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publications update

victory danceMy paper critiquing the Brower-Rea “constitution” approach to the Trinity has now been published in Philosophy and Theology. I just received the issue this week. Pre-print is on the home page. I worked very hard on this, off and on, for more than two years, and tried (with limited success, I think) to make the discussion intelligible to non-philosophers. It’s a metaphysics-heavy discussion though. My thanks to editor James South, and to Mike Rea and Jeff Brower for their helpful comments on various drafts.

Also almost out in Faith & Philosophy is my paper critiquing William Hasker’s “social” Trinity theory.

Hasker tells me that his major book on Trinity theories, published by the best academic philosophy publisher, will be out in the U.K. this August, and in October in the U.S. It appears that my piece will come out just before it. Providential? 😉 I have seen drafts of much of this book, and it has all the virtues for which Hasker is known – insightfulness, clarity, and careful argumentation. It will be understandable by non-philosophers, and is thorough, but not long-winded.

I think he neglects both the Bible and the non-catholic end of the Christian theological spectrum, and am not a fan of his “social” theory. Still, I will be paying careful attention to Hasker’s book, as it will probably be the best developed case anyone has ever made for “social” trinitarianism – or what I would call three-self trinitarianism. Also, it is going to stimulate discussion of all the recent rational reconstructions he discusses.

Congratulations to Bill on the fruition of his work.

29 thoughts on “publications update”

  1. I often see a new post and see that it has a bunch of comments. I get excited and click to see what the comments say. Then I see it is mostly just villanovanus trolling again. When will I learn to not get my hopes up?

  2. P.S. The clearest illustration of the separateness of the commitment to the two types of Realism is the case of Kant: a realist (albeit “conjectural”) in the first sense (he affirmed the Ding an sich, independent of the perceiving/thinking subject), BUT definitely NOT a realist in the sense of the problem of universals. In spite of Hegel’s criticism of Kant for retaining realism in the first sense, I side with Kant …

  3. “… methinks: potæto – potâto …”

    Methinks you don’t understand what antirealism is. However, it is a bizarre and seemingly unsupportable view.

    “entirely “in the eye of the beholder””

    No, unless you think that *all* metaphysical claims (whichever those are) are “in the eye of the beholder,” which I assume means, have only subjective value. But that’s false; some are false, others true.

    About my inconsistency – depends on “main”. I had in mind, of course, the core claims re: homoousios, three wholly divine persons but one God, etc. But, I’ll grant that I was over-generous in the quoted statement.

  4. @ Dale [#25, June 6, 2013 at 11:05 am]

    No, they [Brower and Rea] are not vulnerable to the charge of anti-realism. Such a view holds there to be no objective truths or facts, but only truths are facts relative to some theory or perspective. Facts about constitution and numerical sameness without identity, are not relative in that way, according to Brower and Rea. [sic!]

    It’s just that, without certain theoretical commitments, [sic!] one will probably deny that such are facts or truths.

    So, “theory-dependent” vs. “theoretical commitments” …

    … methinks: potæto – potâto …

    You keep citing Rea’s comment on modalism, but as I’ve explained, he’s not obviously vulnerable to that charge. If one wants to argue that, despite his intentions, the theory implies modalism, well, we need an argument for that, not merely an assertion. The theory is designed to avoid it, by making the persons non-identical substances, and not modes of anything else.

    I have already argued why B-R CT (exemplified by their piece of marble / statue / pillar) is even less than Modalism, because it is entirely “in the eye of the beholder”, or, to use a more philosophical expression, “theory-dependent”. I can only confirm what I said, and you have brought absolutely nothing against this.

    In any case, with reference to Rea’s specific examples, you still haven’t explained why, IF the Kal El / Superman / Clark Kent analogy IS modalist (The Trinity of 2009, p. 7/47; Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity, of 2003, Philosophia Christi, Vol. 5, No. 2, 13/16 @ www3.nd.edu, footnote 26) then the “Caryatid analogy” (piece of marble / statue / pillar) is not, a fortiori, modalist.

    “I suspect there is a certain inconsistency between these two statements” [villanovanus]

    Me too. [Dale]

    Your frank admission of the inconsistency between your statements, evidenced at comment #23 (villanovanus, June 4, 2013 at 4:13 pm) does you credit. 🙂

    MdS

  5. Mario,

    No, they are not vulnerable to the charge of anti-realism. Such a view holds there to be no objective truths or facts, but only truths are facts relative to some theory or perspective. Facts about constitution and numerical sameness without identity, are not relative in that way, according to Brower and Rea.

    It’s just that, without certain theoretical committments, one will probably deny that such are facts or truths.

    You keep citing Rea’s comment on modalism, but as I’ve explained, he’s not obviously vulnerable to that charge. If one wants to argue that, despite his intentions, the theory implies modalism, well, we need an argument for that, not merely an assertion. The theory is designed to avoid it, by making the persons non-identical substances, and not modes of anything else.

    “I suspect there is a certain inconsistency between these two statements”

    Me too.

  6. P.P.S. … unless, of course, one decides to resort to the claim that the expression “main creedal formulas” excludes precisely “generation” (“begotten of the Father”, “begotten, not made”) and “spiration” (“who proceedeth from the Father”) …

  7. P.S. I suspect there is a certain inconsistency between these two statements:

    As it has been developed, CT does provide an interpretation of the main creedal formulas which is specific and intelligible enough to be believed – (Constitution Trinitarianism. An Appraisal, p. 16/24)

    Unclear that they [Brower and Rea] account for this [(creedal) “generation” and “spiration”], or even whether they want to. They might, like Craig, urge that there’s no biblical ground for those parts of the creeds. (Dale, #21, June 4, 2013 at 8:54 am)

    MdS

  8. @ Dale [#21, June 4, 2013 at 8:54 am]

    1. Brower-Rea CT (not only is NOT an analogy for the “trinity”, BUT it) is not even an analogy (let alone a “model”) for Modalism. It is even dubious that the seated / standing / reclining Socrates analogy would be. But, at least, Socrates appears in three different “modes”. OTOH, that a Caryatid (piece of marble / statue / pillar) is three distinct “somewhats” of the same material object is NOT objective, but merely subjective: “in the eye of the beholder”, or, to use a more philosophical expression, “theory-dependent”, which is precisely what Brower and Rea, the latter even more explicitly than the former, specially plead to want to avoid:

    Many philosophers are attracted to antirealism, but accepting it as part of a solution to the problem of the Trinity is disastrous. For clearly orthodoxy will not permit us to say that the very existence of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is a theory-dependent matter. Nor will it permit us to say that the distinctness of the divine Persons is somehow relative to our ways of thinking or theorizing. The latter appears to be a form of modalism. (Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity, Michael C. Rea, 2003, Philosophia Christi, Vol. 5, No. 2, 13/16 @ www3.nd.edu – bolding by MdS)

    (In a note appended to the above text, Rea goes on to say: According to modalism, each Person is just God in a different guise, or playing a different role—much like Superman and Clark Kent are just the Kryptonian Kal-El in different guises, or playing different roles. )

    2. CT simply does NOT account for entities that are “numerically the same without being numerically identical”. OTOH, once again, Moreland-Craig “Trinity Monotheism” (with its “Cerberus analogy”) satisfies the requisite NOT ONLY of being “numerically the same” BUT ALSO of being “numerically identical”, because the ONE Cerberus (=> the “trinity”) with its three distinct heads (=> three distinct “persons”) is obviously identical to itself.

    3. I take good note that you confirm that Brower-Rea CT (in this, like Moreland-Craig TM) does NOT account for (ecumenic-creedal) “generation” and “spiration”. Obviously the required “development” of CT to include “generation” and “spiration” cannot be as trivial as “(somehow) because of the Father, that same [divine] nature is shared with the Son, and (if they go filioque) (somehow) because of Father and Son, that same nature is shared with the Spirit”. This, at most, would account for the (ontological) homoousios, NOT for (creedal) “generation” and “spiration”, which are processes, however much one may want to put them (thanks, Origen, for the “clever” idea …) “in eternity”.

    In sum, I leave it for people “tutored in contemporary metaphysics” to take seriously the idea that a piece of marble / statue / pillar can be an analogy (or even a “model”) of the “trinity” – Father / Son / Holy Spirit.

    MdS

  9. Hi Mario,

    Some quick repiles. As I’ve said in the past – if you flail around with more than a dozen demands per comment, I simply won’t have time to answer. And I won’t want to, because some are missing the point. Still, there are good questions here. Among them:

    Their CT is not modalism, because their persons are not modes of God, or of the Father. Nor any identical to each other, or to the divine nature. They are “numerically the same” without being numerically identical – and yes, that is a controversial concept. They can’t be, because they (all four of the aformentioned entities) differ. In the view of Rea and Brower, the lump of mable, the pillar, and the statue are not, any of them, identical to one another, nor is any a mode of the other. They are non-identical, because they differ, as I explain in the paper.

    ” How would CT account for (creedal) “generation” and “spiration”?”

    Unclear that they account for this, or even whether they want to. They might, like Craig, urge that there’s no biblical ground for those parts of the creeds. But if they want to account for it, they need only say that eternally, the Father is constituted by the divine nature. And (somehow) because of the Father, that same nature is shared with the Son, and (if they go filioque) (somehow) because of Father and Son, that same nature is shared with the Spirit.

    “What has being “tutored in contemporary metaphysics” to do with any of it?”

    One has to be concerned with what Rea calls the problem of material constitution to really understand his perspective on the lump/statue/pillar cases, and to grasp the Aristotelian solution, which, as they point out, does preserve some common-sense beliefs. If one goes that far, one may be willing to extend the constitution relation to non-material realities.

    CT “stands and falls with the adequacy of the analogies of material constitutions”

    As I explain in the paper, it’s not wholly clear whether they mean CT to be a mere analogy (perhaps, not much better than other, seemingly incongruent analogies) or an actual model of the Trinity. I think they lean towards the latter, pretty clearly. That is, they think that the concept of constitution applies beyond the material realm, and that the divine nature (along with various relations) *literally* constitutes each person. Each is literally a complex entity, with form and something like a matter (the divine nature).

    In sum, if you just insist that they’re really modalists, I think that you get nowhere against them.

    It is fair to press them on the generation and procession claims, and now that I think about it, it wish I had done that in the paper. It’s not so much an objection, as making the point that their theory remains in need of development.

  10. Can I second this about Mario? At the same time, I like Mario’s input to inject some input and another take, just don’t appreciate the one-up and one-down-ness? Come on Mario, man-up and mellow a bit. You’re helpful to the dialogue…just abrasive and edgy. We all got enough edge in our lives. Keep it positive.

  11. Dale,

    Your blog manners need some improvement. You should stop the insults to the effect that Tuggy is making a lot of money from all of this. From the books @ lulu.com, I get an average of $5 / month – total! It is clear that you’ve read and learned a lot on this topic. But people will tune out, as soon as the nasty attitude and words start to flow.

    I think your moderatorship is needed here. Even though many of the exchanges are interesting and informative, MdS’s unrelenting and temperamentally loaded responses are just unpalatable. For the sake of enjoying your blog, a fresh breath of courtesy and maturity is urgently needed…

    …may I dare say…

    1. Thanks, Jaco. I agree. I tend to err on the side of permissiveness, and honestely, yes, sometimes that is the product of laziness. From here on, I am not going to approve all of Mario’s comments. Too many are, as you point out, not helpful. I’ve weighed just ruling him out. He’s close to that. But I prefer, when possible, to allow people room to grow. He does make some good points here and there. If he can leave behind the urge to dominate and humiliate, he may put his knowledge to some use. I know that it does him no favor to sponser and unintentionally encourage his misbehavior.

  12. I took a look at Dale’s paper Constitution Trinitarianism. An Appraisal.

    I remain in wait of a response to my main objection, viz. how is CT not simply Modalism, OIOW, and with reference to Rea’s specific examples, how is it that IF the Kal El / Superman / Clark Kent analogy IS modalist (as explicitly affirmed by Rea in his paper The Trinity of 2009, p. 7/47) then the “Caryatid analogy” (piece of marble / statue / pillar) is not, a fortiori, modalist?

    In the meantime, here are my quick comments on the value of Dale’s “seven objections” to the CT model of the “trinity”.

    1. [CT is not trinitarian] See general objection above: if Modalism is NOT a satisfactory realization of the traditional-orthodox-creedal “trinity”, then, certainly, “CT is not trinitarian”.

    2. [CT implies polytheism and the falsity of monotheism] How so? Modalism is, by definition, NOT polytheistic (perhaps GT/ST is).

    3. [Objection from impossible qualitative differences] Rea’s attempted distinction within the (obviously same) object (say, Caryatid), on ground that …

    Surface erosion will destroy the statue without destroying the pillar. Internal corruption that preserves the surface but undermines the statue’s capacity to support the weight of a building will destroy the pillar but (if the statue is removed (Rea 2009, 418, 25/47)

    … is weak, NOT because “[i]f one could exist without the other, then they can’t be identical”, BUT because it implies change, even changes of different kind (surface erosion, internal corruption), whereas it is far from obvious that Rea (or Tuggy, for that matter) would include change in his “Godhead model”.

    4. [Objection: powers which aren’t] The least we can say is that Rea’s claims, and Tuggy’s objection, are inescapably tied to Aristotelian word-play on hylomorphism and dynamis vs. energeia (entelecheia), applied to the “trinity”. Hardly cogent …

    5. [Objection from divine aseity] On the rather dubious 7-step argument, I will simply say that, under CT, there is no reason that 3 applies to the “Son” any more than it does to the “Father” or the “Holy Spirit”, unless the Father is a formless “lump of potentiality”, which though, would have the immediate consequence that the three cannot possibly be co-equal.

    6. [Inconsistency with self-evident truths] With reference to Dale’s reflections and “extensions” to Christopher Hughes (2009, 302-303), methinks that Dale is playing fast and loose with as conceptually diverse notions as “individual” and “self”. For instance, if we posit …

    individual ? person ? consciousness
    self ? (spiritual) substance ? soul

    … then Moreland’s and Craig’s “Trinity Monotheism” (see their Cerberus analogy, in particular at (Trinity Monotheism Once More: A Response to Daniel Howard-Snyder, by William Lane Craig, @ reasonablefaith.org) is a perfect realization of a “co-equal, tri-personal” “trinity”, with the only limit that it doesn’t account for the creedal element of “generation” and “procession”: Moreland’s and Craig’s “trinity” just is. But, as already commented elsewhere, this is the very reason why Calvin, even if hard pressed under suspicion of “Arianism” (in particular by Pierre Caroli), never accepted to subscribe to any traditional creedal formulation of the “trinity” (whether conciliar or not), while he boldly affirmed the autotheotes (that is, approximately, the aseity) of the “Son”.

    BTW, for Karl Bath (“possibly the most influential theologian of the 20thcentury”) God is obviously ONE (personal) self in three “persons” that he calls modes.

    7. [reference of “God”] With reference to the alleged “non-ambiguity” of “God” in the NT, some theologians would deny that in a phrase like “God loved the world so much that he sent his only Son…” (John 3:16), “God” refers to the “Father”: they would claim that it refers to the “trinity”.

    OTOH, with reference to the alleged “ambiguity” of “God” in the OT, “trinitarians” would easily rebut that, in the OT, “God” is obviously ambiguous, otherwise the “trinity” would have been plain to see also for the Jews, which (except for some bizarre exceptions) it manifestly is not.

    As further by the bye comments, it would be interesting if Dale clarified what he means by affirming that the “trinity” cannot be explained because “it is a mystery, delivered to us by divine revelation”. This, of course, according to (unitarian) Dale is (should be) a mere projection onto scriptural revelation by “trinitarians”, so why does he bother making the point at all?

    As for explication, it would be interesting if Dale clarified what he means by affirming that, “As it has been developed, CT does provide an interpretation of the main creedal formulas which is specific and intelligible enough to be believed – at least, by those tutored in contemporary metaphysics”. Really? How would CT account for (creedal) “generation” and “spiration”? How would this claim be compatible with the previous claim that “[CT] fails as a Rational Reconstruction of creedal trinitarian claims”? What has being “tutored in contemporary metaphysics” to do with any of it?

    What sense does it make that CT would be “false, and known to be false by most people who entertain it”, YET it would be proposed as a valid “model of the trinity”. Surely such calembours only have currency among “analytic metaphysicians” …

    To end with, may I suggest that any doctrine of the “trinity” that claims that “any action of any member of the Trinity is an action of the three inseparably” should provide an explanation (if any at all) for these biblical facts: ONLY the Logos “became flesh” (sarx egeneto – John 1:14) and ONLY the Holy Spirit descended on the Apostles and filled them at Pentecost (Acts 2:1-4).

    MdS

    P.S. The most serious objection yet to CT (which, let’s not forget, stands and falls with the adequacy of the analogies of material constitutions) is, IMO, the one raised by William Craig Lane in his (Does the Problem of Material Constitution Illuminate the Doctrine of the Trinity? (Faith and Philosophy 22, 2005: 77-86), viz. that CT is, at best, a model for Modalism/Sabellianism/Patripassianism.

  13. “The doctrine itself, he thinks, is unquestionable, simply on the basis of the mainstream catholic tradition.”

    What’s the justification for prioritizing the *mainstream* catholic tradition? How could he think the doctrine is unquestionable “simple on the basis of the mainstream catholic tradition” when, arguably, it is at odds with the ecumenical creeds, and definitely not held by the majority of church fathers. If they were wrong, why couldn’t the mainstream be wrong? In fact, this claim seems so weak that I must have misunderstood what you meant by it!

  14. “may have encouraged anybody to abandon the “trinity”

    No one suggested this, Mario. Yes, he was a sort of trinitarian though, at least, he thought he was.

  15. Mario,

    1. trinities.org/dale. Upper right.

    2. No. But you are quite rude. And when someone points it out, you take pleasure in the fact that you have been rude. Classic troll.

    3. Your summary leaves out many things, such as their concept of constitution, their motivation for believing in such a thing, their concept of numerical sameness without identity, and so on. And I argue that the view is much more akin to ST, though they do intend it to be an alternative to both ST and LT as you have said. But I think that whole framework must go. I offer some half a dozen arguments against their view. You heap contempt on the theory and its authors.

  16. Hi Chad,

    If I recall, he doesn’t go much into them. I can’t remember what he says about the Swinburne-Davis type argument. I have a ms in my office – maybe I’ll look into it on Monday. The doctrine itself, he thinks, is unquestionable, simply on the basis of the mainstream catholic tradition. He is impatient with suggestions that the Bible doesn’t really imply it, rightly interpreted. But it seems to me that what’s governing his thinking, oddly enough, for an open theist, is the assumption that a good God would never allow the mainstream tradition to go awry on such a central point. Me, I think that is a very odd claim for a Protestant to make!

  17. P.S. In case you may still think that Dallas Willard said something else of relevance about the doctrine of the “trinity”, here is the link to ALL 16 web-pages including the word “trinity” at website dwillard.org.

    You may find of particular interest the presentation “Redeeming the Time in the Church”, frames #9 (By contrast: the “Great Commission”) and (in case you still have any doubt …) #10 (Three Parts of The Great Commission).

    Enjoy (cringe …) 😉

    MdS

  18. @ Dale [#7, June 1, 2013 at 12:44 pm]

    1. Please indicate how someone who is not a subscriber to “Philosophy and Theology ” (@ pdcnet.org) can get the “preprint version” of your paper Constitution Trinitarianism. An Appraisal.

    2. I obviously touch a raw nerve every time I get near lulu.com, don’t I? BTW, my comment was on the previous post, and I simply remarked that The apology of Theophilus Lindsey, M.A. on resigning the vicarage of Catterick, Yorkshire is available for free at Google eBooks. I am sure the readers of your blog don’t mind …

    3. About Brower and Rea, instead of pleading for their seriousness, why don’t you take issue with the way I quickly … er … appraised Michael Rea’s paper (The Trinity) at comment #2?

    MdS

  19. Dale,

    Do you know if Hasker’s new book will go into philosophical arguments *for* the trinity (i.e., reasons to think that is God exists, God is more than one person)?

  20. James,

    Thanks for the very interesting comments.

    ” Once Christ is put in the 2nd place of the Trinity and made into God, they can no longer see him as an example to follow. The non-Trinitarians who deny Jesus’ deity and believe only the Father is God (as opposed to Marcionitish type non-Trinitarians who make Jesus the only God) clearly see Jesus’ example as something to follow and something followable, because he was just a man in their view. But to the Trinitarians he is God, and therefore, we can’t be like him, so don’t even try. They deny that Jesus left us an example to follow.”

    I wouldn’t agree with that last statement, but I do agree that evangelicals, in their zeal to assert that “Jesus is God” (which they usually seem to understand as Jesus and God being one self) do to a large extent remove him for serious consideration as a model for us to imitate. They end up reading him as someone who spouts nice sounding things which everyone knows are not true, and which realistically could not be obeyed. But he was of course deadly serious! Dallas Willard’s The Divine Conspiracy helped me to see this, and the point you make was a part of my own decision to give up on the trinitarian project. The main point, though, was coming to see it as poorly motivated, and even inconsistent with the NT. Another point was realizing that true discipleship really had nothing to do with affirming the ecumenical creeds – whether found in Catholics, Protestants, unitarians, or wherever.

    I do think that Christians, to the extent they can, need to learn what the other side thinks and why, and to respectually engage in debate. What you care about, you care enough to argue about – with respect. Quick to listen, slow to speak, and slow to anger.

  21. MdS,

    Yes, one can buy the official version of my CT paper, but the preprint version is free, as the post says.

    Your blog manners need some improvement. You should stop the insults to the effect that Tuggy is making a lot of money from all of this. From the books @ lulu.com, I get an average of $5 / month – total! It is clear that you’ve read and learned a lot on this topic. But people will tune out, as soon as the nasty attitude and words start to flow.

    About Brower and Rea – I can assure you that their theory is perfectly serious. They are both long-time Christians, who take their faith seriously, and try to serve the Christian community with their skills. They work hard, and in good faith. And they don’t flaunt their learning or their intelligence – which both have in great measure. The same is true of most of the other theorists I have discussed here since 2006. I can assure you, they get little love from the secular academy for publishing on these topics! They are much more serious than someone who takes to the internet to throw around insults and tries to enhance his own image by heaping contempt on his fellow Christians.

  22. James,

    I am afraid that your comment is too full of common sense and of genuine piety to make much impact in a blog whose “corporate mission” is to discuss “theories about the father, son and holy spirit”, however improbable and far-fetched they may be.

    Let me just comment, though, on few of the points you have raised.

    1. It is perfectly true that the mutual role of “father” and “son” in the “trinity” is “contrary to the whole notion behind what it means to be a father”. Nevertheless, however improbable and contrived any variant of the “trinity” may be, the “trinity” is not, per se, self-contradictory. And the advocates of the “trinity” would promptly tell you that the father-son image is an image, not to be made too much of, and that the thee “persons” are “relations” within the “one god”. What really matters and makes the difference, ultimately, is that, for people endowed with intelligence, integrity and even just a smattering of historical knowledge, the “trinity” has not a speck of scriptural support.

    2. Although there is no evidence that the “Trinitarian Baptismal Formula” at Matt 28:19 (“… baptizing them in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit”) is an interpolation (ALL extant MSS have it), nevertheless there is no doubt that that formula, with its reference to the “name” (Grk onoma) in the singular (NOT “names” in the plural), strongly hints to the equality of authority, under the same “name”, of the three. The authoritative Bible de Jérusalem, while its doesn’t explicitly say that the “Trinitarian Baptismal Formula” was interpolated, clearly says that “it is possible that this formula reflects, in its precision, the liturgical usage established later in the primitive community” (see at p. 1730, footnote c), because the Book of Acts suggests that, in the earliest stages of Christianity, Baptism was administered ONLY “in the name of Jesus Christ” (see Acts 2:38 etc.)

    3. I fully agree with you that “[o]nce Christ is put in the 2nd place of the Trinity and made into God, they can no longer see him as an example to follow”. OTOH, I do not agree that the right approach to the Bible is to go overboard in the other direction and deny, purely and simply, Jesus divinity and (literal) sonship from God, the Father Almighty. There is no amount of “metaphorical interpretation” (unless it is prejudiced and dishonest, that is) that can allow to simply get around the obvious meaning of Matt 1:18, Luke 1:35 and of John 1:14. Also, while the Letter to the Hebrews says that Jesus was “made like his brothers and sisters in every respect” (Heb 2:17) and that he “has been tempted in every way just as we are, yet without sin” (Heb 4:15), it is illicit to draw from Hebrews the further implication that Jesus could not sin. The whole point is that he was in such intimate communion with God, the Father, his father, that to sin, for him, would have meant not only to go against the Father, but, more immediately, against himself.

    4. If we believe that Isaiah 53 and Psalm 22 do speak prophetically of the Messiah, then there is no doubt that to die for the sins of his brother was indeed inscribed in the mission of the Messiah – obviously from a Christian perspective, NOT a Jewish perspective. Does this mean that we are authorized to say that “Jesus was just a God-man come to commit suicide for our salvation”? Not in the least! Not only one should explain, first, how and why the “suicide” of a God-man would bring salvation, but, most of all, Jesus’ self-sacrifice was NOT (most obviously NOT) a “suicide”, but, rather, the acceptance that the obedience to the mission given him by God, the Father Almighty –that is to announce and witness the Kingdom of God on earth– with the ONLY “weapons” of Truth and Love (and, to some extent, miracles), would inevitably (NOT necessarily) lead to his rejection by the PTB of his own people, the Israelites, and the cracking down on him of the occupying force, the Romans. Unto death …

    … but God raised him from the dead (Acts 2:24; 3:26; 13:30) …

    MdS

  23. From just a philosophical sense, thinking about God as self-existent and always existing, the Trinity is pure nonsense. It easy enough to hold that God just always existed. But once you have to have him have always existed as Three persons, One the Father of a Second, and yet they both always existed (contrary to the whole notion behind what it means to be a father) the whole thing falls apart.

    “So what? Paul says let no man spoil you after vain philosophy but only after Christ.” Yeah, he does say that. And I can see why Trinitarians would approve of such a statement! Just check your brain at the door and believe in the Trinity because the Johanine Comma says so! Whoops! What do you mean the Johanine Comma is now almost universally acknowledged as an interpolation? Hmmm… Ok, so check your brain at the door and believe in the Trinity because the Great Commission says so. Ah, but the Great Comission may command baptism in the name of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, yet interestingly never says all three are God. Nor indeed does Paul who seems at best to be a Duitarian. “I would not have you ignorant of the mystery of God, both of the Father and of the Son.” Hey, he forgot the Holy Spirit!

    But the argument that ultimately convinced me against the Trinity is simply the fact that Trinitarians are so concerned with Trinitarian orthodoxy but not morality. Once Christ is put in the 2nd place of the Trinity and made into God, they can no longer see him as an example to follow. The non-Trinitarians who deny Jesus’ deity and believe only the Father is God (as opposed to Marcionitish type non-Trinitarians who make Jesus the only God) clearly see Jesus’ example as something to follow and something followable, because he was just a man in their view. But to the Trinitarians he is God, and therefore, we can’t be like him, so don’t even try. They deny that Jesus left us an example to follow. No, Jesus was just a God-man come to commit suicide for our salvation: there’s no moral example there; nothing to see here; move along. Plus, if he was God, he accomplished nothing in living a sinless life, since he was forced by the necessity of his divine nature to be sinless! And so, he is no hero, and has no true accomplishment. He was more like a robot. Thus, not only is it ultimately denied in Trinitarianism that we should even attempt to follow Jesus’ example, but Jesus himself did not live sinlessly by a manly courageous effort of his will striving against temptation, but just robotically in conformance with the divine nature which is incapable of sinning. The Trinity doctrine, no matter which type you choose, ultimately robs Christianity of all moral force.

  24. Difficult to accept that the gist of a two minutes appraisal is about as revevant as a two years long appraisal? 😉

  25. errata => corrige
    ‘thelogical problem of the Trinity’ => ‘the logical problem of the Trinity’
    (whether of the subordinationist or, worse, of the egalitarian flavor) => REMOVE

  26. Quick dénoument

    For those who are too stingy to buy Dal Tuggy’s online paper (a buck is a buck is a buck …) or even too lazy to confront Michael Rea’s paper, I can sum up the gist of the latter for you.

    Various approaches have been proposed and discussed, especially, over the last century, to get around what MR says is commonly referred to by philosophers as ‘thelogical problem of the Trinity’ and by theologians as ‘the threeness-oneness problem’. Essentially there are two already well known approaches, and a new one.

    Greek (or Eastern) Trinitarianism (GT – commonly identified with Social Trinitarianism), in spite of the relative popularity it enjoys, is dangerously close to tritheism (whether of the subordinationist or, worse, of the egalitarian flavor)

    Latin (or Western) Trinitarianism (LT), while essentially the dominant form of the “trinity” in the West (both Catholic and Protestant), is haunted by its closeness to modalism (whether of the subordinationist or the egalitarian flavor). You may be interested to know that MR provides this … er … cartoonish analogy for modalism: Superman and Clark Kent are different manifestations of Kal El (the Kryptonian who is both Superman and Clark Kent), or different modes in which Kal El appears.

    To overcome the shortcomings of both a.m. models, Jeffrey Brower and Michael Rea, in their ingenuity, have come up with a brand new model, the “Material Constitution and the Trinity” (2005). If you want to trust me (otherwise check for yourselves), the core idea and analogy is that, as a piece of marble in the form of a statue can be (also and at the same time) a pillar (think of the Caryatides), analogously, the same God-stuff can be Senior and (also and at the same time) Junior and Spook.

    Is this serious?

    Nah … this is just the kind of game theologians/philosophers (preferably with a safe tenure ;)) indulge in …

    MdS

  27. For those who may not feel immediately inclined to spend the required 15 bucks to purchase Dale Tuggy’s “appraisal” paper on Constitution Trinitarianism, without knowing first what he is “appraising”, here is a link to Michael Rea’s paper The Trinity (In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology ed. Thomas P. Flint & Michael Rea, Oxford University Press, 2009 – The present version includes a clarification at note 25).

    MdS

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