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podcast 14 – One God, One Lord, Two Interpretations

The apostle Paul famously says, …for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist. (1 Corinthians 8:6) Is this passage a radical transformation of, or a redefinition of Jewish monotheism? Is it an insertion of Jesus into the Shema confession, that… Read More »podcast 14 – One God, One Lord, Two Interpretations

Worship and Revelation 4-5 – Part 1 – setup

What, if anything, is wrong with this argument? 1. Only God should be worshiped. 2. Jesus should be worshiped. 3. Therefore, Jesus is God.     (1,2) Before you answer, be sure you understand the claims fully. The “only” in 1 makes a claim of quantification, which we all understand in terms of identity. In standard logic, it would be analyzed as: Wg & (x)(Wx… Read More »Worship and Revelation 4-5 – Part 1 – setup

Did Jesus have faith in God?

“It’s stunning; there is nothing in the Bible that says Jesus had faith.”

missing link

the evolution of my views on the Trinity – part 6

Last time, c. 1998-2001, I was a social trinitarian along the lines of Richard Swinburne. While I was on the job market in 1999-2000, my former professor Stephen T. Davis was kind enough to invite me and a friend to attend the Incarnation summit, a follow up to the earlier interdisciplinary Trinity Summit. This was a great privilege, and I pretty much just observed. But… Read More »the evolution of my views on the Trinity – part 6

SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – ROUND 6 Part 1 – BURKE

In the 6th and closing round, Burke argues from reason, scripture, and history. From reason: The Trinity doctrine, argues Burke, is inconsistent with itself. The “Athanasian” creed presents us with three, each of whom is a Lord, and yet insists that there is only one Lord. As some philosophers have pointed out, it is self-evident that if every F is a G, then there can’t… Read More »SCORING THE BURKE – BOWMAN DEBATE – ROUND 6 Part 1 – BURKE

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 4

The theory, then, is that God is an everlasting, temporally extended thing with three temporal parts, each of which is a god. But, they’re the same god as God. Yet as we saw last time, how can the Three be gods at all, as each exists at some times but not others?

Without going into the arguments for this controversial thesis, Baber appeals to the claim made by Derek Parfit and others, that “identity is not ‘what matters’ for survival”. (p.6) Thus, a future thing can count as my surviving, though it is not (numerically) identical to me.

Suppose (I’m stealing this thought experiment from Richard Swinburne) some mad scientists, such as Pinkie and the Brain, are going to cut my brain in half, and put the left half in one body, and the right in another. The body which gets the left half will be tortured to death, while the body getting the right half will be given lifetime passes to all NFL games and a lifetime supply of good beer. If I’m to undergo this experiment, I want to know which of these resulting people will be (numerically identical to) me: the unlucky one, the lucky one, or neither.

Baber (following Parfit) wants to say that depending on how exactly the resulting people are related to me, both may count as the continuation of or survival of me. Specifically, she suggests that psychological continuity is enough – it is enough that the later people have the same or nearly the same beliefs, desires, and so on that I have.

I don’t think this is right, but back to the Trinity: In her view, the god which is a God-stage (temporal part of God) called the Father would, just before the Incarnation, be mistaken to think Read More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 4

10 steps towards getting less confused about the Trinity – #4 “same ousia” – Part 2

In this post – what did the bishops mean when they declared for the first time that Father and Son were the same ousia? You’ll want to have this list of interpretations from part 1 in front of you. Importantly, some of possible interpretations of ousia imply others, most notably, the problematic 1. 3 and 4 imply 1 (though not vice-versa). But 1 should be unacceptable to any… Read More »10 steps towards getting less confused about the Trinity – #4 “same ousia” – Part 2

A formulation of Leibniz’s Law / the Indiscernibility of Identicals

In discussing the Trinity or Incarnation, I often have an exchange which goes like this:

  • someone: Jesus is God.
  • me: You mean, Jesus is God himself?
  • someone: Yeah.
  • me: Don’t you think something is true of Jesus, that isn’t true of God, and vice-versa?
  • someone: Yes. e.g. God sent his Son. Jesus didn’t. God is a Trinity. Jesus is not a Trinity.
  • me: Right. Then in your view, Jesus is not God.
  • someone: But he is.
  • me: So, you think he is, and he ain’t?!
  • someone: [silent puzzlement]

In this post, I want to explain the part in italics. First: a point of clarification. The second and third lines are important. When many say “Jesus is God” they just mean that in some sense or other Jesus is “divine.” (This could mean a lot of things, depending on one’s assumed metaphysics.) But this sort of person (line 3) understands Jesus to be “divine” in the sense of just being one and the same as God – that Jesus is God himself – one person, so just one (period).

In the italicized line, I’m applying  something called Leibniz’s Law, or the Indiscernibility of Identicals. I sometimes put this roughly as, some x and some y can be numerically identical only if whatever is true of one is true of the other. That’s a sloppy way to put it.

In logic, a more precise way of stating it (used e.g. by Richard Cartwright) is:

(x)(y)(z) ( x= y only if (z is a property of x if and only if z is a property of y))

Literally: for any three things whatever, the first is identical to the second only if the third is a property of the first just in case the third is a property of the second.

The basic intuition is that things are as they are, and not some other way. So if x just is (is numerically the same as) y, then it can’t be that x and y qualitatively differ. This seems undeniable.

There are a few problems, though, with the above formula, which any person trained in philosophy may spot. Read More »A formulation of Leibniz’s Law / the Indiscernibility of Identicals