Search Results for: richard swinburne

Richard of St. Victor 7 – The Same Divine Substance (Scott)

June 27, 2009June 29, 2009

Up to this point in Book 3 Richard has told us several things about love (caritas). We have wondered at his saying there isn’t a perfectly good person if he doesn’t love. We have sorted through some necessary conditions for love such that we wonder whether a perfectly good person p must love another person q if p is to be perfectly good. You might say we’ve been contemplating some divine ethics, or aesthetics, or whatever.

In the previous post I suggested how we might interpret what Richard means by saying (two) divine persons are equal and similar to one another, namely the divine persons have the same disposition of love and the same acts of love (see [T4’] and [T5’]). In the next part of Richard’s argument he returns to his metaphysics of the divine substance which he discussed in Books 1 and 2.Read More »Richard of St. Victor 7 – The Same Divine Substance (Scott)

Richard of St. Victor 4 – Charity is shared by equals (JT)

June 2, 2009

STAGE 3. Next, Richard tries to establish that God can only charitably love an equal. He introduces this idea by raising the following objection: if God must direct his charitable love at a distinct person, then why couldn’t he direct his charitable love at a created person? That would satisfy T5 from the last post, so that should be enough to perfect God’s charitable disposition, right?

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 22 – part 1

January 23, 2010January 24, 2015

Has Richard, after these 21 chapters so far of Book III of his On the Trinity (De Trinitate) only succeeded in proving that there are at least three gods? In chapter 22, Richard argues for a negative answer.

First, he refers back to the doctrine of divine simplicity, which is common coin for medieval theists, even, surprisingly, for trinitarians. This needs explaining nowadays – theists now tend to think of God’s nature as something he has, and of God as having, and not being, his attributes. Moreover, we tend to think that God has many attributes.

For a primer on divine simplicity, I can do no better than Bill Vallicella:

[According to this doctrine] God is radically unlike creatures in that he is devoid of any complexity or composition, whether physical or metaphysical. Besides lacking spatial and temporal parts, God is free of matter/form composition, potency/act composition, and existence/essence composition. There is also no real distinction between God as subject of his attributes and his attributes. God is thus in a sense requiring clarification identical to each of his attributes, which implies that each attribute is identical to every other one. God is omniscient, then, not in virtue of instantiating or exemplifying omniscience — which would imply a real distinction between God and the property of omniscience — but by being omniscience. And the same holds for each of the divine omni-attributes: God is what he has. As identical to each of his attributes, God is identical to his nature. And since his nature or essence is identical to his existence, God is identical to his existence. (William Vallicella, “Divine Simplicity”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Richard starts ch. 22 by gesturing back at book I of De Trinitate – his point is that this divine being/essence/nature common to the three is utterly simple. Yet he realizes that this by itself won’t soothe the concern about monotheism. How can we rule out that there are three gods, each of which has is an utterly simple, composition free being? Then he hits on an additional argument.Read More »Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 22 – part 1

Richard of St. Victor 8 – A Proposed Constitutional Trinitarian Taxonomy (Scott)

July 14, 2009July 14, 2009

Richard of St. Victor is well known for talking about love, and how awesome it is. It might surprise a few people who have only read the popular English translation of Book 3 (the love/ethics? book) that On the Trinity contains six books. The English translation has brought attention to what some contemporary (continental-esque) philosophers would call Richard’s ‘erotics’. What remains to be seen is whatever he says in Books 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6. In this post I’d like to focus on one theme in these other books, which I’ll call Richard’s Constitutional Latin Trinitarianism (= CLT). At the start I must say that I am claiming that Richard suggests a constitutional model of the Trinity and not that he straightforwardly proposes one. At least, Richard can be read to propose such a model–after all, certain later scholastics like Henry of Ghent seem to have read Richard in that way.

Richard of St. Victor 5 – Evaluation of the argument thus far (JT)

June 7, 2009

"Have you seen this baby? We're dead serious, you know."

In the last three posts, I explained Richard’s argument for why there must be two distinct persons who charitably love each other. Here I want to raise some objections to three of Richard’s claims.

Richard of St. Victor 2 – God’s goodness requires charity (JT)

May 16, 2009May 15, 2009

“Listen Luke, Claudia and I have something to tell you. This comes from a good place, because we love you. It’s the 1980s now. Less gel, more blow dry.“

STAGE 1. In this stage, Richard wants to show that God’s perfect goodness somehow requires that God is perfectly charitable. I say ‘somehow requires’ because the logical relation here is not clear. Richard is saying ‘God’s goodness _____ perfect charity’, but what fills in the blank? Is it ‘entails’, ‘presupposes’, or some other logical relation?

Here’s the actual quotation, with the particular claims marked in brackets.

‘[T1] there is [in God] fullness and perfection of all goodness. [T2] However, where there is fullness of all goodness, true and supreme charity cannot be lacking. [T3] For nothing is better than charity; nothing is more perfect than charity’.

Let’s look at T1, T2, and T3 in turn.

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Chapter 14, Part 2 (JOSEPH)

January 6, 2010January 7, 2010

I (and so we) took a break from the Richard posts. But we now return. Perhaps at some point I’ll blog on some conferences I’ve been to: the Metaphysics of the Incarnation conference at the University of Oxford last September. And I might share a very brief talk I gave on the Trinity at a local church last October. But for now, on to the main attraction.

Richard has already argued in various ways that if there is so much as one divine person, there are at least three divine persons. But the arguments have all been a bit here and there. So to make the reasons even more evident, he plans to gather them all up into one. So here it is:

Suppose there is only one divine person: P.

1) Then P doesn’t share his greatness.

2) Compare two situations. In the first, P is the only divine person. In the second, P is not the only divine person; there is another: Q. In the second situation, P and Q love each other and P has the pleasure that love brings. So in the first situation, P lacks in eternity not only such love but also such pleasure.

3) Anyone supremely good shares her greatness. (Not so to share is to retain something greedily. But anyone supremely good does nothing greedily.)

4) Anyone supremely happy has such pleasure. (Not to have such pleasure is not to have an abundance of pleasure. But anyone supremely happy has an abundance of pleasure.)

5) P is supremely good and happy.

So if there is at least one divine person, there are at least two divine persons.Read More »Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Chapter 14, Part 2 (JOSEPH)

Richard of St. Victor 10 – Perfect Happiness Requires Perfect Love (Scott)

August 10, 2009August 10, 2009

After his initial argument from perfect love for a Trinity of persons, Richard tries to support it by a brief argument from perfect happiness. Here I wish to summarize what I take to be this confirming argument from the plenitude of happiness. [Keep in mind that ‘plenitude’ has that particular meaning of a property of a substance that is not from another substance, but all other substances are from it.] Richard argues that if we are committed to the claim that God is perfectly happy, then we should also be committed to the claim that God is a Trinity of persons. Read More »Richard of St. Victor 10 – Perfect Happiness Requires Perfect Love (Scott)

Richard of St. Victor 9 – Perfect Love Requires Three Persons (Scott)

July 28, 2009July 28, 2009

In this post I’d like to focus on Richard’s initial argument for why God must be a Trinity of persons. Thus far in his argument he has argued for two divine persons, and now adds a further line of argument to show that God is in fact a Trinity and not a Binity of persons. Why must God be a Trinity of persons? Richard argues from his notion of perfect love.Read More »Richard of St. Victor 9 – Perfect Love Requires Three Persons (Scott)

Richard of St. Victor 11 – Response to the Argument From Love Thus Far (Scott)

August 16, 2009August 16, 2009

In three of the last four posts (Rick St. Vick 6, 7, 9, 10) I surveyed some of Richard of St. Victor’s arguments for why there must be at least three divine persons. (We’ve yet to see an argument for there aren’t more than three persons.) Here I’d like to respond to these, and to one JT’s responses too.Read More »Richard of St. Victor 11 – Response to the Argument From Love Thus Far (Scott)

Richard of St. Victor 6 – Supreme Love Only Among Equals, Again (Scott)

June 12, 2009June 27, 2009

Hey bro. I'm JR Ewing. (Forget Dynasty, Dallas - the best kind of city -is awesome.) Just because you don't love me doesn't mean I don't love you.

In De Trinitate Book 3.7 Richard summarizes some of what comes beforehand. We have learned that supreme goodness requires supreme love (i.e. supreme love is a necessary condition for supreme goodness), and that supreme love requires more than one person. If supreme love were only self-love, then the total state of affairs “one divine person has self-love” is not as perfect a state of affairs as another total state of affairs, namely “two persons have self-love, and each loves the other person.” Thus,

If there is supreme love, then there is a plurality of persons.

Likewise, Henry infers from what he takes to be the nature of supreme love to entail the equality of the persons in question.

If there is supreme love, then there is an equality of persons.

Below I try to explain just what all this means.

Richard of St. Victor 3 – Perfect charity must be directed at another person (JT)

May 20, 2009May 25, 2009

“Steven, let’s look over there and pretend like we don’t see that floating head.”

STAGE 2. In this stage, Richard tries to show that perfect charity must be directed at another person. Here’s the quotation:

‘no one is properly said to have charity on the basis of his own private love of himself. And so it is necessary for love to be directed toward another for it to be charity’.

the evolution of my views on the Trinity – part 5

February 27, 2015September 4, 2017

Thinking about Trinity in grad school, reading Richard Swinburne’s The Christian God.

Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 4 – the cooperation involved in procession or spirating

August 29, 2007August 29, 2007

Dale’s Swinburne Trininty chart, version 2.0. (or 1.1 – whatever) Thanks to reader (and Swinburne student) Joseph Jedwab for the correction. He points out: [Swinburne] wants to avoid the idea that the Spirit’s existence is causally overdetermined [i.e. that it has two complete causes, either of which would alone suffice]. But he also wants to avoid the idea that each actively only partly causes the… Read More »Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 4 – the cooperation involved in procession or spirating

Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 12 – Rational Reinterpretation and theologians

July 18, 2008September 4, 2017

Most theologians, even ones who focus on the Trinity, seem completely uninformed about important work in philosophical theology.

Boyd on Incarnation

February 1, 2014February 1, 2014

Pastor-theologian Greg Boyd has been theologizing about the Incarnation recently. He tips his hand right at the start – he’s going kenoticist. Boyd’s reasoning, I think, can be illustrated like this. Consider this inconsistent triad: A fully divine being is essentially omniscient. A human being is not essentially omniscient. A fully divine being can be a human being. Why believe 1? Perfect being theology, and… Read More »Boyd on Incarnation

Craig’s a priori argument for a three-self Trinity

July 20, 2013July 20, 2013

We’ve covered this before. Craig slurs the argument, making the conclusion a bit unclear. The point is not really that a three-self trinitarian theology is just somehow superior to a unitarian theology. Rather, the point is supposed to be that the concept of a perfect being who is a self collapses into incoherence; it is perfect, yet (the idea is) lacks a feature any perfect… Read More »Craig’s a priori argument for a three-self Trinity

Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 3 – functional monotheism

August 29, 2007September 9, 2014

How the three are tightly functionally unified, in Swinburne’s view.

(See below for the interpretation.)

Last time we looked at Swinbure’s suggested reading of the creeds. They can’t he says, be charitably read as holding that in the same sense there’s only one divinity, and that there’s three. Swinburne comes down on the side of three. Like all social trinitarians, he’s attracted to a vision of the Trinity as being a loving community, three eternal and perfect, spirits, three selves, enjoying one another’s company, living in communion with one another, and working together in all they do. In short, he wants to say there are personal relationships internal to God – and this implies that there are persons – subjects of experience, thought, and action – in God.Read More »Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 3 – functional monotheism

two new papers published online

May 13, 2014

At the Journal of Analytic Philosophy, and at the Journal of Biblical Unitarianism. Thanks to the editors of both journals for their good work. The first paper continues the discussion with Hasker of my “Divine Deception” arguments against three-self Trinity theories. I discuss there the monotheism of Isaiah. Then I get into interesting arguments by historical unitarians, such as Nye, Clarke, and Worcester, even comparing… Read More »two new papers published online

Eastern SCP report (Dale)

March 16, 2010March 16, 2010

Call me a satisfied customer – I had a great time at the Eastern Regional Conference of the Society of Christian Philosophers this weekend. Thanks to Patrick Toner and Wake Forest University for their great hospitality! The program was very strong. To mention just a few sessions: Paul Herrick present a paper analysing and endorsing Richard of St. Victor’s main argument for the Trinity, and… Read More »Eastern SCP report (Dale)

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