently, the underlying assumption was that the only will that could potentially create conflict or err was the human will. Now when it comes to the Trinity, why does there need to a single will? I mean, I understand that there needs to be a unity of God’s will, but would not the wills of the Holy Spirit and the Son be subject to the Father? If yes, it would be the Father who would provide unity to the will of God. This seems even more attractive to me because I tend to agree with the Eastern Orthodox and see the Father as the sole source of divine life in the Godhead, which in effect places him as the unifying agent in contradistinction to the Augustinian view that the Holy Spirit is the bond of unity. Therefore, as the Father is the source of life so is he the source of unity.
I know that I’ve said a lot, but those are where my thoughts have been lately. What do you think?
Comments are closed.